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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
What is to be presented here is an argument on 
behalf of a technique of teaching. The technique is~ 6 ~<- ~,~J 
~UiqUE for conductllrg discussions, and I -\nl-u .... t...--..... t~o;:---• ..,J/( 
show why it should be freely used by teachers. I refer 
to the technique I propose as "honest questioning," and 
immediately acknowledge that I was not the originator 
of that name or o( the ~echn~qu~ itself. 
Ill\ ~ V !C.\ r~ &ch~ 1 ( 
will be discussed~ in Chapter V. 
The technique 
At this 
point it is enough to say that an honest question is 
one to which the teacher does not know the answe7 and 
-rov~~v 
to which the student can_giye A correct answer. Honest 
questioning can be seen from many po~nt, of view, as 
~~ ... r-...eP 
will be shown, but it should be ~ft, first of all, 
from the point of view of the teacher. From that point 
of view, honest questioning is simply an efficient way 
to do what many teachers believe they ought to do at ~ 
~ the beginning of a school year or before they begin 
1 
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That is, it is a yay to find out 
the student is. 
I claim that honest questioning can be widely 
used. It can be used in science or humanities courses, 
and with young or old students. In all cases it will 
produce the same sorts of e~ects. But I provide no 
~mpirical evidence to support this general claim, nor 
, he more specific claims I make--nothing other than the 
. •. 
tra«script of a class, which is presented as Chapter 
Although I do not present an empirical study, the 
ideas for which I argue did not arise out of consider-
ation of theory, but out of classroom practice. From 
teaching young children I learned the importance of 
listening and of watching for opportunities to get 
students to see a problem. The experience with younger 
students made it difficult for me to try to teach older 
students using the traditional lecture, and I 
discovered that they, too, responded to honest 
questions. The support I do provide for these claims 
base~ on classroom experience derives in part from 
theory. I make the assumption that if various 
theories, initiated by different concerns, point to 
similar ways of treating other persons, there may be 
some merit in the practices. I also assume that if the 
effects claimed for certain practices are predictable 
from and explicable by a number of theories, it is 
reasonable to suppose the effects are not wholly 
imaginary. I find additional support for my claims 
from another source. Even if it were established that 
the effects of honest questioning were what I claim, 
and even if the effects were adequately explained, it 
would have to be shown that those effects were 
justified by reference to the proper ends of teaching. 
I will show that the effects of honest questioning can 
be so justified, and, therefore, honest questioning 
itself is a justifiable practice. If the present 
ar ument is sufficiently convincing, others may find it 
worthwhile to expend the enormous amounts of effort 
required to gath~r quantifiable data. 
Arguments for and against discussion are usually 
presented in the context of arguments for and against 
other methods of teaching, most especially the methods 
of recitation and lecture. These arguments, culled 
from the literature of the last hundred years, are 
presented in Chapter II. In Chapter II, I also 
acknowledge the similarities between the honest 
questioning and some other techniques of discussion and 
or questioning, and briefly note the differences 
between my arguments and the arguments of those who 
have proposed these similar techniques. 
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Since honest questioning results in a kind of 
discussion that will be unfamiliar to most, Chapter III 
consists of a transcription taken from one two and 
three quarter hour class session. There was no partic-
ular reason for choosing this class or_ this group of 
students. When the time came to make a tape, I did so 
in the next class that came up. Chapter IV provides an 
informal description of the discussion, emphasizing 
those characteristics which are typical of discussions 
led by a teacher who uses honest questions. 
It is in Chapter V that I spell out my assump-
tions about the proper ends of teaching and show why it 
is reasonable to expect that honest questioning will 
contribute to their achievement. I claim that ration-
ality is the end of teaching, and define rationality as 
including both the abili~y to reason in the narrower 
sense of reason and the ability to recognize and act in 
accordance with proper ends. (Although I believe 
honest questioning could enable persons to achieve both 
parts of rationality, the transcript I present shows 
honest questioning employed only to improve the 
student's ability to reason in the narrower sense. I 
cannot justify this omission. I explain it by saying 
that sin~e schools have power over students' futures, I 
have usually chosen not to challenge their enrollment 
4 
in class too vigorously by pressing them to consider 
why they have done so.) 
If asked, few teachers would deny that 
rationality is at least one proper end of teaching. 
But having accepted the rationality of the student as 
an end, a teacher may be uncertain how to produce it. 
I am proposing that honest questioning is a means to 
that end, but that it also may be conceived as a means 
to a less grand, more immediately comprehensible goal. 
For honest questioning is a sensible way for a teacher 
to find out where a student is and it is, as stated on 
the first page, ·a truism of teaching that the teacher 
o u g·h t to be g i n w he r e the s t u d en t i s • A t each e r can u s e 
honest questioning to achieve her immediate goal of 
finding out where the student is and be confident that 
in doing so she will be fostering his rationality. (1) 
In Chapter VI, I show that honest questioning can 
be expected to contribute to the student's coming to 
"know that" and to "know how." I take no particular 
position regarding the nature of propositional 
knowledge as a whole, claiming only that "knowing that" 
depends at least on the individual's knowing how to 
justify a belief. Epistemologists differ regarding the 
nature of propositional knowing, but they do agree that 
some conceptions of it are mistaken. I assume that 
5 
whatever passes for teaching should not derive from 
those clearly mistaken ideas about knowing but should 
rather be consistent with whatever approaches a current 
consensus regarding necessary conditions of knowing. 
Chapters V and VI include attempts to justify the 
honest questioning as a method of teaching. Chapters 
VII and VIII offer explanations of its effects. In 
Chapter VII it is shown how the results of honest 
questioning could be explained in terms of portions of 
Piagetian theory. I make no pretense of evaluating 
that theory as a whole, and do not wish to suggest that 
the truth of my claims depends on the adequacy of that 
' theory any more than I wish to suggest that the 
adequacy of that theory guarantees the worth of my 
proposal. I simply wish to show how my proposal that a 
student can best learn to reason with words by tryin& 
to reason with words is consistent with the work of 
Piaget. My proposal is consistent with Piaget's claim 
that children must act to learn, and consistent with 
his belief in the necessity of cognitive conflict for 
development. My emphasis on a verbal technique is 
obviously consistent with Piaget's early work, and can 
be interpreted as being consistent with much of his 
later work. I agree with Piaget that we do not learn 
to do by being told. I agree that we must learn by 
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trying and being corrected by the environment. We 
learn to ride a bicycle by getting on it and adjusting 
our responses as necessary. We learn to use words by 
trying to use them. But the analogy with the bicycle 
does not tell the whole story. For skill at using 
words is a social skill. As we learn to fence not by 
going through the motions in solitude but by responding 
to a skillful partner, we will learn to use words 
intelligibly by trying to make ourselves understood to 
a skillful partner. 
Chapter VII aligns honest questioning with one 
theory of cognitive development, and Chapter VIII 
aligns honest questioning with a therapeutic model of 
communication~ I have chosen ti show the similarities 
and differences between the techniques of honest 
questioning and the client-centered therapeutic 
techniques of Carl Rogers. There are several reasons 
for focusing on Rogers' work. Despite the lack of 
conceptual clarity in his writing, I found his ideas 
stimulating when I began to teach. Rogers himself 
attempted to employ his ideas in the classroom, and so 
did many teachers during the 1960's who made efforts to 
improve the emotional climate of classrooms. While 
Rogers' ideas felt right to those who tried to apply 
them, they also appeared to be incomplete and Chapter 
7 
VIII suggests addenda to Rogers' formulation. The 
chapter, though critical, is in -part an effort to repay 
a debt. 
Chapter IX deals with some of the obvious 
objections to honest questioning. This concluding 
chapter also attempts to right the balance so that, in 
urging this particular method of teaching, I may not be 
sPen to be overstating the case for it. I try here to 
place honest questioning within the framework of other 
teaching activities and I note the relationship between 
honest questioning and the student's experience, 
between honest questioning and the acquisition of 
information. The very interesting question of 
appropriate methods of evaluating the effects of honest 
questioning as a researcher or a teacher is briefly 
considered. The chapter and the dissertation conclude 
with a few remarks on the practicality of honest 
questioning, and on the function of honest questioning 
as an ideal. 
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1. Throughout this dissertation I shall use 
feminine pronouns to refer to teachers, and masculine 
pronouns to refer to students. This is purely for the 
sake of readability. There are places where locutions 
of the sort "she/he" would lead to at least a moment's 
worth of puzzlement. 
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CHAPTER II 
A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF MAJOR TEACHING METHODS 
The Recitation 
Oral instruction in classrooms takes one of three 
forms: recitation, lecture, discussion. None of the 
three forms is entirely satisfactory as a teaching 
.method. The recitation, so common to primary 
instruction in particular, has been under attack at 
least since the time of Comenius in the seventeenth 
century. The attacks were intensified at the end of the 
nineteenth century, when critics of recitation were able 
to employ a new science, psychology, as a weapon against 
it. (1) William James, for example, acknowledged in 
Talks to Teachers on Psychology that "words, words, 
words must constitute a large part • • of what the 
human being has to learn," but he deplored the failure 
of the teacher to ensure that what was learned was 
understood. His illustrative story is well known: 
A friend of mine, visiting a school, was asked to 
examine a young class in geography. Glancing at the 
book, she said: "Suppose you should dig a hole in 
the ground, hundreds of feet deep, how should you 
find it at the bottom,--warmer or colder than on 
10 
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top?" None of the class replying, the teacher said: 
"I'm sure they know, but I think you don't ask the 
question quite rightly. Let me try." So, taking 
the book, she asked: "In what condition is the 
interior of the globe?" and received the immediate 
answer from half the class at once: "The interior of 
the globe is in a condition of igneous fusion." (2) 
James' object~on was not that children were required to 
learn such information, nor was it that the teacher 
would try to ascertain whether they had in fact learned 
such information. It was rather to recitation by the 
book, and it was an objection James made partly on the 
grounds of efficiency. If the information was to be 
readily available to students, then the teacher must 
change her tactics, and James urged her to "multiply the 
cues as much as possible • • don't always ask the 
question, for example, in the same way; don't use the 
same kind of data in numerical problems; vary • • as 
much as you can." (3) 
Writing in the same decade as James, Joseph Mayer· 
Rice amassed data from visits to twelve hundred 
classrooms, and used them to make the same point but 
with greater emphasis and fervor: 
The instruction throughout the school consists 
principally of grinding these answers verbatim into 
the minds of the children. The principal's ideal 
lies in giving each child the ability to answer 
without hesitation, upon leaving her school, every 
one of the questions formulated by her. In order to 
reach the desired end, the school has been converted 
into the most dehumanizing institution that I have 
ever laid eyes upon. (4) 
12 
Rice continued a few pages later, "in no single exercise 
is a child permitted to think. He is told just what to 
say and he is drilled not only in what to say, but also 
in the manner in which he must say it." (5) 
Rice•s expose, initially published as a series of 
articl~s in the periodical, The Forum, caused a stir, as 
muckraking is supposed to do. But apparently it did not 
cause teachers to change. In 1912, twenty years after 
Rice made his study, Romiett Stevens undertook a study 
of tHe use of questions in classrooms and found the same 
sorts being asked in the same way and with the same 
frequency. Her brief work is filled with examples and 
statistics. It was common for teachers to ask two or 
three questions per minute, hurling them as fast as 
students could reply. Stevens, as James and Rice before 
her, was displeased by what she found. (6) 
The studies of Rice and of Stevens bracket the 
time of John Dewey•s most intense efforts to reform 
education. If his labors had so small a salutary effect 
on classroom procedures as a whole, perhaps it is not 
altogether surprising that recitation in unacceptable 
form, the form described here, is still to be found in 
schools. Teachers today are, possibly, more concerned 
than teachers in the late nineteenth century to be 
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friendly to children, and most would reject the extreme 
rigidity of the teacher immortalized by James. 
Furthermore, teachers now may not know the term 
"recitation" as the name of a method, much less think of 
themselves as using it. But, if the recitation method 
can be taken to consist essentially of the teacher 
posing questions to which she expects the student to 
give a particular answer which she will then evaluate, 
then teachers do use recitation and do so extensively. 
(7) 
Arno A. Bellack and his team observed contemporary 
~lassrooms and reported that recitation provided the 
basic pattern of classroom interaction. The recitation 
"started with the teacher asking a question, which a 
pupil answered, • • (and concluded with) the teacher's 
reaction to or rating of the pupil's response." (8) 
They .suggest a possible rationale for this typical 
procedure: 
From another point of view, teachers may assume 
that students 'learn by doing.' Their aim would be, 
therefore, to stimulate and guide the 'doing' by 
repeated solicitations. From this point of view, 
classroom discourse may be seen as a rehearsal of 
cognitive processes, or in short, an opportunity to 
practice thinking as viewed by these teachers. 
Since thinking begins with a problem, one way for 
the teacher to encourage pupils to think is to pose 
a problem in the form of a question. Thus, the aim 
of teaching is to stimulate and shape the pupil's 
cognitive responses. The teacher stimulates and 
directs the response by posing a problem that 
initiates the pupil's thinking; that is, he asks a 
question that requires an answer. The teacher 
further modifies this response by his subsequent 
reactions. (9) 
Bellack and his colleagues have provided a 
generous interpretation of the function of recitation. 
If the passage quoted cannot be read as an enthusiastic 
endorsement of the recitation method, it is, at least 
not an attack. Richard Hyman, one of Bellack's col-
leagues, does, elsewhere, explicitly endorse the use of 
14 
recitation while noting its dangers. He writes that the 
greatest strength of the method is that the "teacher can 
quickly get direct feedback from the students, and that 
the teacher can give prompt responses to the students' 
remarks." (10) Hyman cautions, however, that the 
recitation is to be used for "elaboration and expansion 
of ideas--rather than to judge or bludgeon students • 
the recitation method has great potential for creating 
a threatening situation for the student • • any 
situation is threatening where someone is constantly 
being evaluated ••• " (11) Hyman does not object to 
evaluation and states his position clearly: "The teacher 
must focus on diagnosis and commentary. This does not 
imply the elimination of evaluation, for surely the 
student needs to be encouraged and praised for his 
achievements. He even needs to be reprimanded at times 
15 
for poor performances." (12) 
Hyman insists that evaluation is an essential part 
of the recitation, and in any case, when the teacher is 
looking for a particular answer, it is likely that her 
response will tend to be in the form of an evaluation. 
But the unforeseen effect of constant evaluation by the 
teacher, no matter how kindly it is done, may be that 
the student gradually comes to assume that the final 
authority is neither reason nor the methods of inquiry, 
but the teacher or the textbook. This is a serious 
objection to raise against recitation. A yet more 
serious objection is that recitation as it is practiced 
tends to reduce knowledge to collections of information. 
Unfortunately, there are those who would not see this 
reduction as an objectionable result of recitation, but 
rather as a point in favor of it. Benjamin Bloom's 
well-known study of teachers' educational objectives 
gives credence to this claim. Bloom based his 
conclusion that the primary goal of most teachers is, in 
effect, the transmission of information, on the fact 
that most of the questions teachers ask require little 
more of students than the recall of information. (13) 
Teachers emphasize knowledge (by which Bloom means 
information or what is passed off as information) "as an 
educational objective out of all proportion to its 
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usefulness." (14) Bloom hoped that his taxonomy would 
stimulate teaching aimed at the development of higher 
level cognitive processes. He hoped teachers would ask 
questions requiring students to interpret, to apply, to 
analyze, to synthesize, and to evaluate what they had 
learned. However, were they to do so, the objectionable 
features of recitation might well be retained. For 
though a teacher could not look for verbatim answers if 
she asked the student to apply information, she could 
still look for one answer in particular, could still 
think it appropriate to evaluate the student's reply 
simply as correct or incorrect, as good or bad. 
Two objections have be~n raised to the method of 
recitation: that it may fail to foster students' ability 
to evaluate sources of information, and that it can 
convey the impression that growth of knowledge is 
essentially the acquisition of information. There is no 
need to detail the grounds for rejection of the method 
of recitation any further here. But before turning 
attention to the method of the lecture, I have a final 
observation to make. Insofar as the teacher adopts the 
suggestions of Hyman ("focusses on diagnosis and 
commentary") and of Bloom (asks questions requiring 
higher level cognitive skills) she will be moving, 
however little, along a line from recitation toward 
discussion. 
The Lecture 
As the recitation has traditionally been the 
preferred method of te•chin~ younger students, the 
lecture has been the most commonly used method of 
instruction for older students. 
The lecture, like the recitation, has changed in 
form over the long centuries of its use. In medieval 
17 
times, when books were expensive, the lecture might have 
been just what the etymology of the word sugge~ts--a 
reading from a book. It might also have been a summary 
of a book. (15) Today a lecture might provide a summary 
of the required reading, emphasizing what the instructor 
thinks has greatest significance, or it may provide 
background for the reading. More rarely, a teacher 
might use a lecture as an opportunity to present her 
ideas and interpretations to an audience. In all of 
these cases, the primary purpose of the lecture may be 
said to be the transmission of information. (16) 
The lecture antedates by many centuries those 
techniques of printing which made inexpensive books 
possible. When printed matter was not readily avail-
able, the lecture method of transmitting information was 
clearly justified on the grounds of efficiency. The 
lecture might be justified today on the grounds of 
18 
efficiency in some circumstances: as, for example, when 
a teacher is presenting her own new ideas to an audience 
and has no facilities for duplicating notes cheaply. 
But oral transmission is not efficient compared to 
transmission through print and it is, therefore, odd 
that the lecture is such a common form of instruction 
today. It is odd precisely because many teachers and 
students, however mistakenly, do think of teaching as 
essentially transmitting information. If that is the 
goal, there are better ways to achieve it. Jean Piaget, 
not an enthusiast of the cultural transmission model of 
learning, writes: 
The sentimental and natural worriers have been 
saddened by the fact that schoolmasters can be 
replaced by machines. In my view, on the other 
hand, these machines have performed at least one 
great service for us, which is to demonstrate beyond 
all possible doubt the mechanical character of the 
schoolmaster's function as it is conceived by 
traditional teaching methods: if the ideal of that 
method is merely to elicit correct repetition of 
what has been correctly transmitted, then it goes 
without saying that a machine can fulfill these 
conditions correctly. (17) 
The lecture is inefficient both because it 
presents information more slowly than most can read and 
more quickly than most can transcribe. Those who love 
the lecture would not be put off by such an objection. 
Though they may embrace a transmission of information 
model of education, and thus, presumably, value 
efficiency, they would argue that the lecture arouses 
the interest of the student more effectively than the 
19 
printed word does. Hyman states that the arousal of the 
interest of the student in the subject is one of the 
most important functions of the lecture. It would be 
foolish to deny that if one must lecture one should try 
to keep the interest of the students. But it would be 
difficult to sustain the claim that a lecture is 
inherently capable of arousing greater interest than a 
book can arouse. One might wonder whether a person 
whose interest in geology was not aroused by the printed 
version of "On a Piece of Chalk," would be any more 
interested in geology after hearing Thomas Henry Huxley 
deliver that lecture, even though one might concede it 
likely that the lecture might prove more entertaining. 
(18) Whether the entertainment value of the lecture has 
educational significance is the question, to which 
Theodore M. Greene's comments on excitement will serve 
for now as an answer: "Excitement is relatively easy to 
arouse, both in lectures and in discussion, and though 
some types of excitement do reflect a real involvement 
in real issues, excitement is often superficial, more 
emotional than reflective, and not indicative of genuine 
student interest and growth." (19) 
Whether the lecture is or is not interesting does 
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depend in part on the lecturer, just as the interest of 
the book depends in part on the author. If the lecture 
is not interesting, it is not the fault of the form. 
But as in the case of the recitation, the most serious 
objection that can be raised against the lecture is an 
objection which does derive from an inherent charac-
teristic of the form. No matter how interesting the 
lecture is, it casts the student in the role of audi-
ence. It is a consequence of the form that "despite the 
best efforts on the part of a lecturer, the student who 
has to rely chiefly on lectures for his academic 
instruction is almost certain to be overimpressed by the 
lecturer's expert authority and to accept much too 
' 
passively and uncritically the lecturer's own 
conclusions regarding what is and is not factually the 
case." (20) 
The problem of student passivity has not been 
overlooked by those who do believe that the lecture is 
an indispensable tool for the teacher. Hyman, for 
example, suggests the lecture is improved insofar as the 
lecturer permits students to question and follows 
questions where they lead. And that amounts to saying 
that the lecture, like the recitation, is improved as it 
assumes some of the characteristics of a discussion. 
21 
The Discussion: General Remarks 
·I have said that the recitation and the lecture 
move toward discussion when teachers encourage students 
to answer in their own words, de-emphasize certain forms 
of evaluation, ask high level cognitive questions, 
permit students to ask question. That seems obvious, 
but it would not be obvious just when that movement 
toward carries the recitation or the lecture across the 
border and transforms it wholly into discussion. It 
would not be obvious because it is not obvious what a 
discussion is. Meredith Gall and Joyce Gall found that 
the names teachers gave to.the methods they employed 
were misleading. "The term 'discussion method' 
(was) used to describe a broad variety of classroom 
interaction patterns" (21) including some that looked 
very much like recitation, "characterized by a 
preponderance of teacher talk and fact questions." (22) 
Discussion is not even distinguishable from other 
methods by the amount of student participation, for in a 
recitation the students may ~ more words than their 
teacher. 
I do not intend to propose that some of the 
activities called discussions be given other names, even 
though lack of conceptual clarity and looseness of 
language create a multitude of problems. Nor am I 
interested in working out some sort of classification 
scheme, useful though such a scheme may be. The Galls 
have proposed one such taxonomy, and David Dietrick has 
proposed another. (23) I acknowledge the variety of 
activities labelled "discussion" and draw the following 
conclusions: 1) Since so many kinds of activity are 
identified as discussions, teachers apparently value 
discussion, at least in principle; 2) The conceptual 
confusion over the nature of discussion indicates 
confusion over the purpose of discussion. That is 
reason enough to consider, as I do in later chapters, 
what this purpose might properly be; 3) Given the range 
of activities labelled "discussion," I am under no 
obligation to defend my application of the label to the 
technique proposed in this dissertation. It is enough 
to say that the technique is assuredly neither 
recitation nor lecture, and so may as well be called a 
technique of discussion. 
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Given the fact that a wide assortment of activ-
ities may be labelled "discussion," it is not surprising 
that researchers cannot agree on the effects or the 
effectiveness of discussion. Dietrick maintains that 
" generally, lecture and discussion methods appear to be 
equally effective with regard to acquisition of 
information." (24) McKeachie would not be perturbed if 
23 
discussion did turn out to be less effective for the 
transmission of information: 
Student-centered teaching might be ineffective in 
achieving lower-order cognitive objectives. There 
seem to be few instances of such a loss. Students 
apparently can get information from textbooks as 
well as from the instructor. But we had also 
predicted that any superiority of student-centered 
discussion methods would be revealed in higher-level 
outcomes. • • The more highly one values outcomes 
going beyond knowledge acquisition, the more likely 
that student-centered methods will be preferred. 
(25) 
That position is close to the position of Gall and Gall: 
On the basis of research f~ndings, then, it appears 
that the discussion method is effective in helping 
students to master curriculum content, especially 
when cognitive outcomes beyond the level of know-
ledge are desired. Discussion also ~ay be more 
effective than the lecture method in promoting 
higher cognitive outcomes. (26) 
In 1954-5 the Journal of General Education devoted 
an issue to the topic of discussion. The articles, 
contributed by philosophers and instructors in 
humanities, each contained the message that discussion 
was the teaching method most appropriate to a liberal 
education. The authors justified this claim on the 
grounds that it was discussion that could lead, for 
example, to understanding, interpretation, and 
evaluation. (27) Discussion is, wrote Joseph Schwab, 
"the experience of moving toward and possessing 
understanding and a liberal arts education is concerned 
with the art and skills of understanding." (28) 
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Theodore Greene praised discussion for promoting 
"reflective inquiry" and "~emonstrating the universal 
need for the interpretation of evidence." (29) Charles 
Wegener chose discussion as that method capable of 
achieving the ends of liberal education, which "require 
that the student be constantly invited to think, to 
reflect, to inquire, and to judge. For such a purpose a 
teaching technique is requisite in which the basic 
procedure is the raising of a problem and the guidance 
of an inquiry." (30) 
Whatever people mean by discussion, whatever 
benefits they claim for it, all admit that conducting 
one is difficult and that success is rare. Greene, who 
has been practicing the method for years, acknowledges 
failing more often than not. And Gall and Gall remark 
that "classroom discussions are frequently boring, 
aimless, and even threatening to some participants." 
(31) Any method of teaching can be done badly, and each 
method has its peculiar dangers. But no matter how well 
the recitation and the lecture are done they may be 
objected to on grounds intrinsic to the form. This is 
not so in the case of the discussion. A discussion can 
indeed be conducted badly, but when conducted well, 
discussion is a superior method of teaching because it 
is a form without intrinsically objectionable 
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characteristics. This I claim and this I want to show. 
In particular, I hope to show what form a discussion may 
take in order to be effective. 
Discussion: Some Specific Proposals 
The claims (cited in the previous section) on 
behalf of discussion do not amount to an adequate 
argument for its use. And the fact that what Jre 
referred to as discussions often go badly suggests that 
few possess the skills discussion leaders need. Others 
besides myself have provided both more substantial 
arguments for discussion as a way of teaching, and 
descriptions of techniques intended to improve the 
likelihood that discussions will be fruitful. I shall 
now briefly review a few of these proposals. I do so 
for the sake of claiming kinship and acknowledging 
indebtedness, and also because it will help to define my 
position if I identify those points at which my argument 
and description diverge from theirs. I begin with a 
report of an experiment designed to test the 
effectiveness of techniques somewhat similar to those 
proposed here and move to those which are more similar. 
M. L. Abercrombie shares with the other authors 
whose work will be described the belief that new 
knowledge will be the outcome of a successful dis-
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cussion. That is to say, the point of discussion is not 
to simply articulate what is already believed or known. 
In her book Anatomy of Judgment, Abercrombie records her 
efforts to use free group discussion as a teaching tool 
after she repeatedly found that her medical students, to 
whom she taught zoology, knew the facts but did not 
think scientifically. Although her experiment was 
carried out with eighteen to twenty year olds, she 
believes free group discussion is appropriate for 
students of all ages. It 
might be most useful where at present least used, 
where autistic (32) thinking is most dominant, 
namely in teaching children. Our methods of formal 
education are still governed by a notion that 
children's little heads are empty • • whereas the 
truth is that it is because they are too full of 
what we do not understand that they are difficult to 
teach. (33) 
Abercrombie believes that whatever the age of the 
learner, "the kind of-change which has to be effected is 
the reassessing and rearranging of what is already in 
the mind, rather than the receiving of new packets of 
'facts.'" (34) It is this ability to reassess and 
rearrange on which inventiveness of imagination in 
science depends, and it is this ability which, Aber-
crombie hoped, would be fostered by group discussion. 
In group discussion, students would better recognize 
their own ways of working, particularly "the part that 
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one's past experience and present attitudes play in 
determining what we see." (35) Such recognitions would 
enable them to reassess and rearrange, to make new 
associations of schemata. 
Abercrombie describes the role of the teacher in 
discussion in these words: 
My main task was to make it possible for students to 
compare and contrast the statements they made with 
those that others made • • I tried to be socially 
reassuring and avoided making statements which -could 
seem to reprove any individual, or even to praise, 
because praise of one implies by contrast criticism 
of the others ••• I tried • • to direct emotion 
into effective channels, so that they could be 
usefully anxious about the difficulties of thinking 
clearly and not be diverted by being anxious about 
its becoming apparent that they had difficulties in 
thinking clear~y. (36) 
The role she outlines for the teacher is not that of the 
expert and Abercrombie gives as reason for this that 
There is a danger in the teacher summarizing 
discussion in too final a way, because it tends to 
inhibit further thinking by the student. They 
[sic] should not be given the impression that 
decisions can be made tidily and finally on the 
matters discussed in the course, but rather that the 
function of the discussion is to start them 
thinking. (37) 
Students were often uncomfortable with, and 
hostile to, the non-authoritarian role adopted by 
Abercrombie. She nevertheless concluded that the 
results made the struggle worthwhile. 
The course brought the student face to face with the 
need for continued change in himself, if he is to 
take in more of the information available to him. 
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• The aim was to make it possible for the student 
to relinquish the security of thinking in 
well-defined, given channels and to find a new kind 
of stability based on the recognition and acceptance 
of ambiguity, uncertainty and open choice. (38) 
Despite their discomfort, compared on the fol-
lowing dimensions, students in the discussion course did 
better than those students in the lecture course: 
They tended to discriminate better between facts and 
conclusions, to draw fewer false conclusions, to 
consider more than one solution to a problem, and to 
be less adversely influenced in their approach to a 
problem by their experience of a preceding one. 
That is, they were more objective--more flexible in 
their behavior. (39) 
Abercrombie's explanation of the effects of 
discussion on learning draws on the work of psychol-
ogists in various specializations: of Adelbert Ames in 
perception; of Freud in psychoanalysis; of'Piaget in 
genetic epistemology; and of s. H. Foulkes in group 
analytic psychotherapy •. From Ames, Abercrombie borrows 
the assumption that experience and attitude determine, 
at least partly, what we see. From Freud, she learned 
"to consider more seriously the possibility that a 
person's behaviour might be changed in a desirable 
direction by allowing him to talk, as distinct from 
talking to him or at him." (40) She defends her use of 
group discussion as the particular vehicle for inducing 
learning, using evidence supplied by Foulkes and on the 
authority of Piaget, both of whom emphasized the 
importance of interaction with others for the develop-
ment of thinking. 
While Abercrombie's work seems admirable to me, I 
differ with her over the limited role she allows the 
teacher. In her model, the teacher appears to be a 
comforter, and a facilitator of others' conversations. 
While it is important to recognize that students have 
feelings and that these affect learning, I see no 
compelling reason for the teacher not to intervene more 
directly in the students' cognitive development. Nor, 
as will now be seen, do the McMurrys. 
I referred earlier (this chapter, footnote 1) to a 
work of Charles A. and Frank M. McMurry, the handboo~ 
called The Method of Recitation. As I said there, the 
McMurrys implicitly define recitation as oral inter-
change between teacher and student. What they propose 
as the correct way to conduct a recitation is what I 
would call the proper way to conduct a discussion, but 
the difference in terminology ought not obscure the 
closeness of our positions. 
The McMurrys' handbook is for teachers. It 
therefore but sketches the outlines of theory while 
illustrating the techniques in some detail. They open 
their short statement of theory by stating what they 
take to be a generally shared assumption: that humans 
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are alike in some ways, including the way they learn. 
There are, the McMurrys write, universal laws of 
learning, and it therefore follows that universal 
principles of teaching method must be discoverable. 
They ground their proposals for practice in these laws 
of learning on the one hand, and on the other hand in 
the universal aims of instruction. There can be no 
question that there are such universal aims. A glance 
at any textbook, observation in any classroom, will 
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reveal them. It simply is the case that all instruction 
aims at "mastery of these (general) rules and prin-
ciples, and the ability to apply them." (41) 
The aim of instruction is always the same. It is 
methods which vary, taking now an inductive now a 
deductive approach. The McMurrys insist that the 
inductive approach is the one consistent with the la~s 
of learning. As the chief exemplar of the inductive 
approach and of the method of recitation they propose, 
the McMurrys cite Socrates, to whom teaching meant 
not the telling of what the instructor knows, but 
rather the asking of such questions as will call up 
previous experience, guide the thought of the 
student, and draw him out (educate) to a free 
expression of his own ideas. The new conclusions 
reached in the course of the conversation 
constituted the knowledge acquired. (42) 
The McMurrys organize the presentation of their 
method around Herbart's sequence of steps to be followed 
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in organizing a lesson, although they see a need to 
modify Herbart's prescriptions or the interpretations of 
these. For example, the McMurrys believe it is a 
mistake to assume that "every recitation should show the 
full treatment of a topic through the series of five 
steps." (43) What they do insist on is that the teacher 
begin by calling up to the student's mind prior exper-
iences relevant to the new material to be learned. 
This, Herbart's stage of preparation, must be done 
through conversation, in which the teacher skillfully 
questions the student. While the purpose of the stage 
of preparation is chiefly to prepare the mind to receive 
.new knowledge by calling up rel$ted knowledge, 
preparation may have other useful effects. One is that, 
as they converse, students are likely to find out what 
they don't know, and their awareness is in turn likely 
to lead to questions or problems of interest to them. 
Another useful effect is that the teacher will hear, and 
consequently have the opportunity to correct, the 
students' mistaken interpretations. 
The name which the McMurrys give to the practice 
they recommend is "the developing plan," a name which 
apparently derives from the stage of instruction which 
follows preparation. This stage consists in providing 
an absolute minimum of facts and then, using questioning 
as in the first stage, drawing from the students 
inferences based on both their· old experience and this 
new information. Charles McMurry was teaching in 
32 
DeKalb, Illinois when John Dewey was teaching in 
Chicago. Undoubtedly the McMurrys knew of Dewey's work 
and perhaps that is why they emphasize the principle and 
its corollary that the student who seeks an answer to a 
felt question will learn more effectively than the 
student to whom the question is merely posed, and that 
what is called "information" may not inform. Infor-
mation is what serves to answer a student's question. 
In the remaining steps of the sequence, the student·is 
to use his information to arrive at general principles, 
and general principles are to be applied to new 
situations. 
The McMurrys plainly believe that the teacher who 
uses the developing plan of instruction must remain 
firmly in charge and know exactly where she is going. 
Their teacher is more than a facilitator. She has a 
direct contribution to make to the student's learning: 
"if a person is left entirely to himself in acquiring 
knowledge, he is likely to make serious mistakes in even 
the simplest observations, and to be very superficial." 
(44) The McMurrys are not afraid to assert that the 
teacher's position derives in part from her greater 
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knowledge and that it is her responsibility to use that 
knowledge to her students' advantage. The McMurrys 
insist on the importance of the teacher being knowl-
edgeable. They set high standards for the occupation, 
and it counts in their favor that they recognize, better 
than some contemporary reformers of teaching, the 
impossibility of improving practice by formulating a set 
of techniques to be used mechanically. Many skills are 
required if the developing plan of instruction is to be 
conducted effectively: "A well-grounded process in 
teaching will not save the teacher who lacks knowledge 
of his subject, who lacks insight and tact in managing 
children, or who is destitute of spirit and 
originality." (45) 
My objections to the McMurrys' methods are both 
major and minor. The minor objections may reflect 
nothing more than current fashions regarding appropriate 
ways of treating children. While I questioned Aber-
crombie for seeming to strip the teacher of all 
authority, I question the McMurrys for allowing her too 
much, as they seem to when they encourage the teacher to 
correct the student's previous experience if he has 
incorrectly interpreted it. (46) I find the remark 
discomforting even though I deny that all interpret-
ations of experience are equally justifiable. Perhaps 
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my discomfort would evaporate if I knew how these 
corrections were to be made. The same remarks might 
apply to my objection to the McMurrys' claim that there 
is a certain order that the mind must follow in 
learning. (47) I could accept this as a claim that 
there is a general pattern in the process of learning, 
but not as a claim that each person must have precisely 
the same sequence of experiences in order to arrive at a 
given conclusion. I am not sure what the McMurrys mean, 
especially in the light of the way they summarize the 
steps necessary if the teacher is to keep a discussion 
from wandering: she must state a clearly defined aim to 
the class, must make herself an outline of the pivotal 
questions, and these must form a necessary sequence. 
(48) The McMurrys show only a little concern over the 
possibility of authoritarian behavior on the part of the 
teacher, but that lack of concern was widespread in the 
early twentieth century when it was not the custom to 
worry much about students' sensibilities, or what might 
be called the affective environment. The major 
objection I have to The Method of Recitation is that, 
while it is designed as a practical handbook (49), it 
fails in fact to give effective instructions to the 
teacher who might want to work towards the goals the 
authors outline. Some teachers would be able to figure 
out how to put the developmental plan into practice, 
ju&t as some people could look at an item of clothing 
and figure out how to duplicate it. But those teachers 
would be few and far between. Having made these 
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objections, I now say that the McMurrys' proposals ought 
not be consigned to history. Much of what they say 
appears to be sound. The task that remains is the task 
of showing teachers what techniques will lead to their 
desired goals. 
John McCollum has attempted this task. He, too, 
has written a handbook, one intended to teach teachers 
what sorts of questions to ask. His scheme for 
classifying questions derives directly. from a model of 
scientific thinking. McCollum describes the "inductive 
knowledge-generating and testing process of: 1. 
Acquiring and describing data. 2. Developing 
explanations. 3. Making predictions based on the 
explanations," (50) and prescribes the kinds of 
questions that will foster the student's ability to use 
that process. These are the: 
Open Describing Question: "What are some of the 
things the article told us about Antarctica?" 
Closed Describing Questions: "What is the climate 
like in Antarctica?" "what grows there?" "What 
animal life do they have there?" "How are the 
animals in Antarctica different from those in 
(Oregon)?" Explaining Questions: "What might happen 
if we took some of our (Oregon) animals to 
Antarctica?" "How do you account for some animals 
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having thin fur and others having thick fur?" (51) 
As the McMurrys do, McCollum distinguishes between 
appropriate and inappropriate sorts of teacher 
questions, but unlike them he pays equal attention to 
the distinction he sees between appropriate and 
inappropriate teacher responses. It is precisely on the 
affective climate of the classroom that John McCollum 
focuses a great deal of his attention. McCollum 
believes that if the student is to learn, he must feel 
he is accepted. Therefore, it is imperative that the 
teacher listen to what the student has to say, that she 
learn how to check up to be sure she understands what he 
said, and that, with few exceptions, she learn not to 
evaluate what he has to say. This last condition is 
especially important, because learning "depends on the 
students acquiring the understanding and skill to 
evaluate their own ideas." (52) McCollum grounds his 
proposals in humanistic psychology and the incomplete 
argument he sketches in his introduction is sufficient 
for a manual of practice. 
McCollum's proposals, like the others cited, have 
much to recommend them. But McCollum has offered an 
analytic tool as a teaching tool. He is not the only 
one to have made this pedagogical mistake: it has 
occurred countless times throughout history. Because an 
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understanding of this mistake is germane to my argument, 
it is a mistake I shall illustrate with another example 
taken from the litera~ure of questioning. 
In the 1960's and early 1970's the scientific 
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model of thinking chosen as the basis of McCollum's 
taxonomy was not the model preferred by educators 
interested in improving teachers' questioning strat-
egies. The experiments reviewed by Virginia M. Rogers 
were all designed to teach teachers how to ask high 
level cognitive questions. (53) In each case attempts 
were made to teach teachers how to classify questions 
according to Bloom's taxonomy. All of the authors 
claimed at least some short term success as a result of 
their efforts. That is, teachers learned to ask 
questions demanding higher level cognitive skills of 
their students. It might be useful to learn to classify 
questions according to the taxonomy, but to teach such a 
skill in order to improve teachers' question-asking 
techniques seems analogous to trying to teach students 
to speak well by teaching grammar rules. Bloom's 
taxonomy, like the rules of grammar, was designed as an 
analytic tool, and teaching the use of an analytic tool 
is not likely to be the best way to improve practice. 
One does not learn to analyze or classify the ways that 
different people walk in order to learn to walk, nor 
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even to improve one's own walking, even though such a 
study might be useful for other purposes. Some people 
may learn to speak well or to ask better questions while 
they learn the analytic language, but I concur with the 
McMurrys: the deductive approach seems contrary to the 
"laws of learning." An inductive approach is 
preferable, and it is such an approach that I will argue 
for here. 
A wholly satisfactory proposal for a technique of 
teaching will have to satisfy a number of desiderata. 
It will have to take into account the intellectual aims 
of teaching, as the McMurrys' and McCollum's proposals 
do. It will have to take into account the effect of 
emotions on learning, as Abercrombie's and McCollum's 
proposals do. And it will have to be compatible with at 
least some psychological theories, as Abercrombie's and 
McCollum's proposals are. In addition, a wholly 
satisfactory proposal will be justifiable from the point 
of view of current thinking about the nature of 
knowledge, and will be justifiable from the point of 
view of the proper ends of teaching (which I take to 
include more than the sheer acquisition of knowledge 
and/or cognitive development). Abercrombie, the 
McMurrys, McCollum do not attempt to justify their 
proposals from such lofty perspectives. I will show 
that what I propose does take into account all the 
factors which must be taken into account, can be shown 
compatible with psychological theories, and can be 
justified from the points of view of the nature of 
knowledge and the proper ends of teaching. But I will 
also show, when I begin my argument proper, that one 
great advantage of my proposal is that it can be 
presented in terms that teachers can understand. The 
McMurrys' proposal was couched in terms of aims. 
Examples were given, but not useful instructions. 
McCollum, and the people Virginia Rogers cited, also 
spoke of aims and offered examples. In addition they 
presented taxonomies, the tools .of analysis, disguised 
as tools of instruction. But learning to classify 
questions is one kind of learning, learning to ask good 
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questions another kind. It is conceivable that a ·person 
could learn to classify questions according to a given 
taxonomy but still not be able to ask questions in 
various categories. It is not conceivable that a person 
could learn to ask honest questions and not ask better 
questions. Honest questioning is, therefore, presented 
as a technique the use of which will lead teachers to 
ask better questions (and. consequently to lead better 
discussions). Chapter III, a transcript of a class 
session, illustrates the technique of asking honest 
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questions to find out where the students are. 
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made between good recitation practices and bad 
recitation practices. For example, Charles A. and Frank 
M. McMurry wrote a handbook, The Method of Recitation, 
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explicit, to distinguish recitation from discussion. 
2. William James, Talks to Teachers on 
Psychology, new edition (New York: Henry Holt and 
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141-2. 
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purpose. In American Education: The Colonial Exper-
ience, 1607-1783 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 
215, Lawrence Cremin describes the lecture at Harvard in 
the eighteenth century, where students were trained to 
argue orally: "The lecture was the master's way of 
demonstrating systematic thought at its best: he would 
commonly cast a proposition as a question, divide and 
subdivide it into its various elements, dealing with 
each separately, and then indicate the relationships 
among the several parts." That kind of lecture was 
itself a model argument. Few teachers today would be 
capable of constructing and delivering anything 
resembling it. 
17. Jean Piaget, The Science of Education and the 
Psychology of the Child, .trans. Derek Coltman (New York: 
Orion Press, 1970), p. 77. 
18. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: 
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(1954-5):48. 
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Discussion Method," in Seventy-fifth Yearbook of the 
National Societ for the Stud of Education, Part 1, 
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23. David C. Dietrick, "Review of Research," in A 
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Richard J. Hill No place of publication given. The 
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articles by Joseph Schwab and Charles Wegener, both of 
whom were teaching at the University of Chicago when 
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time to undergraduates at the end of a yearlong course 
of study. Perhaps this accounts for some of the 
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p. 48. 
30. Charles Wegener, "Discussion and Aims of 
Liberal Education," Journal of General Education 8 
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32. The Oxford English Dictionary Supplement gives 
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Dictionary of Psychology, revised edition, provides the 
following definition of "autistic thinking:" "mental 
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activity which is controlled by the wishes of the 
individual, as contrasted with reality thinking, 
Abercrombie appears to be using "autistic 11 not to 
suggest that children's thought is pathological but to 
suggest that it is less logical and realistic than adult 
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53. Virginia M. Rogers, "Modifying Questioning 
Strategies of Teachers," Journal of Teacher Education 23 
(Spring 1972):59-62. Rogers herself designed an 
experiment to teach teachers how to ask higher level 
questions. She provided this reason (page 58) for 
teachers to do so: "With open-ended and high level 
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questions the answer may be secondary to the reasons 
given to support it. These reasons are clues to the 
thought processes used, the depth of understanding, and 
the lev~l of thinking attained by the pupil." Compare 
this with Richard Suchman's rationale for his inquiry 
training program. See J. R. Suchman, "Inquiry Training: 
Building Skills for Autonomous Discovery," Merrill-
Palmer Quarterly 7 (1961): 147-70. In Suchman 1 s program 
children watch short films about which they may ask 
questions which may be answered "yes" or "no." No 
physical manipulation of materials is permitted: "the 
teacher has very little access to the cognitive 
operations that a child is performing while exploring a 
piece of apparatus. By permitting children to obtain 
data only through verbalized operations (i.e. questions) 
we give the teacher greatly increased access--however 
indirect--to the children's processes." 
CHAPTER III 
TRANSCRIPTION OF A DISCUSSION 
The third chapter consists of a transcription of a 
class discussion. The participants were not selected in 
any formalized way. I merely went to class one day with 
a tape recorder. No advance warning had been given that 
I intended to do this, and when I arrived I explained my 
wish to record and asked students whether they objected. 
None did. The students appeared to be comfortable with 
each other, perhaps in part because the group was small. 
On this evening it was smaller than usual. Out of the 
class of eleven students, only eight were present. The 
number of absences was greater than normal for this 
group, but not high for the time of year at which the 
tape was made. This was the last of ten sessions of the 
third quarter of the year, and so it fell in June, at a 
time when teachers are likely to have all sorts of 
school obligations, and most of these students were 
practicing teachers. They taught in upper middle 
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class suburban schools and at one upper middle class 
private school in the nearby city, at levels from 
kindergarten through high school. Each had at least 
four years of teaching experience, and two had more than 
ten years experience. The other students came from 
different backgrounds: graduate studies in the 
biological sciences, nursing, business, and computer 
programming. As it happened, two of the absentees were 
the business man and the computer programmer. The 
youngest person in the group w·as the graduate student in 
biological sciences, who was in his early twenties. 
Several students were in their mid-thirties. All of the 
students were working toward master's degrees (in 
reading, special education, school psychology, for 
example) at a small teacher's training college in the 
Midwest. The course in historical and philosophical 
foundations of American education in which the tape was 
made was required. It met, as graduate courses for 
teachers often do, in the late afternoo~ and early 
evening, from 4:25 to 7:10. 
The transcription amounts to about forty percent 
of what was recorded in a discussion which lasted two 
and one quarter hours. (We took half an hour out of our 
two and three quarter hour class for general business 
and for a break.) Two long sections were excised, one 
on what a psychologist is, and one on the sort of 
responsibility which might distinguish the professional 
from the non-professional. Sections in which the group 
fragmented so that several people were talking at 
once--sometimes to no one in particular--were also 
deleted. Much material was omitted simply because it 
could be omitted without losing the thread of the 
discussion. As a result of cutting, the discussion 
appears to be less tortuous than it was. That 
distortion was inadvertent, but elimination of some 
repetition has had the effect of improving readability. 
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Even if every word of the original discussion had 
been incluqed, much of its character and content would 
have been lost. For example, it is not possible to 
preserve the pacing of the conversation. There were 
times when all participants spoke at once or interrupted 
each other, and there were long moments when no one 
spoke at all, perhaps because they were thinking, or 
perhaps because they were tired. The warmth, the good 
humor, and the involvement of the group leave few 
traces: a transcript is but a script of a discussion. 
In preparation for this, their last session, the 
students had read several chapters from Arthur Bestor's 
The Restoration of Learning, P. H. Hirst's article 
"Liberal Education" from the Encyclopedia of Education, 
and the article "The Basis of Education" by Robert 
Maynard Hutchins. In the previous class, the group had 
argued about Bestor's effort to justify liberal arts 
education on the grounds that such an education was 
practical. The teacher had decided that it would be 
fruitful to explore further the relationship between 
liberal education and practical knowledge, and the 
relationship between the theoretical and the practical. 
Such relationships are usually of interest to teachers 
and appeared to be so to those in this group. 
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The teacher made a few introductory remarks to 
review what had been said earlier, and to call attention 
to what she hoped would be the major focus of attention 
for the evening's discussion. She concluded her remarks 
by stating Hirst's four criteria of liberal education: 
liberal education is based on the structure of knowl-
edge, is distinguished as a pursuit of knowledge for its 
own sake, is not narrowly specialized and, finally, has 
nothing to do with vocational education. 
(1) Teacher: Do you see now why, from Hirst's 
Aristotelian point of view, it would be 
inappropriate to try to justify liberal education 
on the grounds that it is practical? 
(2) Shan: Could I just jump in? 
(3) Teacher: By all means. 
(4) Shan: I graduated from a liberal arts college, 
and what I think is interesting is that the 
education department was never recognized as a 
department. The professors and the board of 
trustees wouldn't accept a major in education 
based on the fact that it was vocational 
training. 
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(5) ~ I graduated from a liberal arts college that 
destroyed its department of education • 
(6) Teacher: Conant argued that the only function of 
a school of education was to provide supervision 
for student teaching. All courses should be 
taken out of other schools: courses in 
educational psychology should be taught by 
psychologists, courses in history and in 
philosophy of education by historians and 
philosophers. 
(7) Shan: That's what we did in school. We had one 
person in the education department and then we 
took everything else in other departments. 
(8) Teacher: Let's talk about what the preparation of 
the teacher ought to include. Bestor claims that 
a liberal arts education is all but sufficient 
preparation for teaching. Do you agree? 
(9) Jean: I think it makes a big difference whether 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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it's little kids or big kids. 
Teacher: Why do you say that? 
Jean: They're such very different human beings • 
• I guess it's because of communication • 
Teacher: Can you say what the big difference 
might be? 
Jean: Well, if I were going to teach small kids, 
I would need to go to college to learn how to 
communicate with kids because I don't remember 
how they think, how they perceive •• 
Sandy: My view of teacher education has always 
been that we don't have enough kids in it. I 
' don't think you learn any of these things until 
you're ~orking with children. We literally only 
saw children for one quarter of the whole four 
year period • • I can get into catalogs and 
teachers' manuals and things like that on my own 
•• I've always thought that it was a shame 
because the only time I wasn't working with 
children--I've been teaching children since I was 
six years old--was when I was supposedly learning 
how to teach. A much larger part of teacher 
pre~aration should have been experience in the 
classrom. 
Maryanne: That experience should be from the time 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
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you decide that education is your field • 
Rob: To compare it to my own experience, it would 
make about as much sense as studying theoretical 
science for three and a half years and then 
sticking the kid in the chemistry lab and saying, 
"Don't you know how to do chemistry? You've been 
\ 
reading books on it." It seems ridiculous. You 
learn how to deal with your subject matter, kids, 
by dealing with kids. It struck me a little 
funny--nothing personal, Jean--to say, "I want to 
go to college to learn about little kids," 
because that's the only place there are no little 
kids • • • 
Jean: Yes, but where would you go to learn • 
Rob: Be a parent. That would be useful • 
Jean: Some parents can't communicate. (Much 
laughter) They really can't. They don't seem to 
have any conception of how limited their 
children's experiences are and what they don't 
understand because they shouldn't understand. 
They're just too young • 
In the next few minutes, almost all took the opportunity 
to contribute to a collective lament. Parents, they 
said, bring their problems to teachers who are supposed 
to know how to solve them, but don't. 
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(20) ~I think I see where Jean's coming from • 
The problem comes in in the difference between 
the theoretical and the practical. You know a 
child does not fall into page five, paragraph 
seven, and that's the thing that really disturbed 
and frustrated me. I had to spend all that time 
on how it should be and when I went out to teach 
I saw kids did not fall into these categories. 
(21) Teacher: You're all saying that somewhow or other 
you need practical experience with children and 
that you need to learn how to communicate with 
children. What does that mean, "to learn to 
~ommunicate with children?" How is it done? Do 
you learn it by simply being out there with 
children? 
(22) Sandy: You need to know theories. You need some 
background in order to be able to judge what 
direction you're going in. I'm not trying to say 
you don't need the theory, but the balance • 
(23) Irene: First, I'm not sure what people are saying 
when they say "liberal education." Then, I kept 
on thinking of Piaget. Let's say you want to 
I 
learn reading, or some other skill. He says that 
you have different experiences that lead up to 
the development of that skill. You have to have 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
experiences. Whatever goes into the development 
of that skill, you experience different steps. 
Some of the steps might involve concrete 
experience with the children. It might involve 
reading a book. It might involve a discussion 
approach to learning. I'm not sure what we mean 
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by the practical versus the theoretical. I don't 
want to perceive it as a dichotomy. 
Teacher: I think we have to concentrate on three 
terms. What do we mean by theory? What do we 
mean by liberal? And what do we mean by 
professional? 
Sandy: Are we talking about the liberal as 
liberal arts or • • Liberal arts is really a 
body of knowledge and liberal education is 
perhaps a body of experiences • 
Shan: I agree. Traveling might be a liberal 
education. Experience might be a liberal 
education because you're working through 
something one on one with a little kid, an 
animal, a relationship • 
Teacher: Are you saying that~ experience • 
Shan: I wouldn't want to say any experience. 
definitely wouldn't want to say that. 
I 
Teacher: Only those experiences for which you are 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35} 
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prepared contribute to your liberal education? 
Shan: I haven't thought it through that far. 
Irene: I had always thought of liberal arts as a 
body of information. You go and take English, or 
philosophy~ Liberal education, well, you need a 
philosophy. And I thought the liberal arts were 
everything that wasn't science. 
that now • 
I don't think 
Teacher: It was a common misconception. But you 
don't think that liberal arts program was 
inten e to produce a liberally educated person 
necessarily? 
Irene: I don't think it.was. 
Sandy: Does liberal come from the same root as 
library? 
Teacher: No. Although both come from Latin. 
"Liberal" comes from the Latin "liber" meaning 
"free". Our word "library" comes from the Latin 
"libra" meaning "book". Let me say the 
distinction you are trying to make is an 
interesting one, but historically, I believe it 
is accurate enough to say that the liberal arts 
were intended to produce the liberally educated 
person. But look at the root. Liberal arts are 
the arts of the free man. They are also the 
liberating arts. 
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But what do they free you from? 
(36) Jean: When you have to concentrate on your major 
then you're no longer free to take the courses 
you're curious about, like Science 101. What you 
were freed from in your earlier, liberal 
education, was the need to zero in on the skill 
to get your job. 
(37) Teacher: So you're free from having to 
specialize? That sounds close to one of Hirst's 
criteria. Is there anything else the libe~al 
arts might free you from? 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
Rob: He who ends his education on a liberal note 
is free to go on to anything but he who has a 
professional education is bound to that 
profession. I'm quoting, it sounds like •• 
Teacher: Franklin? Who wanted to provide 
students with the basic tools so that they would 
be prepared to learn any business, profession or 
calling? 
Shan: Engineers can only deal with problems in 
the way they're trained. 
Teacher: Are you giving a practical justification 
for liberal arts again? 
Shan: Yes. Not intentionally • • Much like 
what Rob said, if you had liberal arts for four 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
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years you'd tasted • • if I took science and 
didn't like it then I could go back to history • 
• I could then decide which avenue out of this 
whole highway of ideas I wanted to go down. 
Teacher: Now it sounds as though you're trying to 
justify liberal education on the grounds that it 
exposes you and enables you to make choices. Do 
you think those are the only or even the best 
justifications for a liberal arts education? 
Sandy: I'd like to analyze it in somewhat broader 
terms. I keep thinking it frees you from being 
ignorant. I couldn't put it together until Shan 
said it gives you the ability to solve problems. 
Teacher: What kinds of problems would it help you 
to solve? Do I need a liberal education to solve 
the problem of how I'm going to buy a new car? 
Sandy: As you get more specialized you narrow 
down the problems you can solve and the methods 
you can use • • if you're following a liberal 
arts track you're learning a much broader range 
of methods of solving problems. 
Teacher: Are you? 
Rob: I think you do learn more about 
problem-solving in a liberal education, because 
as you learn more disciplines and gain more 
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facility with them you learn more different ways 
to solve problems. 
(49) Teacher: How is a liberal arts education going to 
teach you to solve the problem of making a 
living? 
(50) Irene: It's teaching you how to problem solve. 
Not, er • • what problems to solve. If you 
have the ability to problem solve, you 
theoretically have the ability to go from problem 
to problem. 
(52) Teacher: So you're holding to that: a liberal 
arts education is justified on the grounds that 
it improves one's practical problem-solving 
ability? 
There were "yesses," chuckles, and one "no." 
(52) Irene: No. That is not my justification. I 
think knowledge is the justification in and of 
itself. I think you learn problem-solving 
techniques in a variety of ways and no more in 
liberal education than through a more specialized 
education. 
(53) Sandy: Hmm~ I see a difference between an 
intellectual problem and a practical problem like 
changing a tire or like earning a living • 
(54) Teacher: What kind of difference? 
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(55) Sandy: (giggling) There's one thing in my mind 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
right now and I can't get past it • • it's the 
absent-minded professor • .(General laughter) 
He zeroes in on one intellectual pursuit and he 
can't change his own tire. It's different • 
he's using • all right it shows you the ways 
to collect materials, to put the information 
together, to reason it out, and come to some sort 
of solution or furthe~ questions. In a practical 
situation you're trying to solve a problem. In 
an intellectual situation you may want, ah • 
you may be perfectly happy with more questions. 
Teacher: Are you backtracking1 I think you were 
saying liberal education was justified by its 
ability to improve your problem-solving • 
Sandy: But your intellectual problem-solving, not 
all your problems. 
Shan: I'm trying to look at it from the other 
way. If practical is knowing how to change a 
tire, then let's say a person specialized in 
tire-changing. Now how does that specialization 
help the person, and now I'm trying to think of 
something liberal like • • like do history or 
analyze all the factors leading up to the Civil 
War and make some statement about the causes. 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
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I'm trying to turn it around. I don't know that 
tire-changing can help a person solve liberal 
problems, therefore, I don't know that a liberal 
training can help solve practical problems. 
Karen: But a liberal education will give me some 
start for finding the answer to a practical 
problem. I can go to the library and read a book 
on how to change a tire. Whereas a specialized, 
practical education is not going to help me 
answer a philosophical • 
Teacher: You're referring to skills, Karen? Are 
those skills necessary in order to pursue a 
liberal education or are they themselves a part 
of liberal education? 
Karen: I want to say "yes" to both questions. 
Teacher: I would say those skills, reading and 
knowing how to find information, are not a part 
of liberal education. 
Sandy: I would differ with you. You have to 
teach those skills in the· younger grades and they 
are as much a part of liberal education as 
liberal arts subjects are in college. 
Teacher: So then, you are rejecting the views of 
Bestor, Hirst, Hutchins? To them the liberal 
arts are the fundamental forms of inquiry. The 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
(70) 
(71) 
61 
skills one needs would not be part of • 
Rob: I'd like to turn this in another direction. 
Something about the reason liberal education 
hangs together is that it shares a set of skills. 
Once you've learned something of the 
problem-solving methods of history, you've also 
learned them for economics, government. But the 
skills necessary for the vocational stuff, are 
much more basic, reading, writing ••• that's 
why it's practical to have a liberal arts 
education because it's practical for learning 
more liberal arts. 
Teacher: Why would you want to learn more liberal 
arts? 
Rob: Something about the higher achievers going 
into the liberal arts, the lower achievers going 
into professions and vocations. 
observation • 
That's~ 
Irene: What about engineers, doctors, lawyers? 
Rob: Well, I guess I don't want to include 
professionals. 
Teacher: Now what do you mean by professional? 
We'd better identify some professions. 
Various voices: Medicine. Teaching. Law. Major 
league baseball. (General laughter) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
(81) 
Teacher: You notice immediately that everyone 
wants to be called a professional and we end up 
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calling every occupation a profession. But let's 
take those which we think most would agree to 
call professions and see what their 
characteristics are. 
Jean: They require further education. 
Teacher: Meaning what, Jean? 
Jean: Two things: one is that you subscribe to a 
profess~onal journal so that you stay up on the 
latest research, and the other is that you 
periodically go back for further formal 
education. 
Teacher: Can you think of other criteria? Look 
at medicine, law • 
Irene: What they charge • 
Sandy: • and how the charge is determined. 
They can set their own rates if they're 
professionals. 
Teacher: Now then, if I'm a caterer who reads the 
caterer's journal, and goes to France to study, 
and can charge five hundred dollars for a meal 
for ten, am I a professional? 
Many voices: "yesses," "no~s," and "why nots?" 
Shan: Lawyers and doctors know something that 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
( 8 6) 
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other people don't know and you have to trust 
them. I have to lay myself there and say, 
"please take care of me," beca~se I don't know 
why my heart beats forty thousand times a minute. 
I don't have the ability to find out. I can take 
the book out and check on my prescriptions but I 
can't understand the books. It seems to me 
they've got the magic. Whatever it is you can't 
get at it easily. 
Teacher: Special knowledge? 
Irene: I'm trying to distinguish between the 
caterer who satisfies the criteria and the 
doctor. Maybe it's· a broader base of knowledge. 
No, I'm not sure that's true • 
Teacher: Why is the doctor's training not 
exclusively experiential? Suppose we apprenticed 
the young doctor to be with an experienced doctor 
who taught him what to do. Once admitted to the 
I 
group of doctors he answers questions about why 
he does what he does by saying: "it works," or 
"that's the way I was taught." Would you accept 
those answers? 
Irene: You need a broader base of knowledge. 
Teacher: Can you say what you mean by broader? 
Does that mean more information? 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
~ Maybe he was just lucky once. What he did 
may not work the next time. 
Teacher: Supposing he has one hundred percent 
success? He does know what will work. He says, 
"I've tried this on five hundred and sixty-three 
patients. Here are their names and addresses. 
They're all cured. Call them." 
Irene: Let me use an example from my own field. 
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There's a new intelligence test coming out. It's 
based on theory. You can use it practically if 
you're a technician. But if you want to apply 
it, to understand it, you have to understand the 
theory behind the test. So a professional is one 
who understands the theory • • behind the 
instrument, the technical process, or behind the 
mechanical operation. 
Shan: You can take that into the classroom which 
goes back to our original questions. There's a 
theory on brain growth which says that kids reach 
plateaus and that their synapses don't connect 
and that at that point they cannot learn. Now I 
might be a teacher for four hundred years and 
notice that when kids turn twelve "A" students 
drop down to "c" students. I could tell a parent 
that I know this from experience, and they'll 
start learning again, so not to worry. But if I 
have theory behind it, I can explain to them 
rather than just saying this is the way it is. 
If you have the theory you speak on a different 
level with the parents or the patients. 
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(91) Teacher: Do you want to say the professional 
knows the theory? Do you want to say it gives 
you a way to explain what you observe? 
(92) 
(93) 
(94) 
Rob: It's a way to fit it into an organized 
background. I mean a technician doesn't know why 
he's doing what he's doing. 
Jean: I think he may know why. I don't think he 
understands the larger picture of where it fits 
into a whole. (Jean went on to talk about the 
nursing field, where, she said, each kind of 
nurse, e.g. licensed practical nurse, registered 
nurse, wished to be considered professional but 
did not want those below them in the hierarchy to 
be so considered.) 
Teacher: It may be true that in fact everyone 
wants to be called professional, but if the term 
is going to have any meaning at all, you might 
want to insist that the professional is, for 
example, the one who knows the theory. Do you 
think that by this criterion a teacher qualifies 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
(98) 
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as professional? 
Someone: They should be a professional. 
Teacher: If that is so, then what do you think is 
the theoretical basis of their practice? 
Several voices: Psychology. 
Teacher: Then I'm going to want to ask you why 
you chogse psychology as the theoretical 
underpinning for teaching, and what you mean by 
"knowing psychology." First let me suggest to 
you that we ~ry to distinguish two sorts of 
thinking. Instrumental thinking or reasoning is 
the kind we do when we're doing practical 
problem-solving. In instrumental thinking, we 
accept the goals or ends as given. We don't 
question whether we want to change the tire or 
write the paper.· We simply want to know how to 
do those things. The question for the 
instrumental thinker is, "How do I solve this 
problem?" Now, when we think critically we may 
not take the goals or ends for granted. We may 
ask, "But why maintain the democracy?" "Why be a 
good citizen?" or, "Why buy a new car?" We want 
to know what count as good reasons for our 
actions. And we also want to know what count as 
good reasons for our beliefs: "Why do we believe 
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such-~nd-such?" 
I suggest that the general goal of critical 
thinking is understanding, while the general goal 
of instrumental thinking is control, and I then 
suggest that liberal arts education is education 
in critical thinking. Now consider this 
distinction. You may know the theories or the 
explanations given by the historian, and thus in 
a sense you have the science, that is, the 
knowledge produced by the historian. But you 
have not the art of being an historian. You have 
the theoretical knowledge of the historian, but 
you cannot yet engage in the practice of being an 
hiatorian. We look at theories and demand that 
they translate into practical problem-solving, 
and I think that is a mistake. If I learn the 
theories of history, do I do so to solve my 
practical problems or the current problems of the 
world? What does it mean to be an historian? 
(99) Irene: I was just thinking of what you were doing 
here. You could talk about a theory of 
education, talk about the importance of dialogue, 
but without getting us to do it, you're not a 
teacher. But it doesn't mean we're going to 
solve any practical problems and in point of 
(100) 
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fact, I don't think we have. (Much general 
laughter) • But I'm saying it's an act of 
doing, but using your theory. You can't just do 
something helter-skelter, you have to have a 
theory behind it. You can learn in school about 
Piaget, but if all you can do is spout Piaget and 
cannot sit down with a student and act upon that 
theory, well, it has nothing to do with 
problem-solving, then you are not doing the art 
of teaching. Of Piagetian teaching ••• I'm 
trying to tie it in with science versus the art 
0 f • • 
Shan: • becoming an historian. There's an 
interpretation implied, not just a rote 
memorization of the theories of historians, but 
evaluation, and concluding, and doing some of 
your own writing. 
(101) Teacher: What does it mean to be a psychologist? 
Who is the psychologist? Is it the person who -
knows all the theories? Or the one who knows one 
theory, or a person who knows one ·theory and 
practices psychotherapy according to that theory? 
What about the person who has good human 
relations skills, whatever these might be? What 
about the person who goes through therapy and 
develops these skills? What about the skillful 
manipulator of others who knows how to get what 
she wants? Who is the psychologist? 
(102) Someone: Not the one who just knows the theory. 
(103) Teacher: Do you want the teacher to be a 
psychologist in some sense? 
(104) Jean: I would want them to have the human 
relations skills rather than the theory. 
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(105) Shan: They have to know lots of theories. 
whatever I need at that moment. 
I use · 
(106) Teacher: So you use it to solve your practical 
problems? 
(107) Irene: I want someone who can use whatever they 
need to fit the needs of that child at that 
moment. They don't all respond to the same 
thing. 
At this point the teacher gave another short 
mini-lecture, this one on the history of psychology as a 
science. A strictly empirically-based psychology, 
modelled after a nineteenth century view of the natural 
sciences seeks to explain human behavior in terms of 
causes, or correlations. Other psychologists, those 
whose ideas originate in European phenomenology, for 
instance, look at man as a thinking being who attaches 
meaning to the things and events of his world, who can 
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give reasons for his beliefs and actions. 
(108) Teacher: Which psychology can the teacher choose? 
(109) 
How is she to choose? And what can psychology do 
for the teacher? 
Sandy: Okay, the purpose of studying the theory 
of psychology is to come to a reasonable analysis 
of what I believe. I may forget the names of the 
people we've read for this class, but I have 
taken w~at we've discussed and come to my own 
analysis and my own beliefs. 
(110) Teacher: Would it be okay for the doctor to 
forget what he has learned? 
(111) Sandy: Not everything. But I don't mind when he 
pulls a book off the shelf and checks something 
that he may not be sure of • 
(112) Teacher: I think it is true that there is a 
2enerally agreed on body of law to which the 
lawyer refers. The same is true of doctors, at 
least if they're practicing conservative 
medicine. But look at the problem of the 
teacher: how many psychologies does she have to 
choose from? Does that fact have any bearing on 
the problem of whether the teacher is considered 
a professional? 
(113) Shan: This goes along with that. I teach seventh 
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grade and someone else teaches eighth grade and 
someone below me taught sixth grade and we all 
have different philosophies. I mean I don't know 
what came before and we all come from different 
places and the parents and the kids, too, get 
mixed up, which doesn't make us look any better. 
(114) Teacher: Is that because teachers have such 
different goals. In law, you said, there's one 
goal: "To ge~ the client off the hook." In 
medicine the goal is to cure. Teachers say the 
2oal is the learning of the students, but do we 
a1l mean the same thing by learning? 
(115) Irene: I think that having so many theories does 
make it difficult. I would consider a good 
teacher as one who could go into a classroom and 
teach each child individually, but I don't know 
whether that makes her professional. 
(116) Teacher: It makes her competent? Do you want to 
hold to the criterion of professional that you 
set up before? Should the professional refer to 
a body of theoretical knowledge? Have we figured 
out what that is for the teacher? It seems a 
little odd that as teachers we refer to the 
discipline of psychology. Lawyers refer to law • 
(117) 
(118) 
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•• Does it have to be psychology? 
Irene: I would guess that as you get higher up in 
education they will not say psychology. They 
will say their own content. 
Teacher: Is the college teacher considered a 
professional? 
(119) Maryanne: In universities you need· a degree in 
your specialized area but you don't need a degree 
to teach. You can be a mechanic and be hired at 
a junior college to teach auto mechanics. 
(120) Teacher: Are you saying that at the college level 
teachers are not professionals? 
(121) Someone: Professional what? Professional 
teachers? Probably not. They may be profesional 
historians, or philosophers, or physicists. 
The group then considered the criterion of a good track 
record, which they claimed lawyers and doctors had but 
teachers as a group had not. They examined the case of 
chiropractors and then expressed uncertainty about the 
criteria of more education and theoretical knowledge. 
The teacher then summarized what seemed to be the 
position: that teachers neither referred to a generally 
accepted body of theory, nor did they share generally 
accepted goals. That is, teachers did not agree on what 
learning was, nor on what kind to promote. After she 
said this, the group groaned and someone said, "Then we 
don't have a profession." 
(122) Teacher: Did you want to be professionals? 
(123) Irene: I think we should be • 
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(124) Teacher: Let's throw out psychology for now. Is 
there some other body of knowledge that you think 
the teacher needs to know? 
(125) 
(126) 
(127) 
Irene: The math teacher has to know math and the 
English teacher has to know English. 
Teacher: Should math teachers be professional 
mathematicians? 
Irene: That would be terrible. How many teachers 
have we all had who were brilliant in their area 
but couldn't teach. That just makes them a 
professional mathematician, but not • 
(128) ~ They should know how to communicate what 
they're teaching to whomever they're teaching it. 
(129) Teacher: Does that get you back in some sense to 
psychology? 
(130) Rob: Communication skills. Being able to get 
across ideas. I suppose that's psychology. 
would set up as a criterion the ability to 
communicate. 
(131) Teacher: The teacher as professional commu-
nicator? 
I 
{132) Rob: It's more than that. To communicate a body 
of knowledge, methods, technique, that sort of 
thing. 
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(133) Shan: That does get us back to psychology though. 
(134) Teacher: Are you saying that it is the teacher's 
primary job to communicate? 
{135) Rob: Yes, that's what they do. 
(136) Teacher: This is exactly where we began. Jean 
said one has to go to college to learn to 
communicate with children. And that ability to 
communicate is crucial for the teacher. 
(137) Jean: But wherever people have to work as a group 
to make the thing go, communication is vital. 
(138) Teacher: Therefore the ability to communicate 
doesn't distinguish teaching as a profession? 
(139) Jean: In my undergraduate work in public health 
(140) 
the emphasis was on education and that meant 
communication. At the end of that sequence you 
understood much more about how to take what you 
hear from people who are from a different 
subculture • 
Shan: Which is really interesting because you 
didn't go through teacher training and I went 
through liberal arts and teacher training and 
never had any of that. It's so strange, because 
if your job is communication • 
ordinarily, when we approach the end of our time, I ask 
the group if someone could summarize positions, and if 
no one can then I try to. In this instance no summary 
was provided by anyone. The discussion was moving in a 
lively manner, and, perhaps because this was our last 
session together, I let it go on. We ended the 
discussion reluctantly at this point, and then talked 
about the course as a whole. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
Although the observations which follow refer to 
one discussion in particular, I wish to provide a 
description that could be applied to any discussion led 
as this one was led. The discussion transcribed in 
Chapter 'III will be taken to be representative of a 
type, and differences which reflect unique charac-
teristics of this group will be ignored. However, 
within discussions of this type, variations will occur, 
and the kinds of variations which may be expected will 
be noted in the sections describing student and teacher 
behaviors. 
The description is organized into four parts. The 
first part, The Content of the Discussion, answers the 
question "what was the discussion about?" The second 
part, The Behavior of the Students, answers the 
question, "what were the students doing?" The third 
part, The Behavior of the Teacher, answers the question 
"what did the teacher do?" The fourth part of the 
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description, Outcomes, answers the question, "what 
happened and was it worthwhile?" 
The Content of the Discussion 
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It is not easy to list the several topics of this 
discussion, and in discussions of the sort I am 
describing, that is often the case. Students rapidly 
learn that, since there are interconnections between 
ideas, it is difficult to resolve one problem without 
dealing with others. Carrying on a discussion is a bit 
like rehabilitating an old house: one cannot start at 
one corner of one room and work one's way neatly through 
the building. If one is to rehabilitate effectively, 
one must tackle whole systems, several of them simul-
taneously. Only in this destructive, messy way can one 
do the job well. 
Initially, it seemed that the first major topic of 
the discussion was to be the relationship of liberal 
arts education to the training of teachers. But the 
attention of the group rapidly turned from the role of 
the liberal arts to a critique of teacher training. A 
passing suggestion was made that teachers needed to 
learn how to communicate, but the group let that 
suggestion lie, as they indignantly deplored the failure 
of teacher training to include practical experience. It 
op-
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was apparently the word ''practical" an~ the implied 
suggestion that teacher training was too theoretical 
that prompted the mention of theory. A few minutes were 
spent .arguing the relative worth of the practical and 
the theoretical, and then the group recognized a need to 
clarify concepts, choosing first to try to say what they 
meant by liberal arts. They were unsuccessful in their 
attempt, one abbreviated by their unplanned return to 
the original question, that is, how the liberal arts 
were to be justified. They were subsequently unable to 
resolve the question whether a liberal arts education 
develops superior problem-solving ability, and when the 
discussion got bogged down th~ teacher redirected 
attention toward the concept of profession. The 
students failed to establish a set of criteria by which 
to distinguish profession from non-profession. But they 
did seem satisfied that at least one criterion was 
necessary. This was the criterion of theoretical 
knowledge on which professions were, they claimed, 
founded. Using this criterion, the group was led, 
through a consideration of their own assumption that 
tPaching was founded on psychology, to the position of 
doubting whether teaching was, after all, a profession. 
If teaching was founded in psychology, then its 
foundations were shaky, since there were so many 
psychologies to choose from. Finally the discussion 
came full circle as participa~ts reconsidered the 
suggestion--almost ignored when first made--that 
teachers must know how to communicate. 
If a discussion is to be judged according to 
whether participants, individually or collectively, 
arrive at answers to all the questions that are raised, 
then this discussion failed, as did all the previous 
discussions in which the group had engaged. So in fact 
do most discussions of this sort, though not all break 
off leaving quite so many loose ends. The charac-
teristics of the group and of the teacher which 
contributed to the inconclusiveness of the discussion 
will be mentioned in the appropriate sections. But the 
principal reason why this kind of discussion is likely 
to be inconclusive is that the questions discussed are 
genuinely discussible, and, by definition, that means 
they are difficult to answer. 
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Not all questions are discussible. For example, a 
question about the size of the financial contributions 
of state and federal government to education could be 
settled by reference to a book with the appropriate 
statistics, not by talk. But had this group been trying 
to decide how to find out whether senior citizen 
volunteers reading to first graders could affect reading 
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scores, they would have had something to talk about, 
namely how to design a suitable experiment, or how to 
conduct an inquiry. Had the group been trying to figure 
out how to conduct a study to determine the effect of 
salary on teacher performance, participants would again 
have found themselves in the midst of lengthy 
discussions as they tried to select criteria against 
which teacher performance was to be judged. In other 
words, they would have found themselves discussing, as 
they so often did, questions of concept, e.g., what is 
teaching, what is good teaching? Questions of concept 
were,·for this group, of primary concern, but it should 
not be assumed that only questions of concept are 
discussible. (1) Questions of interpretation of texts 
or events, questions of method are all discussible. 
Answers to these kinds of questions are not likely to be 
quickly found, a fact which, it must be admitted, 
initially causes some students a degree of frustration. 
That this discussion resulted in nothing more than the 
discovery of the complexity of the questions addressed 
is not a mark against it. Discussions must be evaluated 
by other criteria than how many questions are answered. 
What these criteria may be will be suggested in the 
final section. 
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The Behavior of the Students 
It may be helpful to think of discussions as 
located on a many stranded continuum. The strands of 
the continuum would represent, at least, participants' 
social skills, their intellectual skills, and whatever 
pertinent knowledge they bring to bear on the problems 
under discussion. At one end of the continuum might be 
placed "discussions" carried on by persons with minimal 
social and intellectual skills, who, in effect, carry on 
monologues, expressing their uninformed opinion. This 
sort of exchange is exemplified in the parallel play of 
young children. At the other end of the continuum could 
be placed discussions between participants who, having 
well-developed social skills, listen to and respond to 
each other; who, having well-trained minds, speak the 
language of reason; and who, finally are immersed in the 
problem being talked about and well-acquainted with its 
literature. Such discussions are rare indeed! They are 
not likely to be heard in classrooms where students are 
assembled for one short term. 
A classroom discussion is, in all likelihood, 
going to fall between the extremes of the continuum. 
The exact position will be determined in part by the age 
of the students, since age will, to some degree, affect 
social and intellectual skills, and, also, level of 
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knowledge. The students who participated in this 
discussion were all adults whose social skills were 
well-developed. They showed great good will, seldom 
interrupting each other, and never "putting each other 
down" in any way. There were few if any signs that they 
were not listening to each other; occasionally their 
responses were indirect, as if a bit preoccupied with 
their own thoughts (22, 87), (2) or delayed as if the 
speaker was replyin~ to what had been said some time 
previously (16, 23, 42, 83). 
But these students were not characters in a Becket 
play. That they were listening to each other can be 
concluded from the fact that there were times when they 
disagreed with each other, and that they were socially 
skillful can be concluded from looking at the way they 
handled disagreements. A few disagreements were over 
relatively insignificant matters. Jean and Rob 
disagreed (16-19) over where one could go to learn to 
communicate with children. Contradicting Rob, Jean 
argued that being a parent was not enough, since some 
parents could not communicate. Much later Jean and Rob 
appeared to disagree again (92-93) when Jean said that 
technicians did know why they did what they did, but 
simply could not place their actions in a larger 
context. Both Jean and Rob, as well as the rest of the 
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class fail to recognize the ambiguity o_f "why" 
questions. To take but two examples of more significant 
disagreements: Karen (59) insisted, in opposition to 
all, that liberal arts education could help one solve 
practical problems; and Irene (52) differed with others 
when she insisted that in her opinion, knowledge was its 
own justification. Neither statement was taken up or 
directly challenged by the group: certainly neither 
resulted in heated exchange. No disagreement that 
oc~urred could be said to have been disruptive and 
occasionally disagreements were not even recognized or 
acknowledged. For example, after Jean said she wanted 
teachers to possess human relations skills rather than 
theory, Shan asserted that teachers must know lots of 
theories (104-5). No one made any effort to reconcile 
the views. Whether students openly disagree or remain 
silent, the fact of disagreement is, in this sort of 
discussion, rarely the occasion of discourtesy. In this 
particular discussion it never was: from beginning to 
end not an instance of bad manners could be discerned. 
If these students possessed well-developed social 
skills, they were less well-developed on other strands 
of the continuum. Their intellectual skills did not 
appear to be very sophisticated. It is not a criticism 
of them to say so, although it is a criticism of the 
kind of schooling they have had, that, bright as they 
are, they do not have minds trained closer to capacity. 
The speech of students whose minds have been 
well-trained is likely to include numerous linguistic 
pointers, what are referred to by English teachers as 
transition phrases, indicating the relationship between 
thoughts. Well- trained speakers (and writers) 
acknowledge what follows, offer hypotheses and 
counterexamples, make or challenge assumptions, and 
speak of necessary ~nd sufficient conditions. Such 
pointers were all but absent in the speech of students 
in this group. Their metalinguistic vocabulary extends 
to "because" (11, 14, 16, 48, 140), "analyze" (41), 
"criteria" (83), and "example" (89). Furthermore, by 
definition, persons with well-trained minds have good 
command of reasoning skills, while students in this 
group do not. Sometimes their logic is fallacious, as 
when Sandy begs the question (63), and when Rob appears 
to be implicitly assuming the equivalence of converses 
( 6 7 ) • But the weakness of their intellectual skills is 
revealed most strikingly by their preferred methods of 
supporting a point. Most often they rely on the 
fabricated example (26, 36, 40, 42, 55, 59, 81, 90). 
Karen argued that what she took to be liberal arts 
education could help people learn to solve practical 
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problems, but one doubts that she had ever gone to the 
library to find out how to change a tire. When 
possibl~, they use the personal example (14, 89, 99, 
113, 140), as Sandy does when she cites her own 
experience as evidence that teacher training "did not 
have enough children in it." When the examples, 
fabricated or real, are used as evidence, they often 
provide no or weak support for the speaker's point. 
Karen's statement that liberal arts education will help 
one solve the problem of changing a tire may be true, 
but it is comparable to saying that training as a 
surgeon will help one carve the holiday turkey: such 
incidental benefits do not justify a surgeon's training. 
If Sandy's example had been intended sim~ly to 
illustrate her point (as Irene's example at 99, or Rob's 
analogy at 16), and had illustration been needed, it 
would have been useful, but judged by the wording, it 
seems to be offered as evidence for a general claim 
about all teacher training, not just hers. As evidence, 
her example is, of course, inadequate. (I wish to 
emphasize again that I am not faulting these students. 
Their experience is the experience of most students, and 
is, in fact, my own. Their poorly developed skills are 
the consequence of instructional methods which demand 
passivity of students and ignore the social nature of 
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knowledge and of learning.) 
A third strand on which a discussion could be 
located can be called the knowledge strand. The quality 
of a discussion is affected by how much participants 
know about its subject. In this case the participants 
might have been hard-pressed to identify the subject: 
witness the way themes changed from moment to moment. 
However, the changes were not propelled by idiosyncratic 
associations. The concepts amongst which they floun-
dered, e.g. liberal arts education, theory, profession, 
practiee, are linked to one another, and in ways 
difficult to delineate. In fact, for all its twists and 
turns, the discussion was controlled by one topic, to 
which attention always returned, and that was the topic 
of teacher training. 
Teacher training was a topic the students "chose," 
but it was one they were ill-prepared to discuss. It 
seems an odd comment to make of a group of students who 
had been through or were undergoing teacher training. 
But they were familiar with the topic in the way that 
the layman is familiar with money. The layman has had a 
great deal of firsthand experience with money, but sheer 
familiarity does not ensure his ability to discuss it in 
coherent fashion. The participants in the discussion 
had been exposed to teacher training, but they had 
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little knowledge of forms of teacher training other than 
their own and they had not read the literature 
extensively. Judging by the fact that they hardly ever 
refer to it (see 1! and ~ for what may be indirect 
references), they had not assimilated what they had been 
required to read for class. Their own experience, 
including .the master's program they were currently 
enrolled in, remained, quite naturally, far more salient 
for them than the reading they had done. 
It is to be expected that people will draw first 
of all on their own experience as that pertains to the 
subject of discussion. The livel~ness of this dis-
cussion is largely attributable to the fact that the 
participants were trying to make sense to themselves of 
their own experience, to which, as already observed, 
they refer often (e.g., 4, 5, 7, 14, 16, 20, 67, 89, 93, 
99, 100, 113, 139, 140). Personal recollection can lead 
discussions far afield and so interrupt the flow of 
conversation. But reminiscing did not preoccupy this 
group. Only once in the transcript were participants 
unable to resist taking turns telling what happened to 
them (after 19). Even on that occasion, the stories 
they told of their troubling experiences with parents 
who brought to them problems teachers were ill-prepared 
to solve were germane to the question of teacher 
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training, and once each person had, as it were, provided 
a footnote, the discussion proper was resumed. 
Earlier, I noted the students' frequent use of 
examples drawn from their own experience, criticizing 
this behavior from the point of view of argumentation. 
sometimes, however, examples are introduced not as 
illustration, nor as evidence. They are introduced as 
material to be worked over, as when people talk about 
what has happened to them in order to understand it. 
And this--reflecting on experience--might have been what 
participants were doing from time to time. They seem to 
have been trying to explain their experiences in terms 
of ideas they were considering in the course of the 
discussion, as for example, when Shan (113) suggested 
that the variety of teaching styles in her school might 
be a potential source of confusion for students and 
parents. 
It was obviously not the objective of this group to 
achieve some sort of consensus: they were teachers, but 
they were not in a faculty meeting trying t~ establish 
policy. Equally obviously, it was not the objective of 
anyone in the group to win a victory or score points off 
others. There were no signs that participants 
understood themselves to be engaged in a sporting 
debate, an exercise of wits. On the contrary, for the 
most part, participants seemed unsure of themselves, 
aware that they were not making their points clearly to 
others, or, more importantly, to themselves. Only 
rarely did anyone make an unqualified assertion such as 
Sandy's at (63): "You have to teach those skills in the 
younger grades and they are as much a part of liberal 
education as liberal arts subjects are in college." 
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Even Irene's "No. That is not my justification. I 
think knowledge is the justification in and of itself," 
(52) one of the most emphatic, forceful statements made 
in the entire discussion includes a hint of doubt. The 
qualifying self-reference, "I think," was in keeping 
with the consistently--and appropriately--hesitant 
manner of the group. Taken as a whole the mood of 
participants in this discussion was neither self-
consciously conciliatory, nor combative, but rather, 
meditative, like the mood of a small group of children 
engaged in some utterly absorbing project such as 
building a sandcastle at the water's edge. And again, 
like the children of such a group, participants in the 
discussion were each uncertain how their efforts would 
turn out. None was an expert at the assigned task. All 
learned what they were doing and how to do it as they 
went along. 
90 
The Behavior of the Teacher 
Although each participant in the discussion had 
his or her own way of speaking, all were absorbed in a 
common task and their behavior could be described in 
identical terms. The behavior of one student was not 
readily distinguishable from the behavior of another. 
But the teacher's behavior was very different from the 
behavior of other participants, as it was different from 
the behavior typical of teachers. 
In the first place, the teacher's behavior 
appeared to differ from that of other teachers in the 
amount of speaking she did. If the mini-lectures are 
ex~luded from the calculation, the teacher spoke less 
than the students. That is to say, although the teacher 
has more entries than any single student, students as a 
group have more entries than the teacher and speak more 
words. (See table 1) Secondly, while teachers usually 
spend much time dispensing a great deal of information, 
this teacher spent very little time doing so, and on few 
occasions (1, 6, 8, 35, 37, 39, 64, 98, after 107). 
' 
Thirdly, while she did provide some information to 
students, did try to direct the course of the discussion 
(8, 24, 35, 70), did summarize (21), what the teacher 
did most was question. Every utterance except those at 
3, 6, 62, and 136 was a question or included a question. 
Teacher 
Number of Entries per Individual 
57 
All students 83 
Shan 15 
Rob 13 
Jean 12 
Sandy 12 
Maryanne 2 
Bev 2 
Irene 17 
Karen 2 
Total entries 140. Students names presented in the 
order in which they first spoke. 
Table 1 
Asking questions is, like the other behaviors 
mentioned, typical of teachers, but the kinds of 
questions this teacher asked were not typical at all. 
What the teacher did ask was, in effect, what students 
believed ~ and why they believed what they did ~ 
~ On occasion she asked students if they could be 
more specific (12, 74, 86) by asking them what they 
meant. Sometimes she asked them what they meant in 
order to start them off on a new problem (21). She 
asked questions which provided correction (39), and 
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which offered interpretation (29). She made general-
izations based on what the students had said and asked 
them if that was what they were saying (27, 42). She 
asked students to make suggestions (37), and to consider 
her suggestions (101). She asked for examples (45), 
and she invented examples (79) to test criteria the 
group had proposed. She invited students to make 
distinctions (60). She asked, in short, the sorts of 
questions anyone might ask who could not understand what 
someone else was saying. She did not, as would have 
been expected of a teacher, ask questions to learn what 
the students remembered of what they had read or of what 
she had told them. The behavior of this teacher was, 
finally, unlike the behavior of other teachers in that 
she never overtly appraised the students' responses or 
performances. 
Much more could be said about the teacher's 
behavior. Undoubtedly she let pass some remarks which 
she would not want students to think she accepted. She 
may have shown too much of a tendency to let students 
get off the subject, as she did at the outset ~ 
Perhaps she should have intervened and corrected 
mistakes, especially mistakes in reasoning (58, 65 and 
elsewhere), as they occurred. (3) Certainly she failed 
to use metalinguistic pointers as often as she could 
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have done. There were times when she could, in the form 
of questions to students, have identified their own 
remarks as, possibly, statements of necessary or 
sufficient conditions (126, 134), as in need of 
qualification (28), and could have identified her own 
remarks as paraphrases (37), as generalizations (51), as 
analo ies (79). It was, admittedly, not the most 
skillful performance. The teacher, too, was learning 
how as she went along. The question to be taken up in 
the next section is whether this sort of discussion, 
even when clumsily handled, was worthwhile to students. 
Outcomes 
The specific outcomes of the discussion were 
these. A few distinctions were teased out and a few 
insights--not all entirely welcome--were won. Jean (93) 
differentiated between knowing why one does something 
and understanding where that something fits into a 
larger picture. Irene (50) called attention to the 
difference between learning how to solve problems and 
iearning what problems to solve. And Sandy (53) tried 
to separate intellectual from practical problem-solving. 
Insights occurred in the form of new relationships 
perceived, or relationships perceived anew. Irene (89) 
concluded her exploration of the relationship between 
theory and practice saying, "so the professional is 
who understands the theory behind the instrument. 
one 
" 
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She appeared to be phrasing the relationship between 
theory, practice, and profession in what was, for her, a 
somewhat more satisfactory way. Sandy suggested (44) 
that the liberal arts freed you from being ignorant and 
immediately observed that she had just put that to-
gether. Rob's manner when he made his simple affir-
mation, "Yes, that'·s what they do," (135) that is, 
teachers communicate, unmistakably conveyed the 
impression of seeing an old idea afresh, as if all the 
problems of teachers, all the programs to improve 
teaching,. all the research on teaching were to be 
reduced to questions about the nature of communication. 
There were instances of collective as well as of 
individual insight. As a group, all assented to Rob's 
assertion that a principal skill of the teacher is skill 
at communication. And then all were shocked by the 
realization that only Jean's training in public health 
had included training in this skill. None of the 
certified teachers had been taught to communicate. The 
most significant moment and the dramatic conclusion to 
the discussion came when all admitted their failure to 
establish that teaching was a profession (121). They 
wanted to believe it was, but had to admit that they did 
not yet know what a profession was, and that it was 
doubtful that teachers could be called professionals if 
they could not agree what learning was. 
It must be admitted that the number of distinc-
tions made, insights achieved, ideas clearly formulated 
in this two hour discussion were few in number. It may 
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be that if the students had been asked to write on the 
various topics before and after the discussion, the 
essays written afterwards would show changes which could 
be accepted as resulting from the discussion. But it is 
also quite likely that no new ideas would endure close 
examination in further discussion. The new perceptions 
were but steps along the way and this very provi-
sionality must prompt many to wonder again whether 
discussion, which produces so little in the way of firm 
knowledge, is worth the effort. 
It appears that the students were working on two 
related tasks. On the one hand they appeared to be 
trying to make sense of their own experiences, and on 
the other hand they appeared to be trying to make sense 
to themselves, as well as to others. Exactly what the 
relationship is between making sense of and making sense 
~is not a matter to go into here, but ordinary 
experience confirms that people struggling to make sense 
2f struggle to make sense, and at least sometimes when 
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people cannot make sense to themselves, they feel that 
they have not made sense of what has happened to them. 
These two tasks are ongoing--no one ever makes sense of 
everything and no one always makes sense--and they are 
undoubtedly tasks which are and ought to be undertaken. 
Yet one may still ask whether the struggle to make sense 
of or to make sense are or ought to be the primary tasks 
to be undertaken within the classroom. The struggle is 
time-consuming, and when, after all, are students to 
"acquire knowledge?" Why not simply tell the students 
what they are supposed to know? Why, in this case, did 
I not tell them my ideas on teacher training, or 
Bestor's ideas, or what I thought of Bestor? (4) 
Suppose students had memorized Hirst's ideas? 
Would that have been learning? A student could have 
memorized a passage with more new-to-him ideas than came 
out of discussion, in less time than the discussion 
took. But, without anticipating in detail the arguments 
of subsequent chapters, I will say that a teacher who 
refuses to deal with those ideas students already have 
on a subject, and instead requires them to remember what 
others say, builds on shifting sand. When required 
reading presents ideas considerably at variance with 
their own, students may merely assimilate those new 
ideas to old schemas, which is to say they may distort 
them. Old patterns of thought can stand in the way of 
new learning. (Students should read good writers and 
thinkers, and it is unfortunate that, very often, the 
more carefully a writer states his case, the more 
tedious students find him. I hope that one result of 
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extensive experience with class discussions of the sort 
transcribed here might be an increased patience for and 
ability to understand the conscientiously written word). 
At this point I will simply assert that if, in the 
course of a discussion, students reconsider some of 
their beliefs and recognize their inadequacy, and make 
some progress towards a better formulation of other 
beliefs, then that discussion is worthwhile. That is 
the chief criterion by which a discussion is to be 
evaluated. If the criterion is accepted, then the 
discussion in Chapter III was worthwhile. But this 
conclusion will not be sufficient for my purpose. It is 
possible to accept the worthiness of an activity for 
students without accepting it as a foundation of 
learning. But it is precisely as a foundation of 
learning that I am proposing discussion. I want to say 
that not only was this discussion of worth to the 
students, but that discussion conducted as this one was, 
one which takes into account students' beliefs and gets 
students to reconsider these as they try to make sense 
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of experience and make sense to others, has an essential 
role in classrooms. The defense needed on behalf of the 
essentiality of discussion will have to show that it 
does contribute to the growth of students' knowledge, 
and this defense will now be provided. 
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1. One of my assumptions is that concepts are 
not and cannot be acquired all at once, in full flower, 
as it were. Nor, to change the image, can they be 
transferred to another person like pieces of currency. 
Each concept a person possesses is embedded in networks 
of concepts. D. W. Hamlyn writes: "To have a concept is 
not an all-or-none affair; there are degrees of 
understanding and degrees in the complexity of what is 
understood. Conceptual development is as much as 
anything an initiation into a web of understanding which 
may be more or less involuted at any given time." 
"Epistemology and Conceptual Development," in Cognitive 
Develo ment and E istemolog , ed. Theodore Mischel (New 
York: Academic Press, 1971 , p. 10. 
2. The underlined numbers throughout this chapter 
refer to entry numbers in Chapter III. 
3. John Brubacher cites the Jesuits' Ratio 
Studiorum on discussion methods. The teacher is to 
"preside in such a way that he may himself seem to take 
part on both sides; he shall praise anything good which 
is said, and call it to the attention of all; if some 
unusu~lly difficult objection is proposed, he shall make 
a brief suggestion to support the defender or dir~ct the 
objector; he shall no~ keep silent too long, nor yet 
speak all the time, but let the pupils set forth what 
they know; he shall • • not permit an objection which 
is practically answered to be pressed too far, nor an 
answer which is unsound to stand too long; after a 
discussion, he shall briefly define and explain the 
entire matter." The honest questioner would, it is 
clear, satisfy some but not all of the requirements of 
the Jesuit teacher! The quotation, found in A History 
of the Problems of Education (New York: McGraw Hill Book 
Company, 1947), p. 189, comes from E. A. Fitzpatrick, 
St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1933), p. 154. 
4. "Who is so stupidly curious to send his son 
to school in order that he may learn what the teacher 
thinks?" Augustine, St., De magistro, (New York: 
Appleton-Century Co., 1938), p. 55. 
CHAPTER V 
HONEST QUESTIONING AND RATIONALITY 
In the previous chapter, I described the behavior 
of participants in a class discussion and the results of 
that discussion. That discussion was representative of 
a kind of discussion, one distinguished from other forms 
of social interchange by the kinds of question asked. 
In this chapter, I examine in greater detail the nature 
of thoie questions. I will also try to justify these 
kinds of question from the point of view of their 
immediate value to the teacher and from the point of 
view of rationality. 
Finding Out Where the Student Is 
It is in fact a commonplace amongst teachers that 
they ought to begin teaching where the student is, and 
it is for this reason that they do sometimes try to find 
out where he is before they begin teaching. (1) 
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Teachers use different methods to find out where the 
student is, and choose them according to what they mean 
by "where the student is." They do not always intend to 
find out what students know that is relevant to the 
subject in order to prepare the mind for the 
apperception of new knowledge, as Herbart would have 
teachers do. (2) By "where the student is," some 
teachers may mean what the student "knows," and what the 
teacher wants to learn is what students already know 
about a given subject. These teachers may administer a 
diagnostic test prior to beginning a course or a unit of 
study to find out whether a student can give the 
expected answers to a set of .questions. A teacher who 
makes such an interpretation may decide on the basis of 
the student's answers what level of reader he requires 
or what learning materials he should be given. Some 
teachers may want to find out what interests students 
have. That interpretation of "finding out where the 
student is" may be made by a teacher who hopes to show 
connections between the students' interests and what she 
is trying to teach. 
"motivate" students. 
This may be her way of trying to 
Interpretations of the phrase 
"where the student is" differ as teachers' objectives 
differ. I am here proposing an interpretation which is 
more likely to result in the teacher both finding out 
what the student knows and finding out what it is that 
moves him. (3) 
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On this interpretation, to "find out where the 
student is" is to "find out what the student believes 
about a given subject and why he believes it." Finding 
out what he believes can include finding out those 
substantive beliefs he holds about the subject and can 
also include finding out those beliefs he has which 
reflect his feelings about the subject. For example, a 
teacher who wishes to find out where the student is, in 
this sense, may find out not only what beliefs he holds 
about the origin of the English novel, but also that he 
believes English literature is boring or fascinating. 
(4) Whether the student's beliefs about the subject are 
positive or negative, true or false, appropriate or 
inappropriate, those beliefs, together with his reasons 
for them, whether these are adequate or inadequate, ~ 
where the student is with respect to that particular 
subject. One reason why "finding out what the student 
believes and why he believes it" is a sensible 
interpretation of "finding out where the student is" is 
that, as I will argue in later chapters, if the teacher 
does not find out what the student believes about a 
subject, she cannot, logically, find out what he knows 
and she probably cannot "motivate" him. 
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Honest Questions 
If the teacher tries to find out what the student 
believes and why he believes it, then she will most 
likely ask the student questions. (5) And furthermore, 
if she is to be successful in her inquiry, she will, I 
contend, ask what I refer to as honest questions, (6) 
examples of which can be found throughout Chapter III. 
All of the questions the teacher asked in that class 
session were honest. An honest question is here defined 
as one to which the questioner does not know the answer 
and to which the respondent can give a correct answer. 
The honest question is a request for information not yet 
in the possession of the questioner. The honest ques-
tion is a question about the student's beliefs and his 
reasons for them, and he is, therefore, clearly in a 
position to give a correct answer to such a question. 
As was apparent in Chapter III, it may be difficult for 
the student to do so, but he can state correctly· that he 
doesn't know what he thinks (believes), or that he has 
this reason for believing, or that he doesn't know what 
he believes. 
Honest questions may be contrasted with non-honest 
questions, of which there are two principal varieties. 
One, the checking-up question, is used by a teacher to 
find out whether students have learned what she asked 
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them to learn. When the teacher asks, for example, 
"What is the capital of Illinois?" or "How does Skinner 
define learning?"'she expects students to have learned 
the answer. What the teacher learns from the student's 
answer is that he does or does not remember what she or 
the book said. In a trivial sense, if he remembers what 
the book said and tells her what the book said, the 
student is telling the teacher what he believes. He 
believes that this is what the book said. But if a 
tea her wants to find out what the student believes the 
capital of Illinois is (an absurd example, to be sure), 
or whether he accepts Skinner's definition of learning, 
she cannot do so by asking the checking-up question. If 
the teacher is to find out what the student believes 
about the subject, then her purpose is better served by 
an honest question. 
A second kind of non-honest question is frequently 
asked in classrooms. It is the rhetorical question, 
asked by students as well as by teachers. The rhe-
torical question may be asked either when the answer is 
assumed to be obvious to both questioner and respondent, 
e.g. "How much of television is worth watching?" or when 
it is assumed by the questioner that no possible good 
answer can be given. A student may, for example, ask 
"Why do I have to do this?" in such a way that it is 
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obvious he has decided already that no adequate reason 
can be offered. When the rhetorical question is asked, 
it is with no pretence of finding out where the 
respondent is. 
The honest question is not a "What is • • " or a 
"Tell me ho~ • • " question. It is likely to begin 
with phrases which refer to the respondent's mind, 
phrases such as "What do you think • " or "Can you 
tell me why you • " (S~e Chapter III) And this is 
to be expected, since the honest questioner is trying to 
learn what another believes. (7) Nevertheless, the 
phrasing of the question is not a certain guide to its 
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honesty. A "Why do you think • r " question could be 
asked rhetorically or be asked as a way of checking up 
on the student. Ultimately, what determines the honesty 
of a question is the intention of the questioner: if she 
acknowledges that she does not and cannot know in 
advance what her students believe, and if she remembers 
that her task is, first of all, to find out where they 
are, then her questions are likely to be honest. (8) 
While there is much to be said for the honest 
question on pedagogical grounds, before I say it, I wish 
first to point out that neither the checking-up ques-
tion, nor the rhetorical question, asked when it is 
assumed no good answer can be given, are acceptable 
forms of social behavior in our society. 
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When they are 
asked, they are asked by persons who assume they are in 
a position of power, or by persons who believe they have 
been wronged, in just those circumstances when the 
normal rules of courtesy are being ignored or forgotten, 
or have been suspended. Since there is no reason why 
teachers should not be bound by the rules of courtesy, 
there are good grounds to avoid using these two sorts of 
question in the classroom. To a degree, teachers 
themselves, at least implicitly, recognize their 
shortcomings. For example, the older the students, the 
more circumspect the teacher in her way of asking 
checking-up questions. At the university level, 
teachers are more likely to put checking-up questions to 
the group as a whole than to particular students. (And 
of course they will ask checking-up questions of 
individuals on written exams.) The older the student, 
the more likely he would resent being catechized. It is 
bad manners to quiz people without being given 
permission to do so, and it is equally bad manners to 
assume that others know nothing about a given subject, 
that they have no beliefs about it, that whatever 
beliefs they do have are not to be taken seriously. 
Good manners require that we give other persons a chance 
to state their positions as completely as they care to; 
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that we in turn state our interpretations of their 
positions, so giving them a chance to correct us, and 
that we do these things before we tell them all we know. 
The honest questioner begins with the assumption that 
she does not know the other's mind, and her questions 
are intended to acknowledge that ignorance. Thus it 
seems obvious enough that on the grounds of courtesy 
alone, honest questioning is justified as a form of 
social interaction, but it remains to be seen how it may 
be justified specifically as a form of interaction in 
the classroom. 
Honest Questioning as Teaching 
So far, I have argued that honest questioning is a 
way to find out where a student is, indeed, that it 
would be hard to find a better way to do so. If this is 
so, then, if it could be shown empirically, that, for 
example, students learn more when the teacher finds out 
where they are before she begins teaching than when 
teachers do not do so, honest questioning would be 
justified. However, I am not interested in justifying 
honest questioning in this way, because I am not 
proposing· that honest questioning is a preliminary to 
teaching but that it is a teaching technique, and it is 
this claim which must be justified. 
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I first presented and defended honest questioning 
as a way for the teacher to achieve what she is likely 
to accept as a useful short-range goal, that of finding 
out where the student is. But I now present and defend 
honest questioning as a way for a teacher to achieve 
what I will assume is her long-range goal, that of 
bringing her students to knowledge. That is her 
long-range goal, but it is not the one on which she must 
focus. The goal the teacher must focus on is her 
immediate goal of finding out where the student is. She 
must learn how to achieve that goal, and the way to do 
so is by learning how to ask honest questions. There is 
nothing unusual in suggesting ·that a person concentrate 
on short-range goals, as a comparison with other 
practices will show. For example, a tennis player's 
long-range goal may be to play well enough to win 
matches. But that long-range goal, if it is achieved at 
all, is the outcome of a series of small tasks properly 
understood and properly performed. The immediate goal 
of the tennis player is to hit the ball, and she must 
find a way to do that consistently. In order to 
accomplish this goal, she must learn the technique of 
keeping her eye focused constantly on the ball. Hitting 
the ball may not be the whole of the game of tennis, but 
it is an essential part of it. Finding out what the 
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student believes and why he believes it is not the whole 
of teaching, but, I intend to show, it is central to 
that process, just as hitting the ball is central to 
tennis. A teacher can no more teach in the classroom by 
thinking of her long-range goal--bringing her students 
io knowledge--than a tennis player can play tennis on 
court by thinking of her long-range goal--winning games. 
The analogy can be worked out a little further. 
There are a limited number of techniques a tennis player 
may use to help her to hit the ball. The use of 
electronic devices and over-sized racquets would violate 
ethical principles and the principles of the game as it 
is now defined. Similarly, the teacher is limited in 
the techniques at her disposal for finding out where the 
student is. Her techniques must violate neither general 
ethical principles nor the principles of teachin~. I 
make the assumption that the cardinal ethical principle 
governing any form of social interaction is that it do 
no harm to the other's capacity for rationality, and the 
cardinal ethical principle of teaching is that no harm 
must be done to the student's capacity to know. In what 
remains of this chapter, I will begin to show that 
honest questioning, fostering as it does the student's 
rationality and his capacity to know, is amply justified 
on ethical grounds as a teaching technique. 
110 
To say that a technique is justified on ethical 
grounds is to say, at least, that it can be seen as a 
rational action. (9) Teaching itself as a practice can 
only be justified if it is a practice which promotes the 
rationality of the students. Perhaps no one could be 
found to dispute this: what teacher would deny that she 
wished her students to be rational? However, I do not 
think that all teachers have the rationality of the 
student as their explicit goal, and of those who do, I 
do not think that all either have a clear sense of what 
they mean by rationality, or mean what I mean by it. 
Stated in the most general way possible, I 
identify that action as rational which is undertaken for 
the sake of ends in themselves. What are ends in 
themselves are persons and practices. It is consistent 
with the thinking of Kant to say that an action towards 
a person is rational if undertaken in recognition of the 
fact that that person is an end in himself and must be 
treated as such. (10) It is consistent with the 
thinking of Michael Oakeshott to say that an action is 
rational if it is part of a practice and undertaken for 
the sake of the end of that practice. (11) I accept 
Oakeshott's position, with the qualification that such 
an action can be considered rational if and only if that 
practice as a whole recognizes that others are ends in 
themselves . 
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It may be that this qualification would be 
. unnecessary given an adequate description of the concept 
of practice. But lacking that, I include it, since 
otherwise, an action undertaken in war, to give one 
example, could be considered at one and the same time to 
be rational from the point of view of Oakeshott's 
principle, but not from the point of view of Kant's 
principle. It is true that an action within the 
practice of war might be undertaken for the sake of 
warfare itself, but since that practice is an expression 
of an inability to treat others as ends in themselves, 
that is, as rational beings, then one must, if one 
accepts both criteria, either define practices in such a 
way that destructive behaviors are excluded from the 
definition, or, as I have done, qualify Oakeshott's 
criterion so that destructive prac~ices cannot be 
considered rational. (12) Actions are appraised first 
of all in terms of their rationality because rationality 
is the human end. (13) It follows from the claim that 
rationality is an end in itself, and from the descrip-
tion of rational actions, that to treat others as ends 
in themselves is itself a human end or good, and to 
engage in practices for the sake of the ends of those 
practices is also in itself a human end or good. 
What it means to treat other persons as ends in 
themselves I shall try to say below. 
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First I shall say 
what it means to engage in a practice for the sake of 
the ends of the practice. Perhaps this idea can be 
understood by considering the question "Why are you 
doing that?" which may be asked of any action. The 
question has at least three interpretations. It might 
be a question asked from the point of view of practice, 
to find out why a person is doing that specific action. 
It might be a question asked about the agent, that is, 
why that person is engaged in that practice, asking, in 
other words, why it is a good for him or her. Thirdly, 
the question might be about the contribution of the 
practice to human goo~. It is easier to answer this 
last question than it is to answer the first two. The 
answer to the question, "How does this practice 
contribute to the human end or good?" is that human 
rationality is a good in itself, and any practice, 
providing it recognizes other persons as ends in 
themselves, is an expression of human rationality, 
therefore, the practice is a good in itself. 
To answer the second question: If asked why ! am 
baking a loaf or two of bread, a reasonable answer might 
be that bread provides great nourishment for my family. 
If the question is why ! became a professional baker, a 
reasonable answer would be because I enjoy the practice 
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of bread baking and know that good bread contributes to 
human welfare. These would be good reasons, and, given 
normal circumstances, my bread baking would be con-
sidered rational action. If I said I became a bread 
baker strictly as a way to make money, then my action 
would be irrational. It would be irrational first of 
all on the grounds that I seemed to have mistaken a 
means (money) for my end, and it would be irrational on 
the grounds that I was using the practice for an end 
outside the practice. I was not engaged in that 
practice for the sake of that practice, that is, for its 
proper end, which is the end intrinsic to it. It is, 
says Aristotle, the proper end of the flute player to 
play the flute. (14) Writing, not money making, is the 
proper end of the practice of writing, although one may 
hope to make a living at it. 
The interpretation of rationality offered here 
differs greatly from some modern interpretations, of 
which Rawls' might be taken as an important example. 
Rawls gives as a definition of a rational plan that plan 
which advances a person's interests and says that "it 
will generally be rational . • to realize and train 
mature capacities. " since human beings enjoy the 
exercise of these. (15) Stated as it is, in purely 
formal terms, Rawls' definition of the rational not in 
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terms of practices or activities, but, rather, in terms 
of means (rational plans) to ends (a person's interests) 
appears to be consistent with that "technical ration-
ality" referred to by Crittenden in which "we decide 
upon the goal to be achieved and then devise the most 
appropriate means for achieving it." (16) Crittenden is 
employing Oakeshott's analysis of what the latter sees 
as the prevailing and mistaken notion of rationality. I 
have already cited Oakeshott on the nature of rational 
conduct. In the same place he says that the quality 
which distinguishes rational conduct is its "faith-
fulness to the knowledge we have of how to conduct the 
srecific activity we are engaged in." (17) An action is 
rational if it contributes to the practice of which it 
is a part. From Oakeshott's point of view, not only is 
rational conduct in the modern sense of means end 
reasoning not truly rational, it is impossible. Any 
action which is intelligible is part of a practice and 
may be described in the terms of that practice. Which 
brings us back to the first interpretation of the 
question, "Why are you doing that?" 
If a person is mixing warm water and yeast, a 
reasonable response to the question "Why are you doing 
that?" is that the water dissolves the yeast and starts 
its growth. If the mixture does not start to bubble in 
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a few minutes, then I conclude the yeast is not viable. 
ihe response suggests that the question might as well 
have been phrased "What are you doing?" What I am doing 
is proofing the yeast. And if the person who asked the 
question next asks why the yeast starts to grow, then 
that person is no longer asking a question within the 
practice of bread baking, but one within the practice of 
botany. The question "Why are you doing that?" asked of 
the person who is mixing yeast with water could also be 
answered, "I am baking bread." If the questioner 
persisted, asking why I was mixing yeast with water, an 
appropriate answer wouid be, "Because that is how you 
bake bread, that is what bread baking is." (If I knew 
you were bread baking, and I knew how to bake bread, 
then it would be silly to ask why you are mixing yeast 
with water, unless I knew that you intended to make an 
unleavened bread. And under that circumstance my 
question might be rhetorical.) The point that Oakeshott 
wishes to make, if I interpret him correctly, is that my 
mixing of yeast with water is not just a matter of means 
end reasoning. I do not mix the yeast and water "in 
order to," but rather "for the sake of." I am baking, 
and this is part of the practice of baking. He seems to 
be saying, much as Aristotle does with respect to the 
good life, that the means and the end are one. (18) At 
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least for the person who is faithful to the practice, 
there is no distinction between means and ends, no 
instrumental thinking. The person who is a cook 
faithful to the practice of cooking, cooks for the sake 
of the practice. A cook may indeed think of better ways 
to conduct that practice, but unlike the person who 
simply uses the practice, a cook would understand when, 
for example, a search for "efficiency" might be 
destructive of the practice. I take it that the action 
of the person who paid his secretary to "personalize" 
his Christmas cards and mail them out for him would 
exemplify the irrational, since it demonstrates the 
belief, typical of instrumental reasoning, that means 
can be separated from end. (19) 
Oakeshott's remarks are made from a point of view 
within the framework of the practice. He does not, 
apparently, see practices nested or subordinated one to 
the other in the way that Aristotle does. One could, 
however, ask of my engagement in the practice of bread 
baking whether it is a good for me. The question might 
be asked for a variety of reasons. For example, today 
at least, that practice might not so readily be seen to 
be part of another practice known as household economy. 
Or, even if bread baking were to be seen as a part of 
the practice of household economy, the question could be 
117 
asked whether~ bread baking does make a contribution 
to that practice. It may be that the local baker bakes 
a bread which is better for health and cheaper than 
mine, and that my talents can be more effectively used 
elsewhere. (20) To summarize, a rational action is one 
which is guided by knowhow, and is undertaken for the 
sake of the end of person or practice. If it is action 
directed toward persons, then it must have been under-
taken for the right motive, (21) which Oakeshott says is 
the "habit of affectiori." (22) 
Having said what I mean by rationality, I must now 
spell out in greater detail what I mean ~hen I say that 
honest questioning is itself rational action. If honest 
questioning is itself rational action, then it is a way 
of treating persons as ends in themselves, and it is a 
part of a practice, contributing to it. If honest 
questioning is a way of treating persons as ends in 
themselves, then it is a way of treating persons as 
rational beings. If honest questioning is a part of 
teaching practice, then it contributes to the end of 
that practice, which is growth in the students' 
knowledge. 
To treat another as an end in himself is to treat 
another in terms of his end, that is, as a being capable 
of rationality. It is to treat others as if they were 
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capable of recognizing and acting on behalf of proper 
ends. At the level of discourse, treating another as an 
end in himself is shown as the obverse of being willing 
oneself to give reasons for belief and actions. That is 
to say, treating another as an end in himself is 
manifest as a willingness to assume another has reasons 
and is able to recognize what constitute good reasons 
for belief or action. (23) A good reason for an action 
or a belief is tha·t it is acceptable within the 
framework of a practice. An intelligible answer to a 
request for a reason accounts for the action or the 
belief within the terms of a practice. The honest 
questioner is acting on the assumption that the student 
has reasons for his beliefs and actions and that these 
may be good reasons, or, if they are not, that he will 
reco nize that they are not. Honest questioning 
satisfies one condition of rational action. 
If an action is rational, then it is not just the 
right action (justifiable as part of a practice), it is 
done for the right motive (for the sake of the prac-
tice). I said earlier that the honest questioner was 
finding out what the student believed and why he 
believed it, and that it was likely that she would find 
out not just his substantive beliefs, but his affective 
beliefs. Re-stating that in the light of what I have 
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said about rationality, I am saying that the honest 
questioner, who is finding out what the student believes 
and why he believes it, is finding out whether the 
student can justify his beliefs and actions as part of a 
practice and whether his actions are undertaken for the 
right motive. 
Obviously the honest questioner will only learn of 
both aspects of the student's rationality if she 
understands her questions to have reference to both 
aspects. "Why do you believe or do that?" can be a 
request for justification within the framework of the 
practice, or a request for justification of a choice of 
a practice. A teacher who asks a student why he thinks 
so and so is such a bad writer (having learned that he 
does think so) might be on the way to learning of the 
student's motives for his presence in the course. From 
the student's answers the teacher may learn that he 
believes literature is boring and is taking the course 
only to fulfill a requirement. He is using the course 
as means to end. If the student's action, say his 
enrollment in a course, is rational, then he understands 
it to be part of a practice (or a necessary condition 
for engagement in that practice) to which he is 
committed. Unfortunately, as I have already noted in 
footnote 4 of this chapter, and as is attested to by the 
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transcript, I have more often than not avoided dealing 
with what may be referred to as the student's 
attitudinal beliefs about the subject or course in which 
he is enrolled. It is evident from the transcript that 
I did not ask students "Why are ~ doing this (i.e., 
taking this course)?" (24) What this avoidance of the 
affective means is that I fail to treat students fully 
as persons capable of rationality, since I do not ask 
them either to consider themselves as ends or to 
consider the ends of the practice with which we are 
engaged. There are consequences of this avoidance of 
questions of motive. In avoiding questions of motive 
and confining my honest questions to questions about the 
content of the course, I restrict myself to promoting 
one part of the student's rationality, the part which 
recognizes beliefs or actions as justified insofar as 
they are acceptable within given practices. 
It remains for me to show, then, that honest 
questioning may be seen as rational action in the sense 
that it contributes to the end of the practice of 
teaching and specifically that it promotes the 
rationality of the students by bringing them to know 
more about a practice. (I use the word "practi~e" 
instead of the word "discipline,'' considering 
disciplines in a narrow sense to be a subset of 
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practices.) Since one cannot engage in a practice for 
the sake of the end of the practice unless one knows how 
to engage in the practice, the teacher must teach 
students how to engage in a practice. (That is but 
another way of saying that knowing, in some sense of 
knowing, is a condition of rationality. See above, page 
117.) The question to be answered is, "Is it the case 
that discussions of substantive beliefs lead toward 
knowledge of a practice?" Is it the case that the 
effect of the teacher trying to find out what the 
student believes and of the student trying to make 
himself understood is that the student comes to know? 
It is certain that at some time during such discussions 
the teacher will think she understands what her student 
said but reveal by her paraphrase or example that she 
does not. It can happen that the teacher who does not 
understand and knows she does not asks the student to 
paraphrase or give an example. The student can or 
cannot give a paraphrase or an example. If he can, then 
the teacher,may understand. If she understands, then 
she gives a paraphrase or an example or a counter-
example. The student may or may not accept the 
paraphrase or the example. He may recognize that the 
paraphrase is equivalent, or that the example fits, but 
may decide that what he said is not what he meant. He 
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may qualify his position. He may, in the face of the 
teacher's counterexample, abandon his position 
completely. The teacher may not be able to think of a 
counterexample, and may conclude that the student has a 
good reason for his belief. The list is not exhaustive. 
Other sorts of situations can occur, most of them 
causing some puzzlement to student or teacher. There is 
no assurance that the student will see that he has not 
said what he meant or that he overlooked facts of his 
own experience, since it is possible that his position 
is coherent. But it can be said that insofar as the~ 
student and teacher are well cast in their roles, then 
the teacher will, through honest questioning (her effort 
to understand his position), more often than not bring 
the student to recognize that he is not sure what he 
means or how to say it, that what he said was not true 
or that he has no good reason to believe it. (25) He 
cannot account for his beliefs in terms of a practice, 
and, therefore, they are not rational. In short, the 
student finds that he does not know what he is talking 
about. Given the fact that it is the end of teaching to 
bring the student to know, if this, awareness of 
ignorance, is the outcome, honest questioning does not 
seem ·to have much to recommend it. But it will be shown 
in Chapter VI that this technique, although it produces 
doubt and uncertainty as its first effects, does 
subsequently result in the student's coming to know. 
(26) 
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1. Faint echoes of Aristotle hover about the 
belief that the teacher ought to begin where the student 
is. Although Aristotle would not have agreed that this 
was necessary for a teacher of "science," he understood 
it to be necessary in certain situations, as in 
discussions of ethics, which proceed not from but to 
first principles. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1095b. 
2. John Frederick Herbart, Outlines of 
Educational Doctrine, trans. Alexis F. Lange, annotated 
Charles DeGarmo (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901). 
The term analytic may be applied "wherever the pupil's 
own thoughts are expressed first, and these thoughts, 
such as they chance to be, are then, with the teacher's 
help, analyzed, corrected, and supplemented." P. 106. 
The first thing to be done, "in a school whe~e many 
children are to be taught together, is to make the 
children more alike in their knowledge. To this end the 
store of experience which they bring with them must be 
worked over • • " p. 112. De Garmo comments that 
"From being an end of schoolwork, therefore, analytic 
instruction has passed to the realm of a useful means 
for arousing the mental activity of the children 
concerning the regular lessons of the schoolroom. It 
is, in modern terms, an apperceptive basis for all 
instruction." P. 117. 
3. The usage here is very loose. The teacher who 
is trying to find out where the student is, is trying to 
find out where he is with respect to some subject-matter 
in particular. She is trying to find out what he 
believes about Bruner's theory, or chemical bases, or 
the presidency. Furthermore, when I say that if she 
finds out what the student believes and why he believes 
it she will find out what the student knows, I mean that 
she will find out some of what he knows and some of what 
he does not know about a given subject. Another point. 
If the student reveals his affective beliefs about a 
subject, the teacher is finding out what does and what 
does not interest him. Nevertheless, if a student 
claims that he has no interest in learning about the 
presidency and the teacher invites him to (in effect) 
say why, it is likely that the ensuing discussion will 
be of interest to him, precisely because it is a 
discussion of his beliefs. 
4. Although I acknowledge that I do, in fact, 
fail to demonstrate the effect of honest questioning on 
those beliefs which reflect the student's feelings and 
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values, I shall be arguing that the teacher must take 
into account both sorts of beliefs if she is to promote 
rationality. This idea is related to one of John 
Dewey's: "That man has two modes, two dimensions, of 
belief, cannot be doubted. He has beliefs about actual 
existences and the course of events, and he has beliefs 
about ends to be striven for, policies to be adopted, 
goods to be attained and evils to be averted. The most 
urgent of all practical problems concerns the connection 
the subject-matter of these two kinds of beliefs sustain 
to each other. How shall our most authentic and 
dependable cognitive beliefs be used to regulate our 
practical beliefs? How shall the latter serve to 
organize and integrate our intellectual beliefs •• 
Man has beliefs which scientific inquiry vouchsafes, 
beliefs about the actual structure and processes of 
things; and he also has beliefs about the values which 
should regulate his conduct." Quest for Certainti, (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, A Capricorn Book, 1960 , p. 
18. Had the teacher in Chapter III addressed the 
students' values, their feelings about the subject, it 
would not have been by direct questions, e.g. "How do 
you feel about the subject (history of education)?" or 
"Why are you here in this course?" Given the way 
schools are presently organ~zed, and the kinds of 
demands made on students, such questions could be very 
difficult to tackle. However, attitudes do affect 
learning for better and for worse. And a teacher must 
recognize when a student or a group of students have 
feelings which interfere with their learning. Without 
for a moment implying that a teacher should do 
counseling with her students, or dwell exclusively on 
feelings, I do suggest there are times when, for the 
sake of an individual student, the group as a whole, and 
for her own sake, those beliefs which are affective in 
character must be acknowledged and their reasonableness 
considered. 
5. I make the assumption, which I will not 
defend, that the student will reveal his beliefs to the 
honest questioner. To question that assumption is to 
question the very possibility of communication. Gilbert 
Ryle's words: "if you do not divulge the contents of 
your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have no 
other sure way of finding out what you have been saying 
or picturing to yourself • . I find out most of what I 
want to know about your capacities, interests, likes, 
dislikes, methods and convictions by observing how you 
conduct your overt doings, of which by far the most 
important are your sayings and writings." Concept of 
Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, A Division of 
aarper and Row, 1949), p. 61. 
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6. The choice of "non-honest" to contrast with 
"hones t" needs a word of ex p 1 ana t ion • "Non-hone s t" i s a 
term I chose in lieu of "dishonest." "Dishonest" sug-
gests deliberate intent to mislead or to deceive. I 
have chosen to label those questions teachers ask to 
which they do know the answers "non-honest" in order to 
avoid making that false suggestion. I first heard the 
phrase "honest question" when it was used by a young 
music teacher making a presentation at an National 
Association of Independent Schools convention in Chicago 
in the 1970's. I do not remember her name, but I am 
grateful to her for the idea. 
Various observers have described the peculiarity 
of teachers' questions. c. J. B. MacMillan writes: 
"Teachers' questions about the subject matter are not an 
essential part of teaching. Indeed, the teacher-
question-student-answer pattern of teaching has an 
element of inauthenticity, for the information ~ teacher 
generally seeks by asking a question is not the answer 
to the question itself, but rather information about 
whether the students know the answer." "Questions and 
the Concept of Motivation," Philosophy of Education 
1968: Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Meeting of 
the Philosophy of Education Society, 1968, (Edwards-
ville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University), p. 248. 
In S eech Acts An Essa in the Philoso h of 
Language Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 
1970) John Searle writes, "There are two kinds of 
questions, (a) real questions, (b) exam questions. In 
real questions S wants to know (find out) the answer; in 
exam questions,-S wants to know if H knows." P. 66. 
The literature on questioning-has a short history. 
While some psychologists, philosophers, and a few others 
with an interest in schooling have thought about 
questions, their nature has only recently been the focus 
of a great deal of interest on the part of philosophers. 
Persons interested in acquainting themselves with 
current thinking on the subject may find Questions, ed. 
Henry Hiz, Synth~se Language Library, vol. 1 (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel, 1978) a useful, if technical, starting point. 
7. There is an interesting asymmetry in the 
questioning that goes on between teacher and student. 
If a student asks a teacher a question, he is likely to 
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ask a "What is • ." or a "Why is • ." question. The 
assumption appears to be that it is within the teacher's 
capacity to explain the existence of the objects and 
events of the world. But when the teacher asks the 
student a question, if he gives what is the accepted 
answer, she may well ask him how he knew. It is as if 
the student is supposed to trust the teacher while the 
teacher is supposed not to trust the student. The 
student is more likely to be called on to justify his 
beliefs than the teacher is. The premises of the 
teacher's syllogism are likely to be taken as the 
explanation of the occurrence referred to in the 
conclusion, while the premises of the student's 
syllogism are likely to be taken as the reasons for his 
belief. See R. Edgley, who discusses a related point 
for a different purpose, in his article "Practical 
Reason," R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters, 
eds., Education and the Develo ment of Reason (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972 , pp. 303-319. 
8. George Gusdorf describes the person who will 
"be open to the speech of others ••• continually 
striving not to reduce it to the common denominator of 
banality, but to find in it something original." It is, 
Gusdorf believes, necessary that the teacher be open in 
this way, for "by doing this • • by helping, the other 
to use his own voice, one will stimulate him to discover 
his innermost need. Such is the task of the teacher, 
if, going beyond the monologue of instruction, he knows 
how to carry the pedagogical task into authentic 
dialogue where personality is developed." Speaking, 
trans. and ed. Paul T. Brockelman (Evanston, Il.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 125. I believe 
that the only way one could be such a listener is by 
recognizing, as the honest questioner does, how ignorant 
one is of the other. 
9. Cf. Israel Scheffler, who writes that reason 
is "a moral as well as an intellectual notion,'' and that 
the general notion of rationality is "theoretically 
applicable to both the cognitive and the moral spheres." 
Science and Subjectivity, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 2. See 
also John Dewey, who would object to the equation of the 
moral and the rational if rational were taken in its 
narrow sense, as divorced from experience, but not if 
reason is understood in what he believed was a modern 
sense, as "the ability to bring the subject matter of 
prior experience to bear to perceive the significance of 
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the subject matter of a new experience." Democracy and 
Education (New York: The Free Press, A Division of the 
MacMillan Co., 1966), p. 343. Dewey identifies intel-
lectual qualities and moral qualities, for example 
"open-mindedness, single-mindedness, sincerity, breadth 
of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility 
for developing the consequences of ideas which are 
accepted." Ibid., pp. 356-7. 
And in James McClellan one finds "The terms 
'logic' and 'ethics' are used throughout this book 
(though not, I think, by most logicians and moral 
philosophers) to designate those most general canons of 
rational thought and action discernible at our present 
level of cultural de~elopment." Philosophy of 
Education, Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy 
Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1976), pp. 2-3. 
10. "Man and every rational being exists as end 
in itself, not merely as means for arbitrary use by this 
will or that; but he must in all his actions • • be 
regarded at the same time as an end." Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 428 Ab. 46. The 
demand for consistency is part of the demand for ration-
ality. It accords with the demand for consistency that 
I must regard others as ends in themselves, since fo do 
so is to act in accord with a universalizable precept. 
It is inconsistent to act on precepts I would not 
willingly universalize. 
11. Oakeshott writes that rational conduct is 
"acting in such a way that the coherence of the idiom of 
activity to which the conduct belongs is preserved and 
possibly enhanced." Rationalism in Politics (London: 
Methuen, 1962; University Paperback, 1981), p. 102. The 
parallel idea in Alisdair Macintyre's thought is 
expressed thus: "For all reasoning takes place within 
the context of some traditional mode of thought, 
transcending through criticism and invention the 
limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that 
tradition; " After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 206. 
12. War, for Aristotle, was an activity engaged 
in not for its own sake, but for the sake of peace. 
While warlike acts may exhibit practical virtues, war is 
not an exhibition in itself of human rationality. 
"Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses 
to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at 
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war: any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were 
to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about 
battle and slaughter); " Aristotle Nichomachean 
Ethics 1177b5. I do not need here to deny that there 
may be good reason not to regard others as capable of 
exercising rationality. I do, however, assert that 
rationality is inherently social, meaning that the 
rationality of one is dependent on the rationality of 
others. (This is different from, although it is 
compatible with, the common claim that reason is public 
in character, as public character is described for 
example in R. S. Peters' "Reason and Passion:~ "It is 
public, not just in the sense that its vehicle is 
language whose concepts and rules of syntax are a public 
possession, but in the further sense that, even when it 
takes place in the individual's head, it is an inter-
nalization of public procedures--those of criticism, the 
production of counter-examples and the suggestion of 
different points of view." R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, 
and R. S. Peters, Education and the Development of 
Reason, p. 212.) It may be that I have good reason to 
believe that another is going to behave irrationally, 
and, in particular, to behave irrationally toward me. 
Irrational behavior is a greater or lesser threat. I 
may be greatly threatened and I acknowledge that in such 
a situation the action which it may be necessary to take 
in order to survive is less than fully rational. To say 
that any effort directed toward survival is, therefore, 
perfectly rational, is to obscure the concept. Absurd 
action may be required if I am to survive. But this is 
to admit the obvious--that the environment, especially 
the human environment, can threaten and destroy our 
capacity for behaving rationally. 
13. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, ll77b-1178a. 
In Alisdair Macintyre's interpretation: "In man's 
exercise of his rational powers therefore the specific 
human activity consists, and in the right and able 
exercise of them lies the specific human excellence." A 
Short History of Ethics, (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1966), p. 62. 
14. The function, or the good, of the flute 
player is to play the flute. Aristotle Nichomachean 
Ethics 1097b25. 
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge 
Ma.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971), pp. 428-429. 
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16. Brian Crittenden, Education and Social Ideals 
(Don Mills, Ontario: Longman Canada, 1973), p. 172. 
17. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 102. 
18. Again see Alisdair Macintyre's After Virtue: 
"But the exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a 
means to the end of the good for man. For what 
constitutes the good for man is a complete human life 
lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is a 
necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life." P. 140. 
19. I do not intend to suggest that the making of 
cards, the designing of them, and the making of each 
individually are properly parts of sending Christmas 
greetings. The practice of sending holiday greetings, 
jf it has significance at all, is taken as a sign that 
the sender spent a moment at least thinking of the 
recipient. It may be difficult to draw the lines 
delineating a practice, but if none at all can be drawn, 
there is no practice. If someone does design and make a 
card just for one person, it is likely to be received 
not simply as a greeting card, but as a very personal 
gift, and the sender has engaged in the practice of gift 
giving. 
Oakeshott refers to the instrumental mind "as, in 
some respects, the relic of a belief in magic." 
Rationalism in Politics, p. 93. At the conclusion of 
Reason and Nature, Morris R. Cohen writes that "it may 
not be unfair to claim that only a rationalistic 
naturalism can liberate us from false alternatives 
between means and ends. It does so by showing that 
logically the end or aim of any rational conduct is not 
something outside of our activity itself but a character 
or pattern of life itself. If the end is thus a whole 
which includes the necessary means, it is to be judged 
and justified (if at all) by the means which it 
involves." 2nd ed. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 
1953), p. 446. 
20. Macintyre, A Short History of Ethics, p. 74. 
And also, John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle, pp. 
268-269: "the function of the intelligent or 'prudent' 
man . (is) to make the very best he can out of every 
situation." (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). 
21. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1105 17a-18b, 
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interpreted by Sir David Ross as: "Aristotle here lays 
hiS finger with precision on the distinction between the 
two elements involved in a completely good action--(a) 
that the thing done should be the right thing to do in 
the circumstances, and (b) that it should be done from a 
good motive." Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 
1964), p. 194. 
22. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 61. 
23. Cf. R. S. Peters: "A reasonable man is one 
who is prepared to discuss things," "Reason and 
Passion," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. 
Peters, Education and the Development of Reason (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 212. And in 
particular, a rational ~an honors "demands for relevant 
reasons," Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, p. 2. 
In her discussion of conversation, Ruth Saw 
writes, "If we accept some form of Kant's maxim, 'Be a 
person and treat others as persons', we must not add, 
but, some creatures having the human form are not worthy 
of the name 'person'. It is safer to assume that any 
creature having the human form is a person, is to be 
treated as such, and is to be found worthy of being 
engaged in rational enterprises, including that of 
conversation." "Conversation and Communication." 
Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children 2 (May, 
1980):62. 
24. Ideally, students who fail to see the point 
of taking a course would not enroll in it in the first 
place. Such students are unlikely to deriv~ much 
benefit from it and are wasting their own time and that 
of their teachers. If by some mischance they do enroll, 
the teacher ought to be permitted to counsel them out. 
As the situation stands, the efforts of many engaged in 
schooling appear to be misguided by the belief that it 
is up to the teacher to "motivate," and the belief that 
the way to do this is by some version of behavioristic 
conditioning or by techniques which rely on instrumental 
reasoning. Jane Addams described the results of similar 
efforts on the part of teachers at the turn of the 
century: "The one fixed habit which the boy carries away 
with him from the school to the factory is the feeling 
that his work is merely provisional. In school the next 
grade was continually held before him as an object of 
attainment, and it resulted in the conviction that the 
sole object of present effort is to get ready for 
something else. Democracy and Social Ethics (New York: 
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Macmillan, 1902), pp. 188-9. Dewey speaks of the 
"continuity of ends and means" on page 323 and elsewhere 
in Democracy and Education. 
25. See Chapter III, items 22, 23, 28, 30, 115, 
after 121, 140 for specific instances. But specific 
instances do not tell the whole story. What is more to 
the point is that by the end of the discussion all the 
students had become less certain of some of their 
previous beliefs. 
Students do find that in the course of honest 
questioning they are likely to contradict themselves. 
This result leads some students to identify honest 
questioning with "the Socratic method." There are 
resemblances between the techniques, and the resem-
blances are not accidental. But the techniques are not 
identical. A careful consideration of similarities and 
differences would be lengthy. It could properly include 
a history of dialectic before Socrates, and would 
certainly note the changes undergone by dialectic 
throughout the dialogues of Plato. No complete account 
could fail to outline the arguments of the commentators 
trying to say once and for all whether Socrates' 
professions of ignorance were sincere. The various uses 
of dialectic would be described and the evaluations of 
these by Plato and Aristotle would be noted. A large 
amount of space would be devoted to a presentation of 
the views of Plato and the views of Aristotle on the 
relationships between dialectic and knowledge and 
between dialectic and teaching as these views are 
interpreted by numerous modern commentators. 
26. By way of anticipating later arguments, and 
also by way of summarizing this chapter, I quote from 
Ernst Cassirer's Essay on Man: "Only by way of 
dialogical or dialectic thought can we approach the 
knowledge of human nature. Truth is by nature the 
offspring of dialectic thought--it cannot be gained 
except through a constant cooperation of the subjects in 
mutual interrogation and reply: it is not an empirical 
object; it must be understood as the outgrowth of a 
social act. We may epitomize the thought of Socrates by 
saying that man is defined by him as that being who, 
when asked a rational question, can give a rational 
answer. Both his knowledge and his morality are 
comprehended in this circle. It is by this fundamental 
faculty, by this faculty of giving a response to himself 
and to others, that man becomes a 'responsible' being, a 
moral subject." (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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1944), p. 6. 
CHAPTER VI 
BRINGING STUDENTS TO KNOW 
In this chapter I want to show that honest 
questioning does lead the student to "knowing that" and 
to "knowing how," and does so despite the fact that its 
immediate effects are likely to be puzzlement and 
uncertainty on the part of the student, who cannot say 
why he believes what he does, and cannot even say 
exactly what he means. In order to show that honest 
questioning leads to "knowing that" and to "knowing 
how," I will have to say what I mean by those phrases. 
Any teaching technique reflects a theory of 
knowledge, whether or not that theory is explicitly 
recognized by the teacher. For example, the requirement 
that students remember what a teacher says or what the 
book says, when it is the centerpiece of practice, 
suggests that a teacher thinks of knowledge as 
information, of knowing as a matter of remembering 
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words, or that she thinks of remembering what is said as 
a condition of knowing which must precede understanding. 
(1) Those suggestions may not in fact represent the 
teacher's notion of knowledge, for although a technique 
reflects a theory of knowledge, it may not reflect her 
theory of knowledge. This is to say that while a 
teacher inevitably has S?me ideas about the nature of 
knowledge, these may not be the ideas reflected in what 
she does. A teacher's ideas may not be well thought ~ut 
and their relationship to technique may not be well 
understood. It is not to be expected that teachers 
appreciate the subtle problems with which epistemo-
logists wrestle, much less that they delay their 
teaching until those problems are resolved. 
\ 
Never the-
less, if a teaching technique is to be justified, then 
it must be shown that the knowledge it is intended to 
lead to is knowledge in some acceptable sense of the 
word. 
However, because an adequate definition is as yet 
unformulated, whatever acceptable sense of the word 
"knowledge" a teacher chooses, it will be partial and 
approximate. What follows does not pretend to provide a 
justification of honest questioning from the perspective 
of a complete theory of knowledge. There is no satis-
factory complete theory. Thus, I try to justify honest 
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questioning by describing connections between it and 
those ill-defined concepts which are traditionally taken 
to be the conditions of propositional knowledge. 
According to that definition, knowledge is justified 
true be 1 i e f • ( 2) It is a definition that has never been 
without its detractors. Plato rejected the idea of 
knowledge as justified true belief on the ground that it 
is circular and regressive. To cope with the problem of 
regressiveness, self-evident necessary truths have been 
proposed, having i~tellectual intuition as their source. 
At the opposite end of the scale are those basic 
contingent statements which refer to firsthand 
experiences. But if these two possible forms of 
knowledge are excluded, what can be called derivative 
knowledge is left, and it is that knowledge which is 
defined by the conditions of belief, truth, and 
evidence. (3) 
For reasons of pedagogy, a teacher may be for-
given for ignoring the question of ultimate truth and 
intuited knowledge. If there are absolute first truths 
which must be intuited, then they cannot be taught. Nor 
can basic contingent truths be taught, although if there 
are such truths, students can perhaps be put in their 
way. What a teacher will be concerned with primarily 
are not absolute first truths, but those which are 
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relatively prior and with derivative knowledge. (4) A 
teacher works in the middle ground, and if she knows 
what she is about then she understands that "knowledge 
is rational because inquiry is a self-corrective process 
by which we gradually become clearer about the 
epistemological status of both our starting points and 
conclusions." (5) 
Given the traditional definition of knowledge, it 
is obviously nec~ssary that the teacher concern herself 
in some way with the students' beliefs: if students 
believe nothing, then, assuredly, they know nothing. In 
an earlier time, it might have been taken for granted 
both that the students would believe what they were 
taught, and that a teacher should try to get her 
students to believe. Today, however, some teachers 
would think it presumptuous to try to affect students' 
belief systems, and some students would object if they 
suspected that a teacher was in any way trying to affect 
their beliefs. Undoubtedly there are good reasons for 
both teachers and students to be cautious, and undoubt-
edly there is confusion as well as caution. Both 
teachers and students resist what they might take to be 
efforts to propagandize, as well they should. But they 
may also not understand that belief and knowledge have a 
relationship to each other, that is, they may not think 
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of belief as a necessary condition of knowledge. They 
may think of belief as referring solely to matters of 
religion, politics, or values in general. Furthermore, 
they may think that the only way beliefs are affected by 
others is by efforts which must be propagandistic. 
Students often do not include sound argument when they 
suggest the ways beliefs are formed (perhaps because 
they have been exposed to so little of it). But even 
without the confusion on the matter, difficult-to-
resolve questions, both ethical and pedagogical, 
surround the matter of the formation of belief. (6) 
Fortunately, the honest questioner need not address 
them, since, in her effort to try to find out where the 
student is, she is not trying to persuade him to accept 
new beliefs but is trying to learn what he already 
believes. (7) 
If the teacher is to find out what a student 
knows, then she must be able to evaluate the truth of 
his beliefs and be able to assess whatever justification 
he gives on their behalf. This may seem obvious, and it 
also may seem obvious that, if the teacher judges a 
student's belief false, she will not need to ask him why 
he believes it. But to conclude so would be mistaken. 
The teacher will ask the student why he believes what he 
believes, regardless of whether she believes what he 
139 
believes, and she will do so for several reasons. There 
is always the possibility that she is mistaken herself, 
or that she has misunderstood, which she does not know 
until she hears him out. On the assumption that the 
student is capable of rationality, she will give him a 
chance to state his reasons. The most important reason, 
however, for the teacher to ask for reasons even for 
beliefs which are in fact mistaken, is that the student 
must follow them where they lead in order to discover 
their inadequacies. Beliefs do not relax their grip 
easily: it is possible that neither a teacher's oppo-
sition nor her evidence will be sufficient to break 
their hold. It is also imperative that a teacher ask 
the student to account for those beliefs which she 
accepts as true: she wants to find out what he knows, 
and true belief is not knowledge. (8) 
But to put the matter as I have put it above is to 
put it as if truth and justification existed apart from 
each other. That this is the case is likely to be the 
assumption of most teachers. However, it is less likely 
to be the assumption of philosophers, some of whom take 
the different position that truth is defined in terms of 
the justification condition. (9) 
Consider the first possibility, that we do justify 
our beliefs independently of their truth or falsity. 
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,, T r u t h" i n t h i s c a s e i s take n to r e f e r to s om e s t a t e o f 
reality which exists regardless of human awareness of 
it. That is the commonsense version of truth. And 
according to it, our beliefs are true or false regard-
less of whether we can or cannot justify them. If this 
is so then we can say "my belief is justified and it is 
true , " b u t not "my be 1 i e f is j us t if i e d , therefore , i t is 
true." But we could also say "my belief is justified 
and it is false," for the criteria of truth or falsity 
are taken to be something apart from the means of 
justification. (The naive may say that a belief is 
justified because it is true, but there is no need to 
dissect that position here.) (10) The honest questioner 
could take 'this position on the relationship between 
truth and justification, in which case, she would 
evaluate a student's belief as true or false. 
Practically speaking, what she meant by true or false 
would be what is or is not received opinion. Justifying 
a belief would not be a matter of the student ascer~ 
taining its truth or falsity, but of defending his right 
to it. The teacher could not expect the student to 
discover the falsity of a belief in the course of trying 
to justify it, since falsity exists independently of our 
ability to justify. Given my understanding of what it 
means to justify, to be discussed below, this position 
141 
is incoherent; that is, I cannot conceive of truth and 
justification in ways which allow me to see them as 
independent. (I am not, of course, denying that there 
is a "reality" which exists independently of human 
knowledge of it, but am asserting that, by definition, 
human beings cannot conceive of it.) It may well be 
that an argument for honest questioning could be 
construed by someone who can see truth and justification 
in this way, but I cannot, and so must make my argument 
on the assumption that truth and justification are not 
independent. 
The main alternative to the common view that truth 
is independent of our ability to justify it, is that, if 
we can justify a belief, then we will consider it 
provisionally true: being able to justify!! what we 
mean by true. James McClellan briefly notes benchmarks 
in the evolution of this position: 
When Descartes says that he will accept no propo-
sition as true that doesn't meet his tests for clear 
and distinct ideas, he is saying in effect that 
'true' means 'having been examined and found to be a 
clear and distinct idea.' With Kant, and more 
particularly with Dewey, this redefinition of ends 
in terms of procedures is made more explicit. (11) 
In the interpretation of the pragmatists, we decide the 
truth or falsity of our empirical beliefs according to 
whether we can or cannot justify them according to some 
physical test: a warranted assertion is true. We have 
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no criteria for determining truth apart from the methods 
of inquiry by which we justify a belief. The object of 
inquiry is the knowledge that our propositions are or 
are not warrantable. True beliefs, understood to be 
provisionally true, are those beliefs we can justify at 
the present moment. (12) 
At this point, a distinction must be made. I have 
accepted the traditional definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief and said that a teacher need not 
concern herself with absolute first truths or prin-
ciples. And that is true. But, as already suggested, 
an honest questioner will have to concern herself with 
relatively first truths and this is because the )eliefs 
expressed by the student will not all be derivative, or 
a posteriori. The student's beliefs will necessarily be 
divisible into those which are a posteriori, and thus 
empirical, and those which are analytic a priori or 
function as such. The pragmatists' description of the 
relationship between truth and justification applies 
only to a posteriori, or empirical propositions. What, 
then, is to be said regarding the relationship between 
truth and justification in the case of a priori 
propositions? 
The beliefs the student has which reflect his way 
of categorizing the events and objects of the world are 
hiS a prioris. They are those beliefs which are 
functioning for him as definitions, which describe his 
concepts. I do not wish to take the position that 
definitions are simply stipulations, or that they must 
lead backwards to ostensive definitions and ultimately 
to sense data. I do not wish to take an empiricist 
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position on the matter of definitions, (13) nor do I 
wish to commit myself to an idealist view that 
definitions are of essences. All that I intend to say 
about a priori propositions is that they describe 
concepts and can be appraised as adequate or inadequate, 
if not as true or false. In the case of an individual's 
concepts, to say that they are adequate or inadequate is 
to say, at least, that they are publicly acceptable: the 
language is not being used in a wholly idiosyncratic 
fashion. (Logical coherence must be a criterion of the 
adequacy of any set of concepts. It is likely that the 
set ?f public concepts does not yet form a completely 
coherent network, nor yet does any subset. Consider, 
for example, the subset of concepts associated with the 
concept of education.) 
Whatever position one takes on the relationship 
between truth and justification, or of the criteria by 
which concepts are judged adequate or inadequate, both 
sorts of belief, those expressible as a priori and those 
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expressible as a posteriori propositions, must be 
justified. And whatever one takes to be the object of 
knowledge as such--a picture of the world as it is, or 
the more modest objective of the pragmatists, the 
knowledge that propositions are warranted--the methods 
of justification will have important characteristics in 
common. This claim is true, despite the fact that a 
priori and a posteriori propositions are distinguished 
from each other precisely in the way their "truth or 
falsity" come to be known. A posteriori propositions 
are those the truth of which can be determined by exper-
iment and observation, by the skillful employment of all 
the paraphernalia and equip~ent of scientific inquiry. 
But the tools of inquiry include, at least, the powerful 
tool known as logic. I say, "at least," since Dewey 
argued for the identity of inquiry and logic. Logic was 
not to be taken as it had been taken, as but a tool to 
demonstrate the truth of what was already known. Dewey 
believed, as Newton and Bacon believed, that rules of 
reasoning were "legislative of procedures as well as 
demonstrative of the truth of • • conclusions." (14) 
Dewey enlarges the concept of logic, identifying it with 
the entire process of inquiry. The point I wish to 
emphasize is that logic, reasoning (meaning the practice 
of, not the formal study of), is the means of coming to 
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know. 
Now, by definition, a prioris cannot be put to 
empirical test. How would a student try to justify the 
proposition, for him an a priori, "education is 
everything that a person learns?" He could be asked 
whether his concept is consistent with others' concepts 
of education, these to be suggested to him by way of 
examples. His concept can be tested by presenting 
hypotheses derived from it in the form of examples, to 
see if he can use the concept consistently. If he can, 
then he can say that learning to murder is a part of the 
education of a person who learns to murder, and he 
cannot say that education is necessarily improving. One 
would want a person to justify an idiosyncratic concept, 
for example, a concept of knowing that does not include 
the truth condition (in some sense of truth), by showing 
that it is preferable on the grounds of consistency. In 
short, a prioris, whether idiosyncratic or public, are 
to be tested by means of the techniques of concept 
analysis, and concept analysis, as much as experiment, 
is an exercise of reasoning skills. It is in this 
perfectly obvious sense that I mean that a prioris and a 
posterioris are to be justified using some of the same 
methods. Both sorts of proposition rely on the use of 
reasoning skills for their justification. That claim 
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should cause no objection whatsoever, and yet it bears 
elaboration. 
it is still not clear what is meant by justifying, 
and it will not help to translate justifying as "having 
evidence." "Having evidence" does not seem to apply at 
all when speaking of a priori propositions, and it is 
not clear what it means when speaking of a posteriori 
propositions. 
What does it mean to have evidence? If evidence 
can be had, can it be given? If the student memorizes 
the evidence, does he have it? Scheffler comes to this 
formulation: 
In every case where evidence is required for the 
right to be sure, knowing involves not merely having 
adequate evidential data but also appreciating their 
value as data, in the light of an appropriately 
patterned argument • • But what is it now to have 
such an argument? • Certainly he (the stude~ 
must do more than produce an accurate physical 
replica of the original proof (argument) he has 
seen; he must understand the proof, see its point. 
(15) 
What we now have is a claim that if I have 
evidence for an a posteriori proposition, I understand 
the relationship between the proposition which states 
the evidence and the proposition being defended to be 
the relationship "reason to believe." The relationship 
is a logical one. If a person can place a proposition 
in the context of an argument which serves to demon-
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strate the meaning of the proposition and at the same 
time to show how its truth or falsity may be ascer-
tained, then that person can be said either to under-
stand that proposition or to know how, in principle at 
least, to justify that proposition. For example, to 
understand the proposition "Chicago is a large city," is 
to be able to place it as the conclusion of an argument: 
"If a city is inhabited by at least one million persons, 
then it is a large city. Chicago is (according to the 
latest census figures) inhabited by more than one 
million persons. Therefore, Chicago is a large city." 
Taking the proposition "You'll get better teachers if 
you pay teachers better" to be an untested hypothesis, 
one might ask the speaker either "What do you mean by 
that?" or "How would you know that, or how could you 
know that?" and might receive in answer to either 
question (from a sophisticated student) that "If the 
hypothesis is true as stated, then it could be shown 
that, other things being equal, of two groups of 
teachers, those in the group having the higher salaries 
will be better teachers than those in the group having 
lower salaries, according to some criteria which, it is 
agreed, will indicate better teaching." If an empirical 
proposition can be understood, then it has meaning. In 
Scheffler's paraphrase of Peirce, "To have meaning . 
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it must embody conditional predictions testable by the 
senses," (16) an acceptable formulation if "it" is taken 
to refer only to empirical propositions. 
If to understand an empirical proposition is to be 
able to place it within th~ framework of an argument 
which specifies the conditions of its justification, 
what does it mean to understand what functions as an a 
priori, a definition of a concept? Understanding of a 
proposition which functions as an a priori is a matter 
of seeing what follows from it, of seeing it as a 
premise of an argument. What follows from it serves to 
test the adequacy or inadequacy of that concept by 
showing the relationship between it and other concepts, 
as can be seen in the case of the example of the concept 
of education proposed above. 
If I have evidence for the truth of an empirical 
proposition or can present the case for the adequacy of 
a proposition functioning as definitional, then I 
understand the proposition. Understanding is thus shown 
to be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of 
justifying a belief, and a necessary, though not 
sufficient condition of knowing. Justifying is linked 
to understanding, and understanding is linked to 
in te 11 i g i b i 1 i ty. If the student understands the 
proposition in which his belief is expressed, then he 
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can place it within the context of argument, and that is 
to say he can speak intelligibly, in a strong sense of 
intelligibly. (17) Speaking intelligibly is, therefore, 
also a prior condition of propositional knowledge, by 
which I mean to say that the discovery of knowledge is 
not the accomplishment of some sort of non-verbal 
process of inquiry which results in a belief which may 
then be justified in words. The struggle to know, or 
discover, cannot be distinguished from the struggle to 
.communicate, or justify. As has already been noted, 
Dewey refers to true propositions as those which can be 
justified, which are, that is, found warrantable when 
tested through experiment. But Dewey suggests an 
alternative way of characterizing true propositions, one 
which emphasizes the social nature of truth. He cites 
Peirce's as the best definition of truth: "The opinion 
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate." (18) Kennedy interprets Peirce and John 
Dewey to be saying that 
the 'truth' as here conceived implies that the 
processes of investigation, if pushed far enough, 
will give one certain answer to every meaningful 
question. In actual practice, however, many 
inquiries are interminable and the truth value of 
any particular belief must depend upon the 
indefinite prolongation of that inquiry. Charac-
teristically, applications of the method of science 
do not result in certainty but in progressive 
approximations to an eventual consensus. 
(19) 
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consensus is the key word. The inquiry process is not a 
private affair, for "No isolated individual, however 
intelligently he applies "scientific method," can be 
sure of his results." (20) Knowledge is public in the 
sense that it is a joint or collective creation of 
mankind. All inquiry presupposes a "social or public 
context that is the medium for funding the warranted 
conclusions and norms for further inquiry • • Inquiry 
both requires such a community and helps to further the 
development of this community." (21) If propositions 
are true, they are fated to be agreed on and they are 
intelligible. The world of knowledge is public and 
sharable, and the struggle to speak intelligibly is a 
condition of entrance into it. 
Honest questioning can be seen as the effort to 
understand by a person who has, at least, an intuitive 
feeling for what it means to understand. The teacher 
who is willing to acknowledge that a student may have 
good reasons for his beliefs and gives him a chance to 
express these has a better chance of promoting 
intelligibility than the teacher who quickly concludes 
that she does understand and judges that he is right or 
wrong. The teacher as honest questioner demands greater 
explicitness of the student and of herself. In ordinary 
conversations, participants do not demand of each other 
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explicitness, at least until they recognize that they 
have not, in fact, been commmunicating. A responsive 
listener sometimes supplies adequate support for a 
proposition, and gives the speaker credit for speaking 
intelligibly even though he is not doing so. An obtuse 
listener may, being unable to supply the necessary 
supports, accuse the speaker of not making sense when 
perhaps the speaker simply thought the supporting 
premises too obvious to mention. A credulous listener 
may not recognize what it means to support a propo-
sition, will accept any proposition as stated, and 
cannot be said to understand at all in a strict sense of 
understanding. It may be true that, other things being 
equal, the greater the listener's abi.lity to evaluate 
the speaker's argument, the more likely her questions 
will be to reflect her understanding of the inquiry 
process and thus the more effectively she will promote 
intelligibility, but that is a matter I do not wish to 
take up. I am content to say that the effort of a 
teacher to find out what the student believes and why is 
an effort to understand what he says, and that honest 
questioning, itself a form of inquiry, is well-adapted 
to that end. 
In answering honest questions, the student will 
find out what? It has already been said that he finds 
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out, often, that he is not saying what he wants to say, 
does not know what he wants to say, and so on. In the 
case of beliefs which have empirical content, he may 
find that, on the basis of what he already recognizes as 
evidence, he must modify a belief or contradict himself. 
occasionally he will convert a belief to knowledge, 
finding that he can justify it. It is not being claimed 
that the efforts of a student to respond to honest 
questioning will be sufficient to enable him to justify 
his a posteriori beliefs. A student may come to 
understand what he believes, and that means that he 
knows what would count as evidence for it. One outcome 
of discussion might be a proposal for an experiment. In 
the case of those beliefs which function as a prioris, 
honest questioning alone can be sufficient to enable the 
student to recognize their inadequacy or adequacy, 
although it may not be sufficient to enable him to 
discover a more adequate concept to replace a less 
adequate one. 
Some "knowledge that," may be one outcome of a 
discussion, but this, however valuable, is not the most 
important outcome. More important by far is the "know 
how" which results. It was said earlier that "knowing 
that" depends on understanding~ I restate that claim 
here in a more general, and a decidedly ambiguous form: 
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"knowing how" is prior to "knowing that." In one sense, 
that means that knowledge of how to justify precedes 
propositional knowledge. The student may not, as a 
result of honest questioning, be able to justify a 
particular belief, but he will learn how to justify. 
That is the sort of "know how" towards which honest 
questioning leads, and I shall say why it is a more 
important outcome than "know that." 
First, the student has beliefs, as all persons do. 
He may be able to convert a small portion of his beliefs 
to knowledge new to him or new to the human race. But 
he cannot possibly convert all of his beliefs to first-
hand knowledge. 
edge of others. 
All of us are dependent on the knowl-
If the species is to accumulate 
knowledge, then individuals must be able to trust others 
and know when not to suspend belief until it can be 
converted to knowledge. If we are to "share" knowledge 
then we have to be able to evaluate the propositions of 
others. We do this in two ways, first by evaluating the 
trustworthiness of others in a moral sense--would they 
intend to deceive?--and second by evaluating their 
trustworthiness in an intellectual sense--are they 
competent inquirers? We can participate in knowledge 
only to the extent that others are trustworthy. If they 
are not, then we are foolish to believe what they tell 
us and wise to suspend belief until we know. (22) 
Knowledge is a social product in every sense of the 
phrase. It is generated collectively as a result of 
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social interaction, and it is generated in an individual 
through social interaction. It comes into being as the 
effort is made to share it, or, in other words, as the 
result of the attempt to justify beliefs. Our chief 
means of evaluating the intellectual trustworthiness of 
others is our own skill at evaluating argument. Each 
human being must, if he is to "share'' in knowledge be 
able to evaluate the arguments of others, and if he is 
to be able to "share" his knowledge with others, he must 
be able to place his beliefs within the framework of 
argument. He must, in short, know what it means to know 
how to justify beliefs. (23) 
If what I have said is true, if "knowing that" 
depends on knowing how to justify and if knowing how to 
justify is of such individual and collective importance, 
then the teacher should teach students how to justify 
beliefs. But the ability to justify depends on 
understanding, so one must ask how the teacher can bring 
about understanding. In fact, although we sometimes do 
speak of the teacher making a student understand, we are 
as likely to speak of the student's understanding as a 
condition of his learning. It is certain that we do not 
speak of teaching a student to understand. (It would 
sound as odd to ask how one could teach the student to 
understand as to ask how one could teach another to 
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hear. Hearing can be trained, but only if there is some 
prior capacity to hear.) But it is the case that what 
goes on between teacher and student can affect the 
student's sense of what it means to understand. In 
particular, the teacher's effort to understand what the 
student says prompts the student's understanding of what 
he says. Put another way, the student learns to 
justify, by trying to justify. (24) 
That sounds like a psychological claim, one that 
ought to be dealt with in subsequent chapters. So, i~ a 
sense, it is, and so it will be. But it is also a claim 
about the relationship between "knowing that'' and 
''knowing how," conceived as a relationship between 
theory and practice, which is not the way it has 
previously been discussed in this chapter. In How We 
Think, John Dewey describes the process of thinking or 
problem solving as a matter of suggestion, converting 
felt perplexity into a problem, forming of hypotheses 
and gathering of data, the elaboration of ideas, or 
reasoning in the narrow sense, and the testing of 
hypotheses. (25) Perhaps the more accomplished one is 
as a thinker the more one approaches that idealized 
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version, but if Dewey had intended that model as a 
prescription for thinking, then the same comments could 
be leveled against it that Ryle levels against the rules 
of logic: 
Rules of correct reasoning were first extracted by 
Aristotle, yet men knew how to avoid and detect 
fallacies before they learned his lessons, just as 
men sin'ce Aristotle, and including Aristotle, 
ordinarily conduct their arguments without making 
any internal reference to his formulae. They do not 
plan their arguments before constructing them. 
Indeed if they had to plan what to think before 
thinking it they would never think at all; for this 
planning would itself be unplanned. (26) 
Dewey did not intend his model to be a prescrip-
tion, but a description, idealized, of how thinking 
proceeds. And he certainly did not think he was 
proposing an instructional model. Dewey well understood 
the distinction between the order of knowledge and the 
order of learning. I am consistent with Ryle and with 
Dewey on this point. I maintain that learning how to 
justify is one kind of learning how and that it is 
learned as other learnings how are learned: by practice. 
Ryle describes "knowing that" as theorizing, and 
theorizing as but a kind of practice learned by 
practice. He echoes Vygotsky when he writes that "this 
trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired 
neither quickly nor without effort; and it is a necesary 
condition of our acquiring it that we should have 
157 
previously learned to talk intelligently aloud and have 
heard and understood other people doing so." (27) I 
sal that the propo~ition "'know how' precedes 'know 
that'" is ambiguous. Besides meaning that knowing how 
to justify this particular proposition precedes my 
knowing that this proposition is the case, it means that 
knowing how to justify precedes my knowledge of the 
principles of justification, that is, precedes any 
explicit knowledge that these are principles of 
reasoning or inquiry. (28) This is to echo Dewey, 
echoing Aristotle: "while inquiry is the causa 
cognoscendi of logical forms, primary inquiry is itself 
causa essendi of the forms which inquiry discloses." 
(29) A few paragraphs above I said knowledge comes into 
being as a result of an effort to justify our beliefs. 
It is also true that on an individual and on a 
collective level our effort to know brings into being 
our ways of knowing. 
In this chapter I have argued that honest 
questioning does lead the student to knowing. I have 
ar ued by showing what is meant by "knowing that" and by 
showing the ways in which it may be said that "knowing 
how" is a condition of "knowing that." In making 
"knowing that" dependent on understanding, I am making 
it dependent on ability to use the language. But 
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"knowing that" is propositional knowledge and 
o~ropositional knowledge is knowledge that can be 
expressed in linguistic symbols. The distinction 
implicit in the chapter is one which i~ aptly paralleled 
in the distinction between learning to say rules of 
grammar and learning to use the language. Why the 
distinction is important, and hence, why honest 
questioning brings the student to know, are the 
questions to be taken up in the next chapter. 
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1. It will already be obvious that I wish to 
distinguish knowing from remembering, although 
remembering may be a condition of belief and, therefore, 
a condition of knowing that. It would make no sense to 
speak of someone with no ability to recall anything 
whatsoever of his past experience as knowing anything. 
But remembering is not synonymous with knowing. That 
there is a distinction between the two is apparent to 
students who are required to memorize masses of material 
which make no sense to them, although the distinction is 
sometimes ignored by the teachers of those students. 
The practice of teachers who ignore the distinction 
between remembering and knowing exemplifies what is 
called the "transmission of information model of 
teaching/ learning." Israel Scheffler criticizes this, 
which he refers to as the impression model of 
teaching/learning, in both its sensory and verbal 
variants. He does so because the student is "heir to 
the complex culture of belief built up out of 
innumerable creative acts of intellect of the past, and 
comprising a patterned view of the world. To give the 
child even the richest selection of sense data or 
particular facts alone would in no way guarantee his 
building up anything resembling what we think of as 
knowledge much less his developing the ability to 
retrieve and apply such knowledge in new circumstances." 
"Philosophical Models of Teaching" Harvard Educational 
Review 35 (Spring 1965):134. 
2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Knowledge and 
Belief," by Anthony Quinton. I understand that what is 
meant by each of these conditions varies according to 
whether a philosopher is rationalist, empiricist, 
pragmatist, positivist or other. A teacher may wish to 
find a position of safety with respect to knowing, in 
territory over which epistemologists no longer dispute, 
but if there is no such territory, perhaps she can be 
forgiven for jumping borders if she can show that an 
irresponsible eclecticism is not her goal. An alternate 
solution to the problem is offered by David Harrah: "The 
difficulties with the concept of knowledge are very 
deep. No one has yet produced a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for knowledge--a definition that 
works in all cases and is not subject to counter-
examples. The best that a teacher can do, if the 
tea her insists on using the notion of knowledge, is to 
instill in the student some caution about making 
knowledge claims. The safe locution is 'I believe that 
~ is true, and I have good reasons for believing it'. 
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Correspondingly, instead of analyzing questions in terms 
of 'make me know', it might be better to analyze in 
terms of 'make me believe, and have good reasons for 
believing'. There are many problems that still have to 
be resolved concerning the notion of good reason, but we 
are much more likely to obtain a satisfactory theory of 
good reasons than we are to obtain a satisfactory theory 
of knowledge." "What Should We Teach about Questions?" 
Synthese 51 (1982):27. One easily accessible 
colllection of papers on the problem of knowledge as 
seen by twentieth century philosophers is Knowledge and 
Belief, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths, Oxford Readings in 
Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
3. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Knowledge and 
Belief," by Anthony Quinton. 
4. Aristotle may not have agreed. On occasion at 
least, Aristotle distinguished didactics from 
dialectics: "Of arguments in dialogue form there are 
four classes: Didactic, Dialectical, Examination 
arguments, and Contentious arguments. Didactic 
arguments are those that reason from the principles 
appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions 
held by the answerer (for the learner should take things 
on trust): dialectical arguments ~re those that reason 
from premises generally accepted, to the contradictory 
of a given thesis • ." Aristotle On Sophistical 
Refutations 165b. But H. Tredennick writes that 
"Clearly Aristotle is thinking of 'dialectic,' as a 
means of instruction distinct from science (which seeks 
only to discover and demonstrate the truth) " 
Aristotle Posterior Analytics, trans. H. ~redennick. 
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), p. 24, fn. b. 
5. John Dewey, Quest for Certainty, p. 383. 
6. The educational literature, most of which 
emerges from the field of psychology, says little about 
the formation of belief. Perhaps philosophers of 
education are more willing to deal with the matter. 
Israel Scheffler does and is sure that the teacher ought 
to affect the student's belief. Although he is writing 
from the position of one who believes that knowledge is 
transmitted from the teacher, what he writes can be read 
as partial endorsement of honest questioning: "It is 
crucial that we recognize not only the ramifications of 
belief in conduct but also the influence of motivation 
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and social climate on verbal expression. If we aim to 
engage the student's belief and not simply to shape his 
verbal output, we need to be able to communicate with 
him. For this to be possible, we need to create an 
atmosphere of security, so that verbal expression may 
approximate genuine belief. Such an atmosphere itself 
would seem to require an emphasis on rational discussion 
free of constraint and free of propagandistic tenden-
cies: this emphasis underlies the common or standard 
sense of teaching." Conditions of Knowledge, Keystones 
of Education Series (Glenview, Il.: Scott, Foresman, 
1965), p. 90. 
7. There is plenty of research to substantiate the 
belief that prior beliefs can interfere with the acqui-
sition of new beliefs. See, for example, the now 
classic RemembeTing by F. C. Bartlett. The interference 
can occur in the form of the distortion, or assimilation 
to schema noted by Bartlett and by Piaget. If prior 
beliefs can interfere in this or other ways, the teacher 
has an additional reason to find out what the student 
believes before she tries to implant new beliefs. This 
is a psychological matter and will be dealt with, indi-
rectly, in the next chapter. Psychologists, however, 
are not the only ones to recognize the pedagogical value 
of beginning with those beliefs a student has. 
Scheffler's reference to Poincar6's essay, "Mathematical 
Definitions and Education," is relevant here if one can 
accept the comparability of "images and intuitions" to 
"beliefs." "Poincare' suggests the importance • • of 
respecting the initial (faulty) images and intuitions of 
students in the process of mathematical education. If 
we reject these images and intuitions prematurely and 
force upon the students our superior formal 
constructions resting upon premises that 'seem to them 
less evident than the conclusion, what will the wretched 
pupils think? They will think that the science of 
mathematics is nothing but an arbitrary aggregation of 
useless subtleties • • ' Poincar~ counsels initial 
encouragement of the pupils' intuitions and images so 
that, working with them, the pupils will begin to 
realize their inadequacies of themselves, at which point 
our formal demonstrations will be welcome and 
beneficial." Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p. 71. 
8. As may be seen in the transcript, there are 
many ways to ask a student why he believes what he 
believes. One doesn't always ask for reasons in those 
words, although one sometimes might. Ryle says that the 
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question "Why do you believe?" is a question about 
motive, not a request for a reason or evidence. Concept 
of Mind, p. 134. Strictly speaking, Ryle may be 
correct. But however it is phrased, I do not think the 
question is so taken. I have never known anyone to 
respond that they believe out of fear, or because a 
belief suits their purposes or makes them feel good, and 
if anyone were to make such a response, I would think it 
odd, or not to be taken seriously. People cannot always 
give a reason, but they interpret the question as a 
request for one. 
9. The correspondence theory claims that there is 
some one to one correspondence between propositions and 
the world as it really is. Whatever that means, we 
cannot get outside ourselves to see whether there is 
such correspondence. Presumably, however, if we are to 
survive in the world, our beliefs should correspond to 
our experience of the world. If we stick our fingers in 
the fire, we will get burned. And we will get burned 
whether we do or do not believe it. Our recognition of 
the effects of our actions is a condition of our 
survival, a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, 
for we may after all choose not to survive. According 
to one interpretation of the coherence theory, the truth 
or falsity of a statement is determined as it is or is 
not "a member of system whose elements are related to 
each other by ties of logical implication." 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Coherence Theory of 
Truth," by Alan R. White. It is plain that it is 
possible for humans, individually and collectively, to 
produce systems of beliefs which are internally 
consistent but have no reference to the world, e.g. 
mathematical structures. Therefore, if truth is 
expected to have some reference to the world, coherence 
is not a sufficient condition of truth. And yet it 
seems also obvious that coherence must be a condition of 
truth. What can it mean to say so? First, it is 
sensible to recognize that consistency has two 
dimensions. It can refer to our efforts to categorize 
the things and events in the world in some way. Certain 
phenomena which warm my body, burn it if I get too 
close, are to be categorized as similar and conveniently 
labelled "fire." Adequate classification schemes are 
the foundation of knowledge, and categorization is our 
chief and most difficult intellectual task. It is not 
one I can perform alone. My consistency is judged by 
others, and it is judged not simply by observing my 
actions, but by observing my language, that is, my 
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efforts to symbolize my experience. Coherence is a 
condition of communication and refers to interhuman 
intelligibility. And it may be that there is a 
relationship between coherence and the description of 
correspondence given above. While we can devise a 
coherent set of propositions bearing no relationship to 
our experience, in practice we usually do not do so. As 
human beings we are not compelled to act but are free to 
symbolize action. Coherence does not guarantee truth, 
but is a test of truth: if we disagree with ourselves, 
or with others, at least one of our propositions is 
wrong. The test of coherence itself doesn't tell us 
which proposition fails to correspond, and we must test 
each against other propositions, or against actions. 
This position is in part close to Hamlyn's: 
"Interpersonal agreement provides the criterion for the 
concept of truth, the point of application through which 
the concept of truth becomes intelligible, and without 
which truth is impossible." The Theory of Knowledge, 
Modern Introductions to Philosophy, ed. D. J. 0 1 Connor 
(London: The MacMillan Press, 1970), p. 142. 
. 
10. It may be that most of us speak in ordinary 
conversation as if we accepted the position that truth 
is independent of justification. But perhaps we do not 
always do so. We may believe that truth is independent 
of our ability to justify it, but not that the ability 
to justify is independent of the truth. We may be 
inclined to believe that a particular belief cannot be 
justified because it is not true. Another view of the 
relationship between justification and truth is 
exemplified when the reply "Because it's true," is 
offered to a "Why do you believe x?" question. The 
multiplicity of positions on the relationship between 
truth and justification indicate that there may be as 
many lay views of truth itself today as there are 
professional views. One I find to be common amongst 
students is the view that truth is entirely relative to 
the believer: a belief can be true for one person but 
not for another. 
11. James E. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of 
Method: Quest for the Philosopher's Stone in Education," 
School Review 67 (Summer 1959):222. 
12. "Knowledge which is merely a reduplication of 
ideas of what exists already in the world may afford us 
the satisfaction of a photograph, but that is all." 
John Dewey, Quest for Certainty (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
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sons, Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 137. Knowledge is 
something else, something other than an acquaintance 
with things as they really are. Dewey wanted "a phil-· 
osophy which holds that we experience things as they 
really are apart from knowing, and that knowledge is a 
mode of experiencing things which facilitates control of 
objects for purposes of non-cognitive experiences." 
Ibid., p. 98. He argued that "the scientific way of 
thinking about things does not give the inner reality of 
things--it is simply an instrumental way of thinking 
about things." Ibid., p. 136. Dewey's choice of the 
word "control", echoing as it does both the idea of 
man's claim to dominion over the earth and Bacon's 
assertion that "knowledge is power," will not go 
unchallenged in these times. "Knowledge" may in fact be 
used to control, but one can accept much of Dewey's 
position without either defining knowledge as an 
instrument of control or accepting control as its 
purpose. If humankind learns that fecal bacteria poison 
drinking water, humankind can arrange to protect the 
drinking water source from this form of pollution. But 
in this case, if control is being exerted, then it is 
over man as much as nature. If Dewey does not mean by 
control "exploitation or manipulation of the 
environment" in disregard of long range consequences, 
then his idea that control is the purpose of knowledge 
becomes acceptable. 
The justification condition is sometimes referred 
to as the evidence condition, and there are different 
descriptions of it as the evidence condition. Roderick 
Chisholm's "the proposition must be one which, for him, 
is evident," [Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 102.] may 
not mean the same as Israel Scheffler's "X has adequate 
evidence that Q." (Conditions of Knowledge, p. 21.) 
Leaving the question unanswered, and the differences 
between Chisholm and Scheffler unanalyzed, I shall make 
the assumption that, adequately interpreted, "having 
evidence," "being evident," "warrantable," and 
"justifiable" would not be inconsistent with each other 
and would at least overlap in meaning. 
13. As the quotation cited on pages 132-3 indi-
cates, Dewey took "first principles" not as absolute 
truths, but as hypotheses. For discussion, see his 
Logic, A Theory of Inquiry, especially Chapter VIII. 
It is a bad example that McClellan chooses, but I 
think it may be figured out from it what Dewey meant by 
concept or definition: "When Dewey argues that the 
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statement "This table is real" takes its meaning from 
the concrete operations by which we adjust ourselves and 
other objects to this table, it is clear that he means 
for method to define reality and not vice versa. This 
contrasts with the common-sense notion of the chemist, 
let us say, who would think that his procedures of 
quantitative analysis were good to the extent that they 
told him what the table was really composed of, while 
Dewey is saying that the statement "The table is really 
a molecular structure of form F" means that certain 
concrete operations, themselves subspecies of general 
philosophical method, were performed on the table." 
"Dewey and the Concept of Method • ," School Review 
67 (Summer 1959):222. It is an odd example, because the 
table is not defined simply as wood. The predicate does 
not define table although it may be a fruitful 
hypothesis about wood. 
14. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of • ," 
School Review 67 (Summer 1959):215. By making reasoning 
a part of or synonymous with inquiry, the illusion that 
the boundary between the context of discovery arid the 
context of justification can be clearly demarcated is 
destroyed. 
15. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p. 70. In 
discussing the question of the evidence, or justifi-
cation condition, and a person's knowledge of his own 
feelings (physical sensations and emotions), Scheffler 
concludes that we must grant that individuals know that 
they have a headache even though we do not require them 
to offer evidence: "It would seem, then, that the 
evidence condition is too strong a general requirement 
for propositional knowledge. For in such cases as we 
have lately considered, a person may indeed know that Q 
without having adequate evidence that Q." Ibid., p. 60. 
There are various grounds on which to differ with 
Scheffler on this point. One may admit that in some 
sense of know individuals know what they feel. One may 
say with Dewey that neither direct experience of things 
as they are, nor reports of things as they are, are what 
we mean by knowledge. If one is a teacher, one may 
si estep the matter altogether. A headache is a private 
experience whether one does or does not want to speak of 
awareness of it as knowledge, and teachers should be 
primarily, if not exclusively, concerned to initiate the 
student into not private but public knowledge. 
Scheffler has distinguished several kinds of 
knowings. It is in consequence of this distinction that 
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Scheffler writes that "While, however, there may indeed 
be contexts in which knowing X conveys the connotation 
of understanding X, it does not seem plausible to make 
the proposed general reduction. A person may say 
without contradiction, 'I know the doctrines of the 
existentialists, but I don't understand them.' Or we may 
say of a child, 'He knows Newton's laws (or Shake-
speare's plays) but doesn't yet understand them.'" 
Ibid., p. 17. The knowing that Scheffler refers to here 
is remembering. While remembering may be a condition of 
knowledge, it may not be a temporally prior condition. 
It is not necessary to remember a bit of information 
before coming to know it. I insist that teachers should 
keep the distinction between remembering and knowing in 
mind, and would say with McClellan that if the student 
cannot know in the strong sense, which does include 
having evidence, and therefore understanding, he ought 
not be required to know in the sense of remember. At 
page 70 Scheffler appears to take a position which 
includes that of McClellan: "being evident" in 
McClellan's terms must be close to what Scheffler means 
by 'appreciating their value as data.' See also Ryle, 
Concept of Mind, p. 54: "Understanding is a part of 
knowing how." 
16. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p·. 42. 
And elsewhere he writes: 11 it does not follow that the 
student will know these new facts simply because he has 
been informed_;____ • knowing requires something more 
than the receipt and acceptance of true information. It 
requires that the student earn the right to his 
assurance of the truth of the information in question. 
New information, in short, can be intelligibly conveyed 
by statements; new knowledge cannot . • To know the 
proposition expressed by a sentence is more than just to 
have been told or to have grasped its meaning, and to 
have accepted it. It is to have earned that right, 
through one's own effort or position, to an assurance of 
its truth." Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of 
Teaching," Harvard Educational Review 35 (Spring 
1965): 137 0 
17. McClellan, "Dewey and the Concept of • 
School Review (Summer 1959):228. Although we do speak 
of understanding the world on those occasions when we 
can predict events, we do not in fact understand the 
world, nor is it intelligible. Predictability is not 
sufficient condition of intelligibility. The motions 
" 
a 
of 
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the planets are predictable but that is not the same as 
saying that the motions of the planets are intelligible. 
If we insist on such an equation, we are then committed 
to saying that those forms of psychopathic behavior 
which are predictable are intelligible. To deny the 
intelligibility and, therefore, the understandability of 
the world is to quarrel with John Dewey (Quest for 
Certainty, p. 210 and Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. 
"John Dewey.") if he meant that the world is literally 
understandable, literally intelligible. Perhaps most 
people would take Dewey's side. Nonetheless, it cannot 
be the case that the non-human world and the speech of a 
human being are understandable or intelligible in the 
same way. If the world is understandable, it is 
predictable by man. If what a person says is 
understandable, it is coherent, not merely predictable. 
It is when we speak of human beings as being 
understandable that we approach the core of the meaning 
of the concept "understand," yet further distinctions 
must be made. For sometimes we understand how another 
feels and sometimes we understand how another thinks and 
our understandings may not be of the same kind. Even 
the phrase "understand how you feel" is ambiguous. For 
example, we may say we understand another person when we 
mean that we know or think we know what his feelings 
are, perhaps even sympathize, but nevertheless say that 
there is no reason to feel that way. But in this sort 
of case the word "understanding" is being pushed into 
service beyond the borders of its core meaning. I say 
this not because understanding in a strict sense can 
have no reference to matters of feeling. It is well 
within the boundaries of the core meaning of under-
standing to say that we understand how another feels 
when we know why that person feels as he or she does and 
believe they have good reason to do so. We commonly, 
and I believe correctly, make the assumption that people 
do have reasons for feelings, and if a person has no 
good reason that we can see for feeling as he or she 
does, we say we do~ understand those feelings. If we 
say we understand how someone feels and mean that we 
acknowledge that person has a reason to feel as he or 
she does, then our usage is consistent with what I take 
to be the central meaning of the word "understanding''. 
We may also say that we understand when we see how 
a person made a mistake. And we mean that we can see 
how they thought and can perhaps explain to them what 
they didn't understand. In a strict sense we didn't 
understand their position, since in a strict sense it 
was unintelligible. But we say we can understand when 
168 
we can reconstruct some argument so that we see how, if 
they took this as the premise, they got there, or, see 
bow, if they didn't know this or mistook x for y, their 
reasoning followed. When:-hOwever, a person's 
procedures appear to have been quite without reason, 
then we are baffled and neither understand nor know what 
to do to help. 
I would like to say that it is not persons we 
understand but what persons say when they speak 
intelligibly. If I cannot make a case strong enough to 
sustain that position, then I will retreat to the 
position that the words "understand" and "intelligible" 
are homonymous. 
18. John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 345n. 
19. Gail Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic and Theory of 
Knowledge," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo 
Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Il.: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1970), p. 83. 
20. Ibid., p. 82. 
21. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "John Dewey" 
by Richard Bernstein. 
22. Scheffler: "What seems indubitably more 
appropriate in all these cases of knowing is an emphasis 
on the processes of deliberation, argument, judgment, 
appraisal of reasons ~ and con, weighing of evidence, 
appeal to principles, and decision-making, . It is 
in terms of such principles of deliberation, or the 
potentiality for it, rather than in terms of simple 
vision, that the distinctiveness of knowing is primarily 
to be understood." "Philosophical Models of Teaching," 
Harvard Educational Review 35 (Spring 1965):138. Wil-
liam James is quoted by Gail Kennedy as having written 
"thinking is one mode among others--a peculiarly 
efficient one--of adapting to an exigent environment." 
"Dewey's Logic and Theory of Knowledge," Guide to the 
Works of John Dewey, p. 63. And John Dewey wrote: "By 
means of symbols, whether gestures, words or more 
elaborate constructions, we act without acting. That 
is, we perform experiments by means of symbols which 
have results which are themselves only symbolized, and 
which do not therefore commit us to actual or existenial 
consequences. If a man starts a fire or insults a 
rival, effects follow; the die is cast. But if he 
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rehearses the act in symbols in privacy, he can 
anticipate and appreciate_its result. Then he can act 
or not act overtly on the basis of what is anticipated 
and is not there in fact. The invention or discovery of 
symbols is doubtless by far the single greatest event in 
the history of man. Without them, no intellectual 
advance is possible; with them, there is no limit set to 
intellectual development except inherent stupidity." 
Quest for Certainty, p. 151. 
23. "Those educators who stress so-called dis-
covery and problem-solving methods in schooling may, in 
fact, be operating upon the general presumption that 
such methods lead to strong knowing as an outcome. An 
emphasis on teaching, with its distinctive connotations 
of rational explanation and critical dialogue, may have 
the same point: to develop a sort of learning in which 
the student will be capable of backing his beliefs by 
appropriate and sufficient means." Scheffler, 
Conditions of Knowledge, p. 10. "We can see the whole 
course of a child's education as involving the 
progressive incorporation, and increasingly au~onomous 
use, of these standards • The implicit appeal to 
standards of adequacy in knowledge attributions means 
that, in an important sense, these attributions have a 
normative function as well as a descriptive one: They 
attribute belief in "Q" and affirm the truth of "Q," 
but they also appraise-the believer's grounds fo_r __ __ 
belief, in the light of assumed standards." Ibid., p. 
58. 
24. The claim that the student's efforts to win 
the teacher's understanding will result in the student's 
coming to speak more intelligibly is not as much at 
variance with ordinary experience as one might at first 
think. Although the roles are reversed, it is a claim 
which finds support in the anecdote of the professor who 
reported that he looked up, having said what he had to 
say, and saw a sea of blank faces. He paraphrased what 
he had said and still looked out on a sea of blank 
faces, and so he paraphrased again. This time, he 
reported, wrily, he understood what he had said. Such 
experiences are not unusual. A further reason why the 
student should do the talking and in particular should 
talk about his beliefs has to do with what might be 
thought of a motivation. John Passmore skirts my 
meaning when he writes that "A child will be encouraged 
to be critical only if he finds that both he and his 
teacher can be at any time called upon to defend what 
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they say--to produce, in relation to it, the relevant 
kind of ground. This is very different from being 
called upon, on a set occasion, to produce a case in 
favour of one side in a debate." "On Teaching to be 
Critical," The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1967), p. 198. I would go 
much further than that, saying that the student cannot 
reasonably be expected to defend what he has read or 
heard if he doesn't believe it, and then I would say 
that, therefore, if the student is not encouraged to 
defend his own beliefs, it is unlikely that he will 
learn to be critical in the desirable sense. I suspect 
that one reason why teachers often fail to get students 
talking in class is that they are asking students to 
talk on matters about which they have no opinions 
whatsoever, i. e., about what the teacher has asked them 
to read. 
25. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath, 
1933), p. 107. 
26. Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 30. 
27. Ibid., p. 27. See Lev Vygotsky, Thought and 
Language, trans. and ed. Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude 
Vakar (Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1962). I hope 
that what I have said will not be seen to be contra-
dictory to this: "The force of the evidence condition 
may be illustrated historically by reference to St. 
Augustine's theory of teaching. Augustine argues 
against the idea that the teacher transmits knowledge 
through words. Words are signs referring to reality, he 
says, and knowledge is not a matter simply of having the 
words. It requires also a personal confrontation with 
the reality to which the words refer. Without such 
confrontation, the student may, at best, acquire belief, 
but not knowledge." Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, 
p. 55. 
28. Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 41. A discussion of 
the possibility of reducing "knowing that" to "knowing 
how" with reference to Hartland-Swann and Jane Roland 
would be useful here, but I must forego it for now. A 
propos of the point I am making: "for it is only in the 
practice of an activity that we can acquire the know-
ledge of how to practise it," and the whole of the essay 
from which that quotation is taken, Michael Oakeshott's 
"Rational Conduct," Rationalism in Politics (London: 
Methuen, 1962), p. 101. 
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29. Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, p. 4. 
CHAPTER VI 
HONEST QUESTIONING AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
I would like now to show some relationships 
between honest questioning and Piagetian theory. I 
shall make no effort to summarize Piaget's work. Taken 
as a whole his theory is complicated, and, according to 
many critics, it is seriously flawed. I shall mention 
some of the flaws in my discussion as I try to fit 
honest questioning into the Piagetian framework, but I 
leave open the question of the stability of that 
framework as a whole. Since Piagetian theory is not 
accepted by all, it might be asked why one would choose 
it as a point of reference. An answer to that question 
is that it is sensible to try to show one's own 
relationship to a major figure, in order to locate 
oneself; one chooses as points of reference major 
figures, such as Aristotle or Kant, not their critics. 
Critics have challenged Piaget's position at its 
foundations: on the source and nature of "structures," 
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an on the relationship between language and thought, 
yet it seems likely that much of what Piaget has 
proposed--what he has proposed, for example, on the role 
of activity and cognitive conflict in development--will 
endure. 
Points of Contact with Piagetian Theory 
There are, briefly, four points I shall make. 
First, I will try to say how it is that I can claim any 
sort of relationship to a theory of cognitive devel-
opment. My effort may be seen as quixotic given that 
the effects of honest questioning ("knowing that" and 
"knowing how") do not seem to be effects which Piaget 
would identify as cognitive development. Second, I will 
show that, while I agree with Piaget that words cannot 
substitute for action in cognitive development, action 
on words can be genuine action. The significance of 
this point is that the student engaged in answering 
honest questions is active, not passive. The third 
point I will argue is that honest questioning is a form 
of social interaction representative of the kind of 
social interaction which is, according to Piaget, 
necessary for cognitive development. The fourth point I 
will make is related to the third: it is that honest 
questioning leads to cognitive conflict, which is 
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necessary if development is to take place. If I can 
make these points, I will have shown that honest 
questioning is justifiable from a Piagetian point of 
view on the grounds that it is likely to foster 
cognitive development, and I may also have shown how the 
effects of honest questioning might be explained in 
terms of Piagetian theory. Whether I have been able to 
do the latter depends on whether one accepts Piaget's 
account, on whether one accepts knowing how as dependent 
on or as implying cognitive development, or on whether 
one accepts that two different phenomena, i. e. 
cognitive development and knowing how can be explained 
in the same way. 
I will not dwell long on the first point. I 
cannot begin to establish that what Piaget means by 
cognitive development is the same as what I mean by 
knowing how. By cognitive development, Piaget is 
referring to the development of logico-mathematical 
thinking, best exemplified by scientific thinking. 
Piaget distinguishes development from physical knowledge 
of the world, which includes, for example, knowledge of 
the shapes, colors, weights of objects. (1) By knowing 
how, I am speaking in particular of knowing how to 
justify, and that means, knowing how to reason, how to 
place propositions within the framework of an argument. 
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Knowing how to justify is a skill dependent on, at 
least, if not identical with, the ability to use 
language. It is a skill which clearly does include the 
ability to think hypothetically, and this ability to 
think hypothetically, to reason on symbols, is the mark 
of the person who has reached the formal operational 
stage of thinking. This, according to Piaget, is the 
highest stage of thinking. Perhaps it would be safe to 
say that the way one goes about trying to justify a 
belief is an indicator of one's level of cognitive 
development. It may be, but I am trying to show that 
cognitive development will be promoted by honest 
questioning, which is to say that it can be promoted by 
the use of words. 
Piaget speaks of logico-mathematical knowledge as 
discovered, or constructed, and, as is well known, he 
claims that these discoveries precede language. This is 
one of the basic issues on which critics challenge him. 
Piaget is claiming that logico-mathematical knowledge is 
essentially non-linguistic, while others claim the 
contrary. Brian Rotman argues that Piaget misun-
derstands "the nature and status of proof, seeing it as 
a relatively unimportant part of mathematical thought 
subsidiary to the invention or discovery of structure." 
(2) Rotman, a mathematician himself, says that there 
are parts of mathematics, the calculus being just one 
example, "where the method of argument and not the 
creation of new strutture is central." (3) Piaget has 
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separated, mistakenly, the context of discovery from the 
context of justification. "Contrary to the assump-
tions of Piaget's structuralist outlook, an important 
part of mathematical creativity consists of using 
mathematics as a language; a language for talking about 
parts of the mathematical world itself." (4) Despite 
the efforts of Rotman and others, the debate over the 
relationship between language and thought will continue, 
and hence the question whether cognitive development is 
the same as "knowing how" cannot yet be resolved. I 
shall assume the worst case, that the two are not the 
same and argue my case from that point of view. 
As I have already acknowledged, it might seem that 
if cognitive development is not the same as "knowing 
that" and "knowing how," then it is absurd for me to try 
to lean on Piaget for support. The situation appears to 
be analogous to that of a farmer arguing that particular 
methods of cultivation will produce firm apples on the 
grounds that someone else claims they will produce juicy 
peaches. But the situations are not analogous. I am 
claiming that honest questioning effectively initiates 
individuals into public modes of knowing, and I have 
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previously shown why it may be said to do so. It seems 
highly unlikelr that one can be so initiated unless one 
has achieved a high level of cognitive development, but 
I do not need to say any more about the matter. All I 
claim in this chapter is that given the conditions of 
cognitive development as Piaget describes them, honest 
questioning, which does further the growth of knowledge 
in the student, also seems likely to further cognitive 
development. 
My second point could also be dealt with 
briefly, unless one wishes, as I do, to discuss the 
concept of activity. The brief way to deal with the 
point is as follows. Honest questioning is a way of 
using words, a way which, I claim, is likely to promote 
cognitive development. But Piaget emphasizes the 
necessity of the child's own activity for development. 
It may again, therefore, seem odd to look to Piaget to 
find support for honest questioning. However, my 
emphasis on the linguistic interaction is not intended 
to imply that action on the part of the student is not 
necessary for development. The classroom environment, 
especially of the young child, should be rich in objects 
of interest that invite activity, and the students' 
activities ought to be the focus of attention in the 
classroom. It is these activities, past, present, or 
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future, which are to be talked about, which must be 
talked about for the sake of maximum cognitive 
development. Piaget emphasizes the activity of the 
student, and my main concern is that form of activity 
known as social interactivity, in particular, inter-
activity between teacher and student, which necessarily 
manifests itself as an oral transaction. My emphasis 
reflects a belief that the kind of talk which takes 
place between the teacher and the student will to some 
extent determine the nature of the experience that 
results from that activity, or will, in other words, 
determine to some extent what is learned. Whether 
Piaget would agree with this formulation is, 
fortunately, immaterial. It is enough for me to say 
that I accept Piaget's position that activity on the 
part of the student is necessary for development. 
I wish to note, however, that it is not 
entirely clear what Piaget means by "activity." Irving 
Sigel and his co-authors note that the "theoretical and 
empirical characterization (of the concept) has been 
much too vague." (5) Furth's effort to clarify--action 
"is generally synonymous with behavior"--is not helpful. 
(6) The infant's grasping scheme is the repeatable, 
organized aspect of his behavior and it is that aspect 
which constitutes the action. However, it should not be 
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understood from this that an action is necessarily 
overt. An action may be wholly internalized and appear 
to lack any physical component but it is an action 
nonetheless. (7) As Barbel Inhelder and her colleagues 
put it, "being cognitively active does not mean that the 
child merely manipulates a given type of material; he 
can be mentally active without physical manipulation, 
just as he can be mentally passive while actually 
manipulating objects." (8) That activity is not limited 
to physical activity is a significant qualification to 
the concept, and one of which I shall make use. There 
are other considerations to be kept in mind, but they 
may be understood best in the light of Piaget's position 
on the role of language in cognitive development. 
As is well-known, Piaget's position is that 
those general structures through which we organize 
behavior (those logico-mathematical forms of thought 
such as causality, order, number, class, hierarchy) 
antedate language, at least in their primitive form. 
And even after language is acquired, as new structures 
develop, they result at all levels of development from 
the child's actions on the world. What is not so 
well-known is that Piaget does grant that language makes 
a contribution to development. Barbel Inhelder and 
Annette Karmiloff-Smith have tried to set Piaget's 
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record straight. They refer to his first book, The 
Language and Thought of the Child, wherein Piaget w~ote 
that "language first accompanies action as if it were a 
very part of it, whereas with the gradual process of 
decentration, language can replace effective action." 
(9) Since Inhelder was closely associated for many 
years with Piaget, it may be safe to conclude on the 
basis of this article that he had not entirely renounced 
what he had written in this early work. Even if it is 
not safe, Qne can draw on Piaget's own later material 
for support of the point that he does not wholly reject 
a role for language in cognitive development. 
Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith, in the same article 
from which the above citation was made, say that the 
child must go beyond the here and now, "which is only 
possible through representation--in other words, through 
development of the semiotic function." (10) For the 
sake of development it is vital that a person be able to 
represent reality to himself, through images, objects, 
personal symbols, or language. If he could not, he 
would be confined to the sensorimotor level of intel-
ligence. And so Piaget concedes that 
(it) is quite possible that language is a necessary 
condition for the achievement of logical struc-
tures. But this does not by itself make it a suf-
ficient condition of logical formation, even less 
as far as the more elementary logico-mathematical 
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structures are concerned. (11) 
piaget has little to say about the function of language. 
in development prior to the stage of formal operations, 
but, once they are achieved, language 
profoundly transform(s) thought by helping it to 
attain its form of equilibrium by means of a more 
advanced schematization and a more mobile abstrac-
tion • • language indefinitely extends the power 
of these operations and confers on them a mobility 
and a universality which they would not have 
otherwise. (12) 
An example may illustrate the ability of language to 
confer power on the operations of thought. (13) It is 
possible for a concrete operational child, using Dienes 
2. 
blocks, to solve the equations (x+l) == 
3 (x+l) == , substituting any number from 2 
or 
through 10. He can use the blocks to build models: 
3x + 1. But unless the child can begin to operate on 
the symbols, discerning the pattern by formal 
abstraction, he cannot solve equations of the general 
f 0 rm (X + 1 )I'\ h i t th t d i w ere x s grea er an en an n s 
greater than three. 
Piaget's point--that regardless of whether 
language develops prior to logic or logic prior to 
language, language appears to be, at least, a tool 
without which our logical capacities cannot develop 
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fully--may be more fully appreciated by way of an 
analogy. A person may possess good balance walking on-
the ground. But if he learns to walk a tightrope, he 
may develop his skills of balancing to a much greater 
degree. Furthermore, unless a person's innate capacity 
to balance is severely limited, that capacity cannot be 
developed to the utmost without a tightrope or its 
equivalent. In the absence of tightropes or other tools 
more challenging than the ground, one could not notice 
great differences in balancing abilities: a sidewalk 
smoothes out variations in more than one way. The 
tightrope, in contrast, by permitting the development of 
capacity, amplifies differences in capacity. So, too, 
the child's elementary operations, his rudimentary 
logical structures, are developed in his encounters with 
the environment. But those logical structures may be 
developed to their utmost only if he is given good 
tools. (14) And yet, the matter is still stated in a 
somewhat misleading fashion. For we do give children a 
multitude of tools, but usually not to develop skills 
unrelated to their use. Normally, we do not give the 
child a bicycle in order that his balance may be 
improved. We give him a bike so that he may learn to 
ride a bike, and we give him a bike because it is the 
best tool we have for learning to ride a bike. Piaget 
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is willing to concede that a vital tool for developing 
logico-mathematical structures to their highest level is 
language. Most of us would perhaps value the capacity 
to use language for the sake of its own ends. But, in 
any case, Piaget, emphasizing the necessity of the 
child's own action, would have to concede that the best 
tool for developing the capacity to reason with language 
is language, unless he wants to say that learning to 
reason with language is comparable to learning the 
physical characteristics of the world, that is to say, 
comparable to learning arbitrary relationships. 
Language is a convenient system of notation or 
representation, and some such system of notation is 
necessary for the fullest development of formal 
operational thought. (15) The person capable of formal 
operational thought can operate on representations. He 
can, for example, operate on linguistic signs. However, 
it is not the signs themselves, but the student's 
actions on them that will nourish his thinking, a point 
deserving of amplification. 
Piaget insists that the verbal sign must not be 
mistaken for the structure, and he has good reason to 
insist. Adults are only too ready to make the 
assumption that their provision of a definition of a 
word suffices for the child's understanding. They are 
184 
ready to make the assumption that words must precede the 
child's efforts to learn some new skill, such as bicycle 
riding. But if the child is to learn to ride a bike, 
then he must get on the bike and try to ride it. (16) 
Similarly, if the child is to acquire a concept, of 
which the word is but the representative sign, he must 
act. (17) Obviously, the child cannot acquire his 
action schemes except by his own actions. His knowing 
how to ride a bike is quite independent of any knowledge 
he may have of a verbal description of riding a bike. 
This point is obvious, even though it is often ignored 
by parents and by teachers. But there is a less obvious 
point to be made explicit. If the child must himself 
try to ride a bike to learn to ride a bike, so, if the 
child is to learn how to represent his experiences in 
language, then he must try to represent his experiences 
in language. The adult cannot substitute his words for 
the child's experience, and this implies that he cannot 
substitute his representation of experience for the 
child's efforts to represent his experience. We act on 
objects and we act on signs. We cannot substitute our 
words for another's actions on either objects or signs. 
I have now presented my second point. I antic-
ipated that the objection could be made that, since I am 
proposing a way of talking with students and making 
claims about their resultant use of language, it is 
absurd for me to begin to compare my position to 
Piaget's. I am talking about words and Piaget is 
185 
talking about actions. To summarize, my first way of 
dealing with the objection is to take the term 
"activity'' as signifying physical and mental activity on 
objects, and to say that I do not deny the necessity of 
such activity for development. My second way of dealing 
with the objection is to show the vagueness of the 
concept of activity in Piaget's work. Once one admits 
that by activity Piaget does not mean simply physical 
activity, it is easy enough to extend the concept to 
cover .the activity of using language to represent 
experience, and to say, therefore, that, since using 
language qualifies as an activity, using language may 
make some contribution to cognitive development in 
Piaget's sense. (18) But it is not necessary to work 
this hard to establish a claim that language contributes 
to cognitive development. Piaget himself concedes the 
point. He acknowledges the necessity of language at 
least for the development of formal operational thinking 
capacities. 
The least that can be said for honest question-
ing so far is this: the student must learn to represent 
his own experience if he is to be able to achieve the 
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level of formal operational thought, which is charac-
terized by the ability to operate on signs. Given the 
assumption that the student can only acquire the concept 
of representing his own experience in signs (in a 
Piagetian sense of "acquire the concept of • . ") 
through his own efforts to do so, then, if he is to 
achieve the level of formal operational thought, he must 
make the effort to represent his own experience in 
signs. Honest questioning may be described exactly as a 
means of stimulating the student to perform the action 
of representing his own experience. 
The third point I wish to make is that honest 
questioning is the kind of social interaction which 
Piaget says is necessary for cognitive development. 
Piaget himself neither defines "social interaction," 
which one might have expected him to do given that the 
word "action" appears in the phrase, nor, alternatively, 
does he explicitly distinguish between forms of social 
interaction which do and those which do not contribute 
to cognitive development. Although Piaget does not say 
what he means by social interaction, he does describe 
some characteristics of social interaction which promote 
development, and I shall list these after I present a 
summary of his argument for the hypothesis that social 
interaction is a necessary condition of cognitive 
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development. 
Social interaction is one of the four factors 
which contribute to development. (The others are: 
maturation, activity, and equil~brium.) (19) The 
specific contribution of social interaction is that it 
results in decentering and as a result of decentering, 
thought becomes more objective. Decentering is the 
inverse of egocentrism, which, in turn, is described as: 
nothing more than lack of co-ordination, a failure 
to 'group' relations with other individuals as well 
as with other objects. There is nothing here that 
is not perfectly natural; the primacy of one's own 
point of view, • is merely the expression of an 
original failure to differentiate, of an assimi-
lation that distorts because it is determined by 
the only point of view that is possible at first. 
(20) 
Egocentrism ebbs and flows as development pro-
greases, reasserting itself as the individual enters 
each new period of development, subsiding as the child 
masters each new stage, but never wholly disappearing. 
(21) It is unavoidable, yet it is undesirable, 
described as, in the quotation above, an "assimilation 
that distorts," or as an excess of accommodation: a 
child may, for example, imitate without recognizing that 
he is doing so. Egocentrism always results in a 
disequilibrium between assimilation and accommodation, 
that is to say, a failure of adaptation. Since thought· 
which is not fully adapted is not fully operational, 
egocentric thinking is not fully operational. The 
individual, thinking egocentrically, is unable to 
coordinate his own actions. In a social context, 
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egocentric thinking is thinking which is not fully 
cooperational, that is to say, the individual, thinking 
egocentrically in a social context, cannot coordinate 
his point of view with that of others. Fully decentered 
thought would be formal operational thought and fully 
operational thought would be equilibrated thought. A 
state of equilibrium between assimilation and accom-
modation is the goal, the end point without which such 
changes as occurred in the individual as a result of 
maturation, physical and social experience could not be 
considered development. "The most profound tendency of 
all human activity is progress toward equilibrium." (22) 
Movement towards this given ~oal of equilibrium, 
and thus to objective thought, depends on the ability to 
decenter, and if decentering is to occur, then social 
interaction is necessary. (23) Neither maturation nor 
activity (on objects), each necessary, is sufficient to 
produce it. The actions of the child on objects may not 
promote decentering since children can and do "readily 
distort physical experience to fit pre-existent schema." 
(24) It is instead social interaction which prompts 
decentering, which "changes the very structure of the 
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individual." (25) "Without interchange of thought and 
co-operation with others the individual would never come 
to group his operations into a coherent whole: in this 
sense, therefore, operational grouping presupp~ses 
social life." (26) Piaget refers to operational thought 
as thought in its logical aspect and to cooperational 
thought as thought in its ethical aspect. Both of these 
depend on the decentering which results from social 
interaction. It is social interaction which leads to 
the "control and exercise of the critical spirit, which 
alone can lead the individual to objectivity and to a 
need for conclusive evidence." (27) 
What is particularly interesting from the point of 
view of my effort to defend honest questioning is 
Piaget's suggestion that the greater power of social 
experience compared to physical experience derives from 
the fact that it is mediated. Employing the three 
media--"language ~signs), the content of interaction 
(intellectual values) and rules imposed on thought 
(collective logical or pre-logical norms)" (28)--social 
interaction compels recognition of facts, provides a 
ready-made system of signs which modify his thought; 
presents the individual with new intellectual values 
(the content of thought), and imposes on him an infinite 
series of obligations. The "infinite series of 
obligations" are the obligations to abide by the rules 
of logic if cooperation is to be achieved. "Logic 
requires common rules or norms; it is the morality of 
thinking imposed and sanctioned by others." (29) 
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The child who wishes to communicate with others 
cannot assimilate reality wholly to his own fantasies. 
If social interaction is to be sustained, then the 
interactors are constrained by conventions of the media 
which must be learned and observed. It is inevitable 
that social interaction will produce conflict, and 
conflict is itself a necessary condition of development. 
"All development is composed of momentary conflicts and 
ineompatibilities which must be overcome to reach a 
higher level of eq~ilibrium." (30) The conflict that 
results from the effort to communicate can in turn lead 
to a restructuring of thinking, although this is not 
always the result. Many times conflict leads to no 
decentering for any of the persons involved. Thus, the 
assertion must be qualified to read that social inter-
action can lead to decentering if the interpersonal con-
flicts so generated lead to awareness of intrapersonal 
conflicts. It is not disagreement with others but 
consciousness of the shortcomings of our own thinking 
which moves us to develop intellectually. (31) 
Theodore Mischel has tried to show that little 
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more needs to be said to explain why, when an individual 
experiences such intrapersonal conflict, he is likely to 
try to resolve it and is likely to do so in the direc-
tion of greater equilibrium. The explanation for the 
transitions to be found in development "coincides with 
their justification--it consists in exhibiting the 
'failures and insufficiencies' of the earlier way of 
thinking, the greater coherence, 'reversibility,' etc., 
which thinking achieves at the next stage ••• " (32) 
Mischel summarizes his interpretation of P~aget on 
motivation with the observation that to say that formal 
operational thought is more logical than concrete 
operational thought is both to justify movement in the 
direction of such thought and to explain it. 
Points of Contact: Piaget and Classroom Practice 
I now want to tease out from the masses of his 
material what Piaget has said about the forms of 
interaction which do promote cognitive conflict, 
especially within a school setting, and to show that 
honest questioning has such a form. Piaget has not made 
a systematic effort to study the effects of various 
forms of interaction on cognitive development and his 
comments are scattered throughout his work. Never-
theless, what he has written is consistent with his 
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position on the function of language for development and 
on the nature and function of activity, or, at least, -it 
is consistent with my interpretation of his position on 
these topics. 
In Piaget's opinion, peer interaction is more 
effective at promoting the appropriate sort of conflict 
than interaction with adults is. The reason for this 
greater effectiveness is the reciprocity which charac-
terizes interaction between peers. Productive of 
conflict as they are, exchanges with peers can be 
frustrating, but they effect movement to "multi-
perspective reversibility" and hence to more logical 
thought. (33) I interpr~t Piaget to be making a claim 
about what is but not about what must be. It cannot be 
the case that peer interaction is necessarily more 
effective than interaction with adults. Lt would simply 
make no sense to say that an individual's intelligence 
necessarily develops better as a consequence of contact 
with persons of the same level of development. Never-
theless, in view of the fact that, as has already been 
noted in this chapter, adults frequently use words in 
ways which are inappropriate, in particular, use words 
to substitute for action, it must be admitted that 
Piaget has a point. It is obvious that the quality of 
reciprocity is lacking in many adult/child social 
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interactions, including those between teacher and 
student. But although many adults are inept, it does 
not follow that they must remain inept when it comes to 
stimulating cognitive conflict. Piaget himself has 
provided rough guidelines, noting some features of a 
reciprocal relationship between a teacher and student. 
Piaget has provided a theoretical framework 
describing cognitive devel~pment and the conditions of 
its occurrence. It is possible to justify honest 
questioning by showing that it is a form of social 
interaction characterized by reciprocity and stimulating 
cognitive conflict. That is, it is possible to justify 
honest questioning solely by reference to the theoret-
ical framework. But another way to test the claim that 
honest questioning finds support from Piagetian theory 
is to see how closely it fits with whatever relatively 
specific suggestions for pedagogy Piaget himself made in 
consequence of that theory. There are not a great many 
of these suggestions, for Piaget did not write 
extensively on education. Many of his suggestions took 
the form of criticisms of current practices, and I shall 
note these first. 
Generally speaking, Piaget's targets are the 
methods which place the student in a passive role. The 
lecture is one such method. So, too, are some of the 
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methods designed to compensate for the shortcomings of 
the lecture. (34) The demonstration by the teacher, the 
assigned experiment performed by the student, audio-
visual aids, and programmed materials, all fail to 
require genuine activity on the part of the student. 
Teachers make demonstration experiments as if "it were 
possible to sit in rows on a wharf and learn to swim 
merely by watching grown-up swimmers in the water." (35) 
If the sole object of instruction was that the 
student memorize the facts of a discipline, then, of the 
methods mentioned in the preceding paragraph, programmed 
instruction is the most defensible: "if the ideal of 
that method is merely to elicit correct repetition of 
what has been correctly transmitted, then it goes 
without saying that a machine can fulfill these condi-
tions correctly." (36) But memorization of facts is not 
an appropriate end for education (though some memori-
zation may be justifiable as a means). The general aim 
of education is, properly, the formation of intelli-
gence, of individuals "who are capable of production and 
creativity and not simply repetition." (37) Schools 
cannot be places which concern themselves merely with 
the transmission of information. They must concern 
themselves with education, for without education "the 
individual would not know how to acquire his most basic 
mental structures." (38) If the individual is to be 
able to adapt to his surroundings then what he must 
learn and must, most likely, learn in school are the 
standards of logic and of ethics. (39) 
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The more modern methods, such as demonstration, 
laboratory work, programmed learning machines, fail as 
the old methods did in so far as they "foster associ-
ations without giving rise to genuine activities." (40) 
New methods or old, the approach is essentially verbal, 
and this is true of audio-visual aids, for "there e~ists 
a verbalism of the image just as there is a verbalism of 
the word." (41) If intelligence is to be developed, 
then active methods must be employed so that the student 
may rediscover for himself the fundamental truths and 
methodology of the field. "It is not by knowing the 
Pythagorean theorem that free exercise of personal 
reasoning power is assured; it is in having rediscovered 
its existence and its usage." (42) And new methods or 
old, the approaches fail to promote social interactivity 
characterized by reciprocity. If intelligence is to 
develop, students must be permitted to work together. 
"No real intellectual activity could be carried on in 
the form of experimental actions and spontaneous 
investigations without free collaboration among the 
students themselves . " (43) Piaget distinguishes 
196 
this "free collaboration" from those "collective exer-
cises • • in reality no more than a mere juxtaposi-
tion of individual work carried out in the same place." 
(44) However, in addition, if reasoning activity is to 
be established in the child, it is necessary that the 
"surrounding social structure entail • . not merely 
cooperation among the children but also cooperation with 
adults." (45) 
In The Psychology of Intelligence P~aget writes 
that "in order to teach others to reason logically it is 
indispensable that there should be established between 
them and oneself those simultaneous relationships of 
differentiation and reciprocity.which characterize the 
coordination of viewpoints." (46) The burden falls on 
the teacher if anything resembling such a relationship 
is to be created. Piaget gives but a few hints to help 
her do this, hints which serve to describe honest 
questioning, partially, if not completely. If the 
teacher is to establish a relationship characterized by 
reciprocal interaction, then she must (and Piaget quotes 
Rousseau approvingly on this point) begin by studying 
her pupils whom she surely does not know. (47) That is 
to say that she must herself be a decentered listener. 
She must not assimilate what the student says to her own 
structures. She must learn to speak "to the child in 
his own language before imposing on him another ready-
made and over-abstract one" (48} providing "counter-
examples that compel reflection and reconsideration of 
over-hasty solutions. What is desired is that the 
teacher cease being a lecturer, satisfied with 
transmitting ready-made solutions; his role should 
rather be that of a mentor stimulating initiative and 
research." (49) 
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There is nothing radically new in Piaget's 
criticisms of or proposals for reform of teaching 
practices. Educators from Comenius on have urged that 
somehow sheer verbalism be eliminated and that 
instruction be made more meaningful to the child. 
Permitting the child to be, in some sense, more active, 
has been suggested frequently. Piaget's recommendations 
are familiar to students of education. His way of 
justifying those recommendations is somewhat different, 
but it is not wholly unique. For example, Piaget's 
emphasis on the necessity of cognitive conflict for 
development finds precedent in the Socratic dialogues 
and in the work of John Dewey, and in one form or 
another the concept of cognitive conflict plays an 
important role in the theories of many contemporary 
writers, amongst them John McVicker Hunt and Jerome 
Bruner. 
I set out to deal with four separate points, and 
now, having done so, I find that I can collapse my 
findings into two conclusions. First, I can say that 
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honest questioning is a form of activity requiring the 
student to represent his own experience in symbols. 
Since representing experience in symbols is necessary if 
the student is to achieve the level of formal opera-
tional thought, honest questioning is justified on the 
grounds that it is a way to satisfy a condition of 
formal operational thought. Second, I do not try to say 
that the end result of honest questioning, learning how 
to justify, is the same as cognitive development in 
Piaget's sense. But I can say that this form of social 
interaction does lead to cognitive conflict, and that, 
therefore, honest questioning is justified since 
cognitive conflict fosters cognitive development. 
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At least this is what I conclude after reading Flavell: 
"Although the terms schema and concept are not com-
pletely interchangeable, Piaget has recognized a certain 
similarity between them: 'The schema, as it appeared to 
us, constitutes a sort of sensorimotor concept, or more 
broadly, the motor equivalent of a system of relations 
and classes."' John H. Flavell, The Developmental 
Psychology of Jean Piaget (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 
1963), p. 54. I deduce from these statements that if 
the child looks, he has the concept of looking, but that 
conclusion is, I believe, at variance with what is 
ordinarily meant by "having the concept of looking." 
But Hans Furth's interpretation of Piaget on concept 
appears to be different from Flavell's. I admit I 
cannot be certain of this, since I am not absolutely 
clear what Furth is saying. He writes that a concept 
is, "In a logical sense, a mental construct of the 
generalizable aspect of a known thing; it has an 
intension (or comprehension) answering the question, 
"What is its essence?" and an extension answering the 
question as to which things are exemplars of the 
concept. In a psychological sense, a concept is 
identical with an individual's internal structure or 
scheme and corresponds to the level of that structure • 
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. In its verbal manifestations, concept is a 
verbalized expression of a logical concept together with 
its verbalized comprehension; however, verbalization is 
extrinsic to the logical concept as such." Hans Furth, 
Piaget and Knowledge, p. 292. The conversation about 
the relationship, if any, between "acquiring a concept" 
and "having a concept" has been going on for some years. 
The participants include Piaget, Stephen Toulmin, and D. 
w. Hamlyn. D. W. Hamlyn's discussion of the question in 
his paper "Epistemology and Conceptual Development," in 
Cognitive Develo ment and E istemolog , ed. Theodore 
Mischel New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 3-24, is a 
good place to acquaint oneself with the issues. 
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provide an intriguing quotation from Piaget, without 
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Language," p. 8. 
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social context in which knowledge is constructed, others 
have rediscovered in Piaget an acknowledgment of the 
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• Piaget fails to discuss the details of the linkage 
between social and cognitive development." P. 23. Some 
writers use the term "experience" instead of "activity" 
and distinguish experience from social interaction on 
the basis that experience takes place in the physical 
world. In the paper "Development and Learning," Piaget 
defines equilibrium as "active compensation, 
self-regulation." Journal of Research in Science 
Teaching 2 (1964):181. 
20. Jean Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence) 
trans. Malcolm Piercy and D. E. Berlyne (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 161. 
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of Understanding (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 
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and Thought of the Child. There he contrasted egocen-
tric thought with directed thought. Egocentric thought 
is characterized by its use of personal symbols and 
reliance on images and as a result is largely 
incommunicable. Directed thought, by contrast, is 
communicable and is ruled by logic. We are all capable 
of egocentric thinking and Piaget makes the point by 
referring to an experience many people have had. It is 
common to come upon a solution to some problem in 
privacy, not recognizing the inadequacies of the 
solution until the moment it is exposed to the public. 
"The mere fact, then, of telling one's thought, of 
telling it to others, or of keeping silence and telling 
it only to oneself must be of enormous importance to the 
fundamental structure and functioning of thought in 
general, and of child logic in particular." Language 
and Thought of the Child, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New 
York: The New American Library, A Meridian Book, 1974), 
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"Thought and Language," Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith 
write that "the child's attempt to convince others of 
his own arguments and the clash with their different 
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internalized argumentation. Indeed, the conflict 
generated by becoming aware of contradictions is a very 
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opment of representational thinking are distancing 
behaviors: "a class of events and interactions which 
'demand' the child to separate [sic] himself/herself 
mentally (via representation) in space or time from the 
ongoing observable field. • (Distancing behaviors 
contribute to the creation of discrepancy, and the 
effort to resolve discrepancy) creates the potential for 
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et al., eds., New Directions in Piagetian Theory and 
Practice, p. 206. Jerome Bruner makes a similar point 
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it provides "the same opportunity (as writing) to use 
language out of context--even spoken language--for, to a 
very high degree, what one talks about are things not 
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York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 48. 
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and Epistemology, ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic 
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The trouble with a monologue is that the speaker and the 
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Orion Press, 1970), p. 51. 
36. Ibid., p. 77. 
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ignore the interests of the child. When one recalls 
that Piaget carefully notes that the child may be in 
motion but not active and may be active though phys-
ically still, one may be willing to consider the 
possibility that being interested is at least a property 
of being active. Perhaps it is the case that if one is 
not interested, then one cannot be active. Methods 
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development of intelligence insofar as they call forth 
the interests of the students. This is not to imply . 
that the student ought to be permitted to do anything he 
wants to in school but is to recognize that, like any 
other person, a student "is an active being whose 
action, controlled by the law of interest or need, is 
incapable of working at full stretch if no appeal is 
made to the autonomous motive forces of that activity." 
Jean Piaget, Science of Education and the Psychology of 
the Child, p. 153. 
43. Jean Piaget, To Understand Is to Invent, p. 
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44. Jean Piaget, Science of Education and the 
Psychology of the Child, p. 174. John Passmore dis-
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for exercises. By a problem I mean a situation where 
the student cannot at once decide what rule to apply or 
how it applies, by an exercise a situation in which this 
is at once obvious .• " "On Teaching to be Critical," in 
The Concept of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1967), p. 206. John Dewey makes a 
similar point many times over. He distinguishes between 
the genuine problem, of concern to the child, which the 
child knows he has solved, and the teacher imposed 
exercise. In the case of the teacher imposed exercise, 
very often the child does not know when he has "got the 
right answer." See The School and Society, rev. ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) p. 146 and 
Democracy and Education, (New York: The Free Press, 
1966), pp. 153-6. 
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19. 
49. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
50. Piaget's preferred method of observation is 
the clinical interview, in which the experimenter asks 
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The technique is, in essentials, like that of honest 
questioning. The interviewer does not try to correct 
the subject, but tries instead to get him to give 
reasons for his answers. Piaget and Inhelder themselves 
recognized that the clinical interview might be pressed 
into the service of teaching. The clinical interview, 
with or without materials, may have an effect on the 
child's thinking if it brings him up against "something 
which surprises him or causes him to recognize a 
contradiction." Margaret Donaldson, Children's Minds 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), p. 156. When the child 
is at a transition point, it is possible to create 
situations and to ask questions which will generate 
conflict. It is not easy to learn to ask questions in 
this manner. Researchers at the Geneva Institute must 
be trained for a year in the use of questioning 
techniques before they are allowed to conduct 
experiments on their own. Howard Gardner, The Quest for 
Mind: Piaget, Levi-Strauss, and the Structuralist 
Movement (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 67-68. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TEACHING AS A HELPING RELATIONSHIP 
Introduction 
Education as a whole is supposed to affect the 
student's intellect or, if one prefers the alternative 
phrasing, his cognitive development. Some would say 
education ought also to ~ffect the student's emotional 
development. Whether one agrees that it ought to or 
not, it is a fact that the quality of the interactions 
between student and teacher has its effect on the 
student's feelings. And this is important to recognize 
whether one is concerned with the consequence of those 
feelings for his emotional development or is primarily 
concerned with the consequence of those feelings for his 
cognitive development. While no one kind of teacher 
behavior will affect all students in exactly the same 
way, it is likely that particular methods will be 
distinguishable in terms of the emotional effects they 
are most likely to have. A teacher must consider the 
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likely emotional effects of her teaching style and must 
evaluate these in turn according to the likelihood that 
they will make possible the sort of learning she hopes 
for. 
In this chapter, I will show why it is that the 
emotional effects of honest questioning are likely to be 
those that will permit learning to take place. Specif-
ically, I shall show to what extent honest questioning 
may be said to-be compatible with Carl Rogers' 
description of a helping relationship, and to what 
extent honest questioning is not compatible with this 
description. There are several reasons why a comparison 
with.Carl Rogers' work is appropriate. In Chapter V I 
said that the teacher was obliged to treat the student 
as a potentially rational person, and that this implied 
treating him as an end in himself. A chief attraction 
of Carl Rogers' clinical practice is that it is grounded 
in the belief that one must "treat the client as an end, 
• not as a means for alteration to fit some 
preconceived pattern of what he takes to be normal or 
healthy, or "better." (1) Treating persons as ends in 
themselves is what Rogers means by ethical behavior. 
(And ethical behavior is, in Rogers' view, not a means 
to an end but an end in itself.) Another reason to 
place honest questioning in relationship to Rogers' work 
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is that this work is known to many educators, and even 
teachers who do not know it directly testify to Rogers' 
influence when they speak of the "facilitation of 
personal growth,'' of the importance of "not judging 
others" and of being "open to experience." (2) Rogers 
himself has declared that the conditions which he names 
as those necessary and sufficient to a therapeutic 
relationship are the conditions of any helping relation-
ship and in particular are the conditions of any 
relationship which promotes what he calls "significant 
learning." 
But the fact that Rogers' work is grounded in 
ethical principles and is well known does not guarantee 
the soundness of all his proposals. Some of these 
appear to be based on mistaken assumptions which may be 
tacitly shared by many of those who place their faith in 
Rogers. Precisely because Rogers speaks for so many, 
his assumptions need to be carefully examined. In what 
follows, I will sound very critical of Rogers, since I 
will be calling attention to a number of difficulties, 
especially to various instances of a lack of conceptual 
clarity. I hasten to say that my analytic approach does 
not indicate a failure to appreciate what Rogers has 
done. 
Rogers himself did not care that he "lacked formal 
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clarity." (3) Lack it he certainly did, and it may be 
that he chose the wrong mode of expression for his 
ideas. His informal style, with its stabs at defini-
tion, its references to clinical experience and to 
empirical tests, is not successful as science writing. 
On the whole, Rogers' work reads more like inspirational 
literature and might read better if expressed in 
avowedly poetic language. (4) 
Conditions of a Helping Relationship 
First of all I shall try to show that in asking 
honest questions the questioner is likely to be 
satisfying a number of the conditions of a helping 
relationship. (5) Whenever Rogers states the set of 
conditions for a helping relationship, whether he is 
referring specifically to the therapist/client 
relationship or to the teacher/student relationship, the 
set of conditions is the same. The one exception to 
this is that the condition listed first below is 
sometimes omitted. By "helping relationship" Rogers 
means a relationship in which at least one person "has 
the intent of promoting the growth, development, 
maturity, improved functioning, improved coping with 
life of the other." (6) 
These are the six conditions as given in Rogers' 
"systematic statement of his developing theory" (7): 
1. (Sometimes omitted) That two persons are in 
contact. 
2. That the first person, whom we shall term the 
client, is in a state of incongruence, being 
vulnerable, or anxious. 
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3. That the second person, whom we shall term the 
therapist, is congruent in the relationship. 
4. That the therapist is experiencing 
unconditional positive regard toward the client. 
5. That the therapist is experiencing an empathic 
understanding of the client's internal frame of 
reference. 
6. That the client perceives • • the 
unconditional positive regard of the therapist for him, 
and the empathic understanding of the therapist. 
The emphasis throughout is Rogers'. As I discuss each 
condition, I will include, if Rogers has provided them, 
definitions of the emphasized constructs. (8) 
Each of the conditions offers challenges to the 
understanding. Rogers' attempts to define his concepts 
are rarely successful: perhaps that is why the 
definitions have been changed from time to time. While 
the first condition is stated straightforwardly enough, 
its meaning is not clear because the meaning of 
"contact" is not clear. Rogers' definition is not 
helpful: if persons are in contact, then "each person 
must make a perceived or subceived difference in the 
experiential field of each other." (9) (A "subceived 
difference" is a difference of which one is not 
consciously aware.) This effort to be precise is not 
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satisfactory. How could one show that one person did 
not make a "subceived difference'' in the experiential 
field of another and what is an "experiential field?" 
Perhaps, if one thinks of "contact" as some sort of 
acknowledgment of the other, then one can accept Rogers' 
interpretation that it is some sort of relationship, and 
the condition then amounts to a statement that if there 
is to be a helping relationship then there must be a 
relationship. Rogers does not say that the relationship 
must be a good one. And although teachers must 
sometimes fail to establish a good relationship with a 
student, although it may be possible that a given 
teacher will not be making even a subceived difference 
to a given student, I think it can be taken for granted 
that almost any teacher makes at least that--a subceived 
difference--to the student. At any rate, it would be 
very difficult to show that no relationship and, 
therefore, no contact of any sort exists between a 
teacher and her student. Thus, I think it can be safely 
said that no special effort needs to be made to show 
that the teacher who uses honest questions is in contact 
with her students. 
The third condition on Rogers' list and the second 
that I shall discuss, is the condition of congruence. 
In a helping relationship the person known as the helper 
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"is congruent in that relationship." It is difficult, 
as will be seen, to figure out exactly what that means.· 
The work from which the conditions were quoted was 
published in 1959. There Rogers writes that in order to 
be congruent "the therapist's symbolization of his own 
experience in the relationship must be accurate." (10) 
By "accurate symbolization" Rogers means that "the 
hypotheses implicit in the awareness will be borne out 
if tested by acting on them." (11) Rogers had put it 
differently, and more simply, in 1958 when he wrote 
that, when the therapist is congruent, he "is freely and 
accurately aware of what he is experiencing at this 
moment in the rela~ionship . " (12) An example of 
incongruence fits the description: "if he is experi-
encing threat and discomfort in the relationship, and is 
aware only of an acceptance and understanding, then he 
is not congruent in the relationship." (13) But in a 
later formulation, Rogers writes that the concept of 
congruence "may be still further extended to cover a 
matching of experience, awareness, and communication," 
(14) and he draws a distinction between two kinds of 
I 
incongruence. He refers to incongruence between 
experience and awareness as defensiveness, and the 
incongruence between awareness and communication as 
falseness or deceit. (15) Rogers' use of "defensive" 
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concurs with standard psychoanalytic usage insofar as he 
applies it to internal conflict. But he apparently 
wants to restrict it to such conflict, leaving out its 
extension by psychoanalysts to include "techniques for 
dealing with external situations which evoke objective 
anxiety." (16) In ordinary usage the term "defensive" 
does refer to ways of dealing with what is perceived to 
be a threat from the outside and is applied when it is 
believed that the threat is merely imagi.ned or that it 
is being responded to inappropriately. The upshot of 
this discussion is that if I am being defensive in this 
ordinary sense but aware that I am being defensive, 
then, in Rogers' sense of the term, I am not being 
defensive, but am, on the contrary, being congruent. 
If, on the other hand, I am displaying defensiveness (or 
any other emotion), but deny that I am being defensive 
(or • ) , then I am defensive in Rogers' sense. That 
is to say, I am defended against perceiving my own 
defensiveness, which perception would presumably be 
threatening to me. 
It is not too difficult to understand what Rogers 
means by congruence between experience and awareness. 
It is more difficult, for me at least, to understand 
what he means by congruence between awareness and 
communication, or rather to understand exactly what this 
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requirement entails. Rogers himself shows some 
uncertainty over what this absence of falseness either 
is or implies. As an example of falseness, Rogers cites 
the case of Mrs. Brown who was bored by the party but 
says to her hostess, "I enjoyed this evening .!2.. much." 
( 17) A discrepancy exists between her awareness and her 
communication, and she is, therefore, according to 
Rogers, false. That is clear enough. But it is not 
clear whether, to be congruent, the helper must avoid 
saying what is false, or must say whatever it is she is 
feeling. "Should she also express or communicate to the 
client the accurate symbolization of her own experi-
ence?" Rogers asks. (18) He partially answers the 
question by saying that if the helper found herself 
persistently focused on her own feelings rather than 
those of the client, then she should express those 
feelings. If the therapist is focused on her own 
feelings and communicates what she is feeling, then she 
is being congruent in that relationship. In this case, 
however, the feelings on which she is focused or perhaps 
the direction of her focus interfere with her ability to 
satisfy another condition of the helping relationship, 
that of empathic understanding. 
I shall take it that the helper is to be congruent 
in a relationship in the two senses of not being 
defensive and not being false, acknowledging that I am 
not sure what "not being false" means or entails. If 
the honest questioner is to be shown to satisfy the 
condition of congruence, then she must be shown to be, 
as honest questioner, neither defensive nor false. It 
would be hard to prove, but it may be that the ability 
to be congruent in the sense of non-defensive is a 
condition of the ability to ask honest questions. At 
least it is true that the honest questioner must be 
capable of accepting the fact that she does not 
understand. That is to say, she must not be defensive 
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about her own failure to understand: she must not deny 
it to her own awareness, and defend herself by, for 
example, blaming the student for not making sense. Not 
understanding is threatening to many people, and perhaps 
most especially to teachers, who are "supposed to know." 
If, in order to be congruent, Rogers will allow that one 
must be aware of feelings, "feelings" being generously 
interpreted to include experiences which are the source 
of those feelings (see discussion of empathic under-
standing below), then the question, "if she asks honest 
questions is she congruent?" can be rephrased: "if not 
aware of what she is experiencing (not congruent) could 
she ask honest questions?" Specifically, could she ask 
honest questions if she denied that she doesn't 
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understand? 
Though it may be unlikely that one could question· 
honestly yet be defensive, just as it may be unlikely 
that a woman who married for money could sustain the 
fiction that she loved her husband, it is not incon-
ceivable that it could be done. But it is logically 
impossible for a person to ask honest questions and be 
false. What could it mean to say that in asking a 
question she was expressing what she did not feel? If 
she is asking, she is asserting nothing, and so she is 
not saying what she does not feel. If a teacher asks a 
student why he thinks chemistry is useless but does not 
want to listen to his answer, she may be said to be 
being false--her way of asking the question may imply an 
interest she does not feel--but in that case her 
question could not be classified as honest. 
That honest questioning is indicative of con-
gruence within a relationship may be shown another way. 
Rogers claims that the person whose communication is 
congruent with his awareness and experience cannot say 
things like, "He is stupid," or "He is intelligent." 
The reason why one cannot make these sorts of remarks is 
because one cannot have direct experience of another's 
stupidity or intelligence, and if one is to be congruent 
one must refer to one's own experience: "If the person 
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is thoroughly congruent then it is clear that all of his 
communication would necessarily be put in a context of 
personal perception." (19) As a consequence of this 
more inclusive interpretation of congruence-as-absence-
of-falseness, Rogers rejects the use of the declarative 
sentence in which the other is the subject. So does the 
honest questioner, for whom the reference point is 
always the context of personal perception. She wants to 
know, in effect, if this is what the student meant, if 
she has understood, if he could help her understand. If 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of congruence 
are lack of defensiveness, lack of falseness (inter-
preted to mean communication expressed as personal 
perception), then it is fair to say that the honest 
questioner is congruent. 
Unfortunately, lengthy though the diicussion of it 
has been, the concept of congruence cannot yet be 
disposed of. If those conditions are necessary, they 
are not sufficient. The self-concept has to be taken 
into account. "The state where the self-concept 
embraces more or less all of your potentialities is 
called congruence, to signify that the self-concept has 
not shriveled to only part of what you are and can be." 
(20) From this it follows that, if I am angry and this 
anger, of which I am aware and which I communicate 
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verbally, conflicts with my self-concept, I am not 
congruent but incongruent, since my self-concept fails 
to include at least some of my potentialities, in this 
case, the potential for anger. I have no desire to show 
that the honest questioner is congruent in this sense 
and would not have chosen to add to the confusion if it 
were not that it is this interpretation of congruence on 
which the concept of incongruence, to be examined next, 
is founded. 
When Rogers states that a condition of a helping 
relationship is that the client be "in a state of 
incongruence, being vulnerable, or anxious" he means 
that the client is to'sense a "discrepancy between the 
self as perceived and the actual experience of the 
organism." (21) I shall take it that either the vul-
nerability or the anxiety result from the incongruence. 
It is preferable that the client be in a state of 
anxiety rather than mere vulnerability, for "anxiety is 
a state in which the incongruence between the concept of 
self and the total experience of the individual is 
approaching symbolization in awareness." (22) From this 
it sounds as if Rogers sees incongruence as a necessary 
condition of anxiety. If he does, he is wrong. 
Incongruence cannot be more than a sufficient cause, for 
anxiety has many sources . ( 2 3 ) I may be anxious if you 
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threaten my person, though your threat is not to my 
self-concept. That is a minor quibble. It is true that 
in a classroom situation, students often experience 
anxiety and that the source of this anxiety is a threat 
to their seLf-concept. The anxiety students experience 
in a classroom is triggered by the fear that they may 
not know what they are supposed to have learned, by the 
constant exposure to the risk of failure, by the 
constant exposure of their own ignorance. (24) The 
honest questioner does not intend to threaten the 
student's self-concept. And yet her questions do 
provoke in him an awareness of incongruence, since, as 
she expresses her failure to understand the student, he 
becomes aware that he isn't making sense to her or to 
himself •nd this experience is almost sure to be 
incongruent with his concept of himself as a person who 
does make sense. If the experience of incongruence is 
sufficient to cause anxiety, then the student who is 
asked honest questions is likely to experience the 
anxiety which Rogers considers a condition of a helping 
relationship. 
A fourth condition of a helping relationship is 
the condition of unconditional positive regard, which 
the therapist is to feel for the client. Rogers claims 
that "to feel unconditional positive regard toward 
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another is to 'prize' him," (25) and it is from Dewey 
that he borrows the word "prize" used in this way. In· 
Democracy and Education Dewey wrote that 
"to value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but 
secondarily it means to apprize, to estimate. It 
means that is, the act of cherishing something, 
holding it dear, and also the art of passing 
judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as 
compared with something else." (26) 
It is valuing in the sense of apprizing that implies 
evaluating, writes Dewey, and it is this sort of valuing 
that Rogers wishes to avoid. Unconditional positive 
regard "means an outgoing positive feeling without 
reservations, without evaluations." (27) Thus, if one 
prizes a person without apprizing him, then one recog-
nizes his intrinsic value as a person and does not 
evaluate his worth in relationship to others' worth. 
Unconditional positive regard implies not only not 
comparing one person with another. It implies not 
comparing a person's various behaviors with one another. 
Directly after his reference to Dewey, Rogers writes 
that a parent "prizes his child, though he may not value 
equally all of his behaviors," (28) from which one might 
conclude that a parent could be showing unconditional 
positive regard toward a child if she prized him but 
disapproved of his unkind behavior toward his grand-
mother. But in the next paragraph Rogers totally 
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excludes such apprizing of behavior if the condition of 
unconditional positive regard is to be satisfied. To 
prize another is to show "unconditional positive regard 
towards the experiences of which the client is fright-
ened or ashamed, as well as toward the experiences with 
which the client is pleased or satisfied • . " (29) 
At this point problems arise. Why should the 
helper show unconditional positive regard for, that is, 
prize, those experiences of which a person is fright-
ened? If a person is afraid of his own violent temper 
why ought the helper prize that violence? If a person 
wishes to become less violent, does that not imply he 
has himself apprized that violence? A person may wish 
not to be shamed for his feelings of violence, may want 
the helper not to gloss over his feelings of violence, 
and may want the helper to accept his self-report as 
true. That is not to say he wants that violence prized. 
Rogers' discussion of the construct of unconditional 
positive regard does not raise these sorts of questions, 
and he provides too few examples to enable one to 
clarify for oneself. (30) 
Rogers' formal definition of unconditional 
positive regard reads: "if the self-experiences of 
another are perceived by me in such a way that no 
self-experience can be discriminated as more or less 
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worthy of positive regard than any other then I am 
experiencing unconditional positive regard for this 
individual." (31) Given the criteria, I do not see how 
anyone could satisfy the condition of unconditional 
positive regard and I can understand why Salvatore Maddi 
was driven to write "Rogers does not literally mean that 
every possible action must be approved, regardless of 
the consequences to yourself and others." (32) And yet, 
evaluation is to be excluded if the helper is to achieve 
empathic understanding and if she is to communicate 
congruently. Later in the chapter I will discuss the 
inadequacy of Rogers' interpretation of the concept of 
evaluation and the consequences of his rejection of 
evaluation for his educational proposals. 
It has already been stated that the honest 
questioner does not evaluate the students' responses as 
wrong or right, and she certainly does not evaluate them 
or the student as good or bad. If this sort of 
non-evaluation is sufficient to show unconditional 
positive regard, then the honest questioner satisfies 
the condition. However, Rogers chose prizing as a 
synonym for unconditional positive regard and prizing is 
an attitude, not simply a form of speech. In attempting 
to justify honest questioning, it was said, in Chapter 
V, that the honest questioner treats others as if 
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capable of being or becoming rational. To ask honest 
questions is to treat another in terms of his own ends, 
that is to say, as if he had intrinsic value. To treat 
someone in terms of his own ends cannot be wholly 
inconsistent with having unconditional positive regard 
for him. 
The fifth condition of a helping relationship is 
no less troublesome to deal with than the others have 
been. This is the condition that the therapist 
"experience empathic understanding of the client's 
internal frame of reference." (33) This definition of 
Rogers is referred. to in Lauren Wisp''s article on 
sympathy and empathy in the International Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences. Wispe gives as his own brief 
definition the following: "the self-conscious awareness 
of the consciousness of others." (34) The Oxford 
English Dictionary Supplement definition of empathy is 
"the power of entering into the experience of or 
understanding objects or emotions outside ourselves." 
(35) This is not far from Rogers' descriptions of the 
empathic helper "who can sense the client's private 
world as if it were (his) own, but without losing the 
'as if' quality." (36) But when Rogers adds that the 
empathic helper "can both communicate his understanding 
of what is clearly known to the client and can also 
voice meanings in the client's experience of which the 
client is scarcely aware," he extends the meaning of 
empathic understanding considerably. (37) 
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Empathic understanding is, as Rogers admits, a 
condition difficult to achieve. Given that empathic 
understanding is a condition of a helping relationship, 
this is unfortunate. But fortunately, Rogers is able to 
conclude on the basis of research that "'understanding' 
the client's meanings and feelings is essentially 
the attitude of desiring to understand." (38) But to 
say that understanding is desiring to understand is 
false. If Rogers is playing on two meanings of "under-
standing," he merely hints by way of single quotation 
marks that he is doing so, and he leaves the reader with 
an unresolved paradox. Furthermore, if Rogers means 
that "desiring to understand" is empathic understanding, 
then he has moved far from the original meaning of 
empathy. According to Lipps, who is credited with 
coining the word which is the German equivalent, 
"Einfilhlung," and with articulating the concept, and 
according to the dictionary definition cited above, 
empathy was the power of entering into the experience of 
another, not the desire to enter the experience of 
another. Worse yet, in saying that understanding is 
desiring to understand, Rogers contradicts his own claim 
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that the empathic helper has the ability to communicate 
his understanding. Could Rogers possibly mean that the 
empathic helper has the ability to communicate his 
desire to understand? 
It may further the effort to make sense of the 
construct of empathic understanding, if one looks at an 
example given by Rogers himself. A therapist might say 
to a client, "You resent her criticism," and in so 
saying might be demonstrating that she does in fact 
understand the client's meanings and his feelings about 
his mother. Therefore, according to Rogers' own 
description, the therapist has demonstrated empathic 
understanding. However, Rogers·denies that empathic 
understanding was demonstrated. Rogers rejects the use 
of the declarative statement on the grounds that it is 
unlikely to be perceived as an expression of empathic 
understanding. A declarative statement is likely to be 
perceived as "an evaluation, a judgment made by the 
counselor, who is now telling the client what his 
feelings are." (39) The client feels that her condition 
is being diagnosed, not that she is understood. Rogers 
suggests that the therapist form his responses differ-
ently; as for example, "If I understand you correctly, 
you feel pretty resentful towards her criticism. Is 
that right?" Ordinary experience confirms Rogers' 
suggestion that a response expressed in this hypo-
thetical form is likely to be less threatening to the 
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client. The person who sees that you're irritable today 
and says so may be quite correct, but, in saying so, 
shows a failure to understand that you would prefer she 
didn't say so. It seems that a generous or complete 
empathic understanding would include the understanding 
that people have feelings about not being understood, 
about being misunderstood, about not being able to make 
themselves understood, and also have feelings--possibly 
ambivalent ones--about being underst~od itself. In the 
therapeutic situation many of the feelings expressed 
directly or indirectly by the client are going to be 
feelings about which he has feelings. The form which 
Rogers proposes for the expression of empathic under-
standing--a hypothetical phrased as a question--conveys 
recognition of this fact tactfully. 
It looks as if Rogers' empathic understanding 
consists of 1) the desire to understand and 2) the 
ability to communicate that desire to understand. (40) 
It is quite true that the honest questioner may be 
described as one who has the desire to understand and 
communicates that desire to understand. It is also true 
that the questions she asks in her effort to understand 
conform to the model of communication proposed by 
Rogers. Therefor~ it would seem safe to say that the 
honest questioner demonstrates empathic understanding.· 
But I think it is not safe to come so quickly to this 
conclusion. There is some difficulty over the concept 
of understanding. There is understanding as an 
emotional response, and there is understanding as I 
described it in Chapter VI, which is an effort to 
understand in terms of a public language, a public 
context. If it were to be shown that the honest 
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questioner demonstrated empathic understanding then it 
would have to be shown first that she could not very 
well ask honest questions that were perceived as honest 
unless she were sensitive to students' feelings and 
second that empathic understanding also depended on or 
inc uded an ability to communicate one's effort to 
understand in terms of public language and context. At 
this point I can only admit that it is not possible to 
show that the honest questioner invariably satisfies the 
condition of empathic understanding, even though my 
personal experience leads me to believe that most 
students do accept honest questions as expressions of an 
effort to understand, which leads to the next point. 
The sixth and final condition of the helping 
relationship is that the client perceive that the helper 
does have both empathic understanding of him and 
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unconditional positive regard for him. The helper 
cannot control another's perception. But if in fact the 
helper does have empathic understanding of and 
unconditional positive regard for the client it is 
likely that the client will perceive it. The client who 
cannot recognize it cannot be helped. Similarly, if the 
student is capable of perceiving empathic understanding 
and unconditional positive regard, it is likely that he 
will perceive the ~onest questioner as demonstrating 
these qualities, and if the student is not capable of 
such perception, then it is likely that the student is 
capable of learning in only the most minimal sense of 
learning. 
I cannot show conclusively that the honest 
questioner, as honest questioner, can satisfy all the 
conditions which, according to Rogers, a helper must 
satisfy. However, as I have said, I think it likely 
that the person who, in fact, can habitually ask honest 
questions will satisfy most of them. If so, the honest 
questioner is likely to establish something close to 
what Rogers describes as a helping relationship. 
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Helping Relationships and Learning 
Rogers claims that within a helping relationship 
significant learning occurs (41) and that all learning 
should be significant. Rogers appears to be thinking of 
significant learning both as process and product. In 
the process sense, learning that is significant is 
characterized by the personal involvement of the stu-
dent, is self-initiated, is pervasive, is evaluated by 
and is meaningful to the learner, (42) and in the 
product sense, significant learning results in a more 
fully functioning person. In consequence of significant 
learning within a therapeutic situation: 
The person comes to see himself differently. He 
acc~pts himself and his feelings more fully. He 
becomes more self-confident and self-directing. He 
becomes more the person he would like to be. He 
becomes more flexible, less rigid, in his per-
ceptions. He adopts more realistic goals for 
himself. He behaves in a more mature fashion. He 
changes his maladjustive behaviors, even such a 
long-established one as chronic alcoholism. He 
becomes more acceptant of others. He becomes more 
open to the evidence, both to what is going on 
outside of himself, and to what is going on inside 
of himself. He changes in his basic personality 
characteristics, in constructive ways. (43) 
Presumably, significant learning in the classroom 
would have similar results. Rogers characterizes such 
learning as learning which makes a difference, is 
functional, and pervades the person and his actions. 
(44) Because this sort of learning is not the sort that 
commonly occurs in schools, Rogers is critical of 
classroom practices, critical in particular of the 
imposition of knowledge by teachers who often think of 
themselves principally as lecturers and who are con-
stantly evaluating. In his opinion, these practices 
232 
cannot lead to significant learning. Certainly I am in 
sympathy with Rogers' objection to the definition of 
knowledge as information and to constant lecturing by 
teachers. But his proposals for reform seem to me to be 
inadequate. They are inadequate partly because they are 
based on an inadequate interpretation of significant 
learning, which in turn derives from an inadequate 
interpretation of a cluster of concepts, including 
subjective, objective, conflict and evaluate. In this 
section, as in the previous section, my objections are 
objections to Rogers' concepts. 
If it is true that a helping relationship results 
in significant learning, then, to the extent that honest 
questioning satisfies the conditions of a helping 
relationship it results in significant learning, and no 
more need be said. But I have not been able to show 
that honest questioning does necessarily satisfy the 
requisite conditions of a helping relationship. The 
honest questioner knows that she may not understand what 
the student says, and since, in that case, she can 
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hardly be said to prize what he says, it is difficult to 
attribute to her unconditional positive regard. Fur-. 
thermore, whether her way of dealing with her uncer-
tainty of understanding does or does not demonstrate 
empathic understanding depends on which of ~ogers' 
definitions of empathic understanding one is using. 
Nevertheless I claim that honest questioning does result 
in significant learning, and intend to show that this is 
plausible by showing how Rogers' concept of significant 
learning is inadequate. 
Rogers claims that "significant learning occurs 
more readily in situations perceived as problems." (45) 
One sort of problem is a state of incongruence which is 
the result of the student becoming aware of the gap 
between self-concept and self-experience. For example, 
a student engaged in the process of significant learning 
may learn that he is prejudiced, which fact may conflict 
with his self-concept. This learning changes the 
student in some way. That is what makes it significant 
learning. (46) Rogers also writes that "significant 
learning takes place when the subject matter is per-
ceived by the student as having relevance for his own 
purposes." (47) To exemplify this sort of situation, he 
asks us to think of two students taking a course in 
statistics, one of whom is fulfilling a course re-
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quirement, while the other is learning what he knows he 
needs to complete a research project. The latter 
student finds his learning meaningful, as any student 
does when he is learning what will help him solve his 
problems. Rogers offers no examples of other kinds of 
problems which might lead to significant learning, which 
does not mean he does not think there are other kinds. 
And of course other sorts of problem can be sources from 
which significant learning can spring. A third sort of 
problem can arise for a student when he is confronted 
with different theories. Suppose a student has read 
Rogers and read Skinner and is bewildered. He wants to 
believe Rogers, yet is unable to refute Skinner. This 
is not the sort of problem that will drive a client to 
therapy, yet it can produce painful tension and may be 
vrounded in incongruence. The student may find Rogers' 
ideas more in keeping with his deepest beliefs about 
man, and thus about himself and, therefore, the fact 
that Skinner cannot be easily refuted is threatening to 
his self-concept. There is at least a fourth kind of 
problem which engages students' attention, and this is 
the kind of problem which is like a puzzle, one in which 
the self-concept may not be at all at risk. Rogers 
omits from his characterization of problems "puzzles'' 
undertaken for the sheer pleasure of trying to solve 
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them, simply out of an urge to understand or exercise 
one's capacities, but the resultant learning is no more 
inconsequential than is the learning that results from 
the play of young animals. My first conclusion about 
significant learning is that it can arise from a wider 
variety of problems than Rogers specifies. That is 
important, since it may be that a variety of problems 
requires a variety of conditions for solution, and also 
that there will be differences in what counts as a 
solution, as significant learning in the product sense. 
First, under what conditions can persons deal 
effectively with problems? Rogers has one answer, 
"learning, particularly. if it is significant, is often a 
threatening thing." (48) Certainly when the outcome of 
significant learning is greater congruence, it must be 
the case that learning is threatening. If a person is 
to become more congruent, then he must recognize his own 
incongruence and that recognition is threatening. But, 
says Rogers, the threat from external sources can be and 
must be minimized if significant learning is to take 
place and this is exactly what the conditions of the 
helping relationship are intended to do. The helper who 
provides empathic understanding and unconditional 
positive regard satisfies the others' need for 
acceptance and thus the level of threat may be kept 
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within the range at which significant learning can 
occur. (49) Keeping threat to a minimum, says Rogers, 
is all it takes to make significant learning possible. 
Furthermore, one can do no more than this. (50) The 
helper cannot assist or speed up the process of signif-
icant learning by telling the other what to do or what 
to think. To support this point, Rogers cites both his 
own clinical experience, and research by Heine, who 
found that in therapeutic situations, clients perceived 
the therapist's direct advice to be unhelvful. (51) The 
advice is unhelpful, and it is quite unnecessary, for 
the fact is that given the conditions of a helping 
relationship, learning occurs and that learning is 
progressive, not retrogressive. (52) 
While I would agree with both Rogers (and with 
Piaget) that it is probably futile, and possibly hurtful 
to point out to the student inconsistencies between 
beliefs, or beliefs and actions, or actions and actions, 
since he may fail to recognize the inconsistencies or 
may find them too threatening, I do not think the 
teacher must remain as passive as Rogers says a helper 
should be. Rogers, himself, does recognize that there 
are some differences between significant learning in 
psychotherapy and significant learning in a school 
setting. For him, the principal difference seems to be 
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that in a school setting, the student (unlike a client 
in therapy) does not have all the data he needs to solve 
his problems. But it is not up to the teacher to decide 
when or what information he needs, so Rogers casts the 
teacher in the role of a resource person, who can make 
information available to the student on demand. The 
role is still a passive one, that of a kind librarian, a 
non-threatening person who gives no advice unless it is 
asked for. But I believe there is more to teaching than 
this. What more there may be can be seen by considering 
whether the various kinds of problems outlined can in 
fact all be dealt with in the way Rogers proposes. 
It may be that the sort of incongruence experi-
enced by the client in therapy can best be resolved 
using Rogers' approach, by talking to a "reflecting 
mirror." It may be that certain sorts of problems can 
best be solved by doing in Rogers' sense of doing, by 
"placing the student in direct experiential 
confrontation with practical problems, social problems, 
ethical problems and philosophical problems, personal 
issues, and research problems, (which) is one of the 
most effective modes of promoting learning." (53) But 
the sort of problem referred to above, in which the 
student could not make a choice between Skinner and 
Rogers, while it involves the self-concept, is resolved 
differently. One thinks about it and one acquires 
information, and one talks, but not as if to one's 
doting grandmother who smiles and nods her head. 
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When 
considering a choice of principles, whether in the 
physical or the social sciences, one talks with others, 
exchanging views. Even the fourth sort of problem, the 
puzzle sort, which may be thought of as presenting the 
purest cognitive challenge, that is, a reasoning 
problem, ~ be solved more readily (see Chapter VII) as 
a result of social interaction which brings with ~t 
other points of view. Rogers allows for the existence 
of only two possible sorts of relationships between the 
helper and the helped, one in which the helper is 
authoritarian and the helped is passive, and one in 
which the helped is active and helper is passive. He 
does not consider the third possibility of interaction 
between the helper and the one being helped. (54) 
About the "puzzle'' sort of problem another obser-
vation may be made. It may be true that the more 
serious a problem is the more commanding of attention it 
is. But Bruner has suggested that if learning is to be 
readily transferable, then it takes place in conditions 
of playfulness and of freedom from excessive drive. (55) 
Rogers said that significant learning took place in the 
context of problems, and his description of problems 
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clearly indicates that to him problem is always a 
trouble. I have tried to show that significant learning 
(learning that makes a difference) can result from a 
variety of problems, and that these cannot all be 
characterized as troubles. Rogers' paradigm model of 
the sort of problem that results in significant learning 
is the problem of incongruence, and that is a trouble-
some problem. But Rogers has said that significant 
learning is more likely to result when the student is 
personally involved and his effort self-initiated. And 
that is another way of saying that significant learning 
is more likely to occur in the context of problems, and 
is at the same time another way, and a better one, of 
defining the student's problem. 
The honest questioner recognizes that the student 
is likely to learn better when his attention is engaged. 
Her questions are addressed to his beliefs and these 
beliefs, about himself or about the world, are matters 
of some concern to him and rather easily engage his 
attention. As the teacher asks honest questions, 
problems emerge. The student finds that he has no good 
reason to believe what he does, or finds that some of 
his beliefs are inconsistent, or that they do not quite 
make sense. Whether these problems will be troubles or 
puzzles or some other sort of problem depends on a 
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variety of factors. The point is that the teacher, 
although she does not give the student problems, has an 
active role in bringing those he has into awareness. 
In his description of significant learning, Rogers 
seems to have made a mistake parallel to one many 
teachers make in our time, although the mistake was 
called to the attention of the teaching community by 
Dewey sixty years ago, and more recently by P. H. Hirst 
and R. S. Peters. The mistake concerns the most 
important matter of interest. Dewey distinguished 
between three uses of ''interest:" as engagements or 
involvements, as what touches or influences a person, 
and as attitudes towards some object or other. Dewey 
wrote that the pedagogical problem is to "nurture his 
(the student's) sympathetic interest in characteristic 
traits of the world in which he lives" (56), and it is 
clear that he objected to "making interesting by 
extraneous and artificial inducements." (57) Ideally, 
the three interests would coincide, and it is part of 
the teacher's problem to help the child to care about 
and engage in what does touch him. P. H. Hirst and R. 
S. Peters make a useful distinction between interest in 
the psychological sense and interest in the valuative 
sense. (58) The psychological interpretation of 
"interest'' has motivational relevance, since it refers 
to what catches the child's attention. The valuative 
interpretation of the notion refers to whatever is in 
the child's interest. Hirst and Peters do not think 
that these two sorts of interest will necessarily 
coincide in the child. The pedagogical problem is one 
of beginning with what interests the child and leading 
him to recognize what is in his interest. 
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An enthusiastic follower of Rogers might say that 
she wanted her students to learn what is significant to 
them, failing to notice that the word "significant" is 
ambiguous in a way parallel to the way the word 
"interest" is ambiguous. Would she mean she wanted 
students to learn about what they already considered 
significant or that she wanted them to recognize the 
significance of what perhaps they did not want to learn? 
In one sense significant learning is learning that 
begins with what is already of concern or interest to 
one. In another sense, significant learning is 
significance learning, that is, learning what is 
significant to one. This still does not sort out the 
ambiguities well enough. Consider the case of a person 
who is wholly negligent of his diet, who learns about 
the effects of that diet on his health. Objectively, 
this learning is significant, but unless he learns to 
care about what he learns, that learning is subjectively 
insignificant. In the fullest sense, significant 
learnin~ would be that learning in which the sub-
jectively and the objectively significant coincide. 
242 
In other words, "significance " too, may be 
thought of as having a psychological and a valuative 
sense. Of course Rogers wouldn't intend the valuative 
sense of significant learning. He makes very clear that 
evaluation is a source of threat, one that should be 
dispensed with, and in his mind it is closely linked to 
the concept of control. Rogers has no wish to control 
and he does not wish to choose for others. Rogers' 
consistent refusal to choose for another explains some 
features of his list of the outcomes of therapy. (See 
page 231.) Not one of the outcomes is a specific skill 
or a specific content. Rogers acknowledges no specific 
goods for man. Fully functioningness is to Rogers what 
rationality is for Rawls: a purely formal concept. (59) 
But it does not follow from the fact that I ought not 
"ch'oose" others' goals for them, that one goal is in 
fact as good as another. I may recognize that it is 
objectively in your best interest to be healthy even 
though I ought not force you to take steps to protect 
your health. (60) 
The difficulties that Rogers has with notions such 
as significant, evaluate, conflict, and control, are 
closely intertwined, I believe, with the difficulty 
Rogers admits he has with the concept of objectivity. 
In the paper "Persons or Science? A Philosophical 
Question," (61) Rogers makes an effort to reconcile a 
conflict in his own thinking. For many years Rogers 
assumed that an unbridgeable gap existed between 
subjective knowledge and objective knowledge. Subjec-
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tive knowledge was based on feelings and could not be 
communicated: it was significant knowledge, charac-
terized by a feeling of oneness with what was known 
(e.g. another person). Scientific knowledge, the 
paradigm of objective knowledge, separated self from 
other. The objects of knowledge were to be manipulated 
and controlled, and that is to say manipulation and 
control were the objects of knowledge! Given this view 
of objective knowledge, it is no wonder that Rogers 
considered objectivity in a relationship to be 
unethical, and insisted that within a relationship one 
had to be subjective, meaning that the relationship had 
to be based on feeling, not thinking. In addition, it 
is apparent why Rogers had a difficult time finding a 
place for objective knowledge within significant 
learning in his sense of the phrase, that is, the 
psychological sense, for significant learning was 
subjective knowledge. 
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Rogers did manage to find a way to reconcile the 
positions. He recognized the subjective roots of 
science in the passion of the scientist, in the source 
of new -ideas, in the readiness to believe evidence. He 
began to think of objectivity as those methods which 
enabled one to check the reliability of either one's 
subjective experience or one's reliability as observer 
(Rogers says both). The purpose of scientific method 
was to provide one with more dependable belief or faith. 
(62) The reconciliation is based on a sketchy revision 
of the concepts of subjectivitiy and objectivity and a 
mere suggestion of a theory of knowledge, but it is a 
step in the right direction. (63) Rogers has not yet 
worked out the implications of his reconciliation for 
other areas of his thinking. For example, he has not 
yet gone so far as to say that whether they are or are 
not recognized subjectively, there may be objective 
goods for persons (more specific than those he recog-
nizes to be consequences of significant learning). He 
does not, for example, recognize rationality or 
intelligence as universal goods. Nor has he rethought 
the concept of evaluation. And this brings me to my 
third major objection. 
Evaluation has traditionally been considered to be 
a major task of the teacher, but it is obvious, given 
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any of Rogers' interpretations of the condition of 
unconditional positive regard, that it would be impos-
sible to reconcile Rogers' concept of evaluation with 
it. Rogers is being consistent when he forbids 
evaluation of any sort on the part of the teacher. It 
is one of the criteria of significant learning in 
Rogers' sense that it is evaluated by the learner and 
only by the learner: a teacher must not evaluate in any 
way. That a teacher must respond to students Rogers 
understands, but, he says, a teacher 
can like or dislike a student product without 
implying that it is objectively good or bad or that 
the student is good or bad. He is simply expressing 
a feeling for the product, a feeling which exists 
within himself. (64) 
Without question one should not imply that the student 
is good or bad on the basis of the work he has done or 
the statements he has made. But the quotation deserves 
fuller discussion. 
While it is reasonable to avoid suggesting to the 
student that there are absolute standards--aesthetic, 
ethical, or epistemological--it is quite unreasonable to 
avoid informing the student, directly or indirectly, 
about those public standards which do exist. It is 
unreasonable to withhold information about them and in 
so doing to imply that there are no standards or that 
standards are worthless. It may, on the contrary, be 
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one of the most important functions of the teacher to 
teach students what the standards are and to teach them 
how to evaluate the usefulness of these standards. How 
utterly useless for the teacher to express her feelings 
about the work to the student without helping the 
student see what in his work was creating that effect! 
Perhaps, in any case, the teacher should express her 
feelings only after she has ascertained what kind of 
response the student is looking for. It is possible 
that a student might not particularly want to know how a 
teache~ feels but does want to know her response as a 
representative of an educated, knowing public. 
As in the case of other concepts, Rogers appears 
to see that, in some way, his formulation is not quite 
right. Life, he acknowledges, does set conditions, life 
does test. The student will know "that he cannot enter 
engineering school without so much math." (65) And the 
student will be faced with "the fact that he cannot join 
the special literature section until he 'has shown 
evidence of both wide reading and creative writing." 
(66) But what is this life which tests? Is it not a 
someone who decides whether he has enough math or 
whether his writing is in fact creative, and is this 
decision not an evaluation? Rogers writes as if he 
thinks it is not, as if he believes these conditions 
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(which are standards whether or not he sees this) have 
been established by some non-human agency, as if the 
conditions were objective in the most naive sense of 
objective. Rogers again fails to make conceptual 
distinctions and so he fails to see the difference 
between responses which reflect sensitivity to 
intersubjective standards, which are based on informed 
feelings, and responses which are authoritarian and 
arbitrary. For Rogers there is no such thing, appar-
ently, as educated feelings, as developed sensibilities 
and no such thing, apparenily, as a subjective response 
which is indeed feelingful, but is entirely inappro-
priate and unhelpful. Rogers is fearful lest the 
teacher's evaluative responses control the student. 
Rogers' commitment to allowing others to be is laudable. 
But it does not follow from the fact that one ought not 
control others that one cannot state the criteria which 
provide the source of one's responses (feelings do have 
sources), nor that one cannot stand in opposition to 
others, nor that opposition is control. (67) 
I think I have now shown why the honest questioner 
may not satisfy all of the conditions of a helping 
relationship, especially those which have to do with 
understanding and evaluating. The honest questioner's 
position on the nature of signi~icant learning and the 
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conditions of significant learning is different from 
that of Rogers. Certainly the student is or ought to·be 
trying to solve a problem which is significant to him, 
but "while the problem may be found introspectively, in 
the private world of experience, it cannot be understood 
or solved except in social and scientific terms." (68) 
The honest questioner tries to understand, but knows she 
often does not. She constantly evaluates in the sense 
that she makes hypotheses about what the student says, 
and not simply in terms of its psychological signifi-
cance for him, but in terms of its public significance, 
that is, against the standards of public intelligi-
bility. 
Human knowledge is intersubjective knowledge (69). 
It is created through conflict, and it is possessed 
through conflict. Living in this century, one can 
appreciate why Rogers and others abhor conflict and shun 
it. Conflict is so often destructive, but it need not 
be. And in any case, turning our heads from it will not 
make it go away. Those who would teach may learn from 
Rogers to treat the student as a person who is an end in 
himself, a person with feelings which must be respected. 
But teachers can learn also from Dewey, from Buber, from 
Piaget, and from all those who saw what Rogers could 
not, that students need to learn how to deal with 
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conflict. There is destructive conflict, which is 
always the result of a breakdown in or a perversion of· 
communication. There is constructive conflict, which is 
communication raised to the highest level, which is 
grounded in the highest ethical standards of respect for 
the person, in the deepest respect for and skill at 
using the language, and which conforms to the rules of 
reasoning and the rules of the methods of inquiry (which 
in themselves represent mankind's moral victories). 
Honest questioning is a way of teaching students how to 
disagree, of teaching them how to engage in constructive 
conflict, something Rogers' helper could never do. (70) 
Rogers wishes to avoid conflict and thus it is 
fitting that he values so highly his version of sub-
jective knowledge, which accompanies or is the result of 
a feeling of oneness with the other. To be the same as, 
undifferentiated from the other, is a way to avoid 
conflict. But to become one with the other can be seen 
as a regression to the world of the infant, and to be a 
denial of the other. Obviously Rogers could not intend 
this result, and yet I think this is a plausible 
interpretation of his proposals and represents their 
dark side. In trying to become one with the other, in 
denying or ignoring our differences by keeping silent 
and confining ourselves to paraphrase, like very clever 
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parrots, we deprive ourselves and others of our greatest 
source of growth. (71) 
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learned that he is prejudiced, he is more congruent if 
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displays prejudice. However, most of us would incline 
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after he recognized that he was prejudiced, and learned 
not to be prejudiced. But that is because we have a 
predetermined set of goals. See footnote 30, this 
chapter. 
47. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, p. 158. 
48. Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 
390. 
49. Rogers does not say why threat should be kept 
to a minimum, why it is that beyond some unspecified 
point threat hinders learning, but other psychologists 
have dealt with the problem of the relationship between 
motivation and learning and what some of them have said 
provides indirect support for Rogers' position. Jerome 
Bruner reviewed some of the literature on the effect of 
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ness of cognitive activity~ "There is a middle state of 
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generic learning." Jerome Bruner, Beyond the Infor-
mation Given, ed. Jeremy M. Anglin (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1973), p. 227. Rogers is not writing 
spe~ifically about the transferability of learning, 
though there is ~o reason to deny that he would expect 
significant learning to be transferable. The studies to 
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easily translated into Rogers' claim. Highly motivated 
rats learned less quickly than the less highly motivated 
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as a "flexible, knowledgeable power of transaction with 
the environment." Robert W. White, "Motivation 
Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," Psychological 
Review 66 (1959):326. Such learning occurs, says White, 
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example of an infant to make his point. It is when 
needs are satisfied that the "infant can attend to 
matters of lesser urgency, exploring the properties of 
things he does not fear and does not need to eat • 
generally accumulating for himself a broad knowledge and 
a broad skill in dealing with his surroundings." Ibid., 
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that can be taught to another is relatively inconse-
quential, and has little or no significant influence on 
behavior. • I have come to feel that the only 
learning which significantly influences behavior is 
self-discovered, self-appropriated learning. • As a 
consequence of the above, I realize that I have lost 
interest in being a teacher. • Hence I have come to 
feel that the outcomes of teaching are either 
unimportant or hurtful." Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a 
Person, p. 276. It is tempting to say that, in view of 
the fact that Rogers has "disparaged the need for 
intellectual prowess to help others" (Rychlak, A 
Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory, p~ 194) it 
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"conclusions'' and as "hypotheses." They are his 
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he is willing to recognize that from the point of view 
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ality is not the account of a perfectionist. But his 
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Dettering, "Philosophic Idealism in Rogerian Psych-
ology," p. 423. Perhaps Dettering finds this assumption 
not credible. Richard Hofstadter remarks that the same 
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Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Random 
House, Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 386-87. But is it 
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I wouldn't suggest that there is a pre-established 
harmony between any individual nature and any social 
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species' biological equipment, in which case a tendency 
to become rational is p~rt of our nature, and it would 
not be absurd to say that the more rational the 
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Amongst them he includes unaggressive directness: "In 
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order to force the patient to clarify some of the 
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through the therapist's pinpointing, some of the fog 
begins to lift. The unaggressive directness of the 
therapist teaches the patient that he himself has to 
clarify contradictions in his existence. As soon as the 
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it or oppose it. In either case, he clarifies an 
issue." Therapeutic Communication (New York: Norton, 
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his conception of psychopathology as, in essence a 
disturbance of commmunicative behavior so that 
"therapeutic efforts should be directed at correcting 
faulty communication.". Ibid., p. xiv. 
55. Jerome S. Bruner, Toward a Theory of 
Instruction (Cambridge, Ma.: The Belknap Press of 
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59. As Salvatore Maddi points out, "on reflection, 
it becomes apparent that any behavior--some act or its 
opposite--can express fully functioningness. As we 
recognized before, such a position is elastlc, post hoc, 
and quite untestable. One cannot determine whether it 
is true or false." Personality Theories • • p. 319. 
It is true, however, that Rogers admits that the 
qualities of the direction of the good life as lived by 
a fully functioning personality may have a certain 
universality. On Becoming a Person, p. 187. 
60. "When someone begins getting the urge to cure 
others, this goes in opposition to his ethic, and 
therefore we find Rogers getting very uneasy with such 
therapeutic goals." Joseph F. Rychlak, A Philosophy of 
Science for Personality Theory (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1968), p. 190. If, as Thomas Szasz has said, 
the medical model is inappropriate and mental illnesses 
are not illnesses, but sufferings of the soul, then it 
would indeed be inappropriate to speak of therapists 
curing people. One can see why Rogers would object to 
the urge to cure on several grounds: the idea is 
associated with control, authority, and with the notion 
of a specific goal. 
61. Carl R. Rogers, "Persons or Science? A 
Philosophical Question," On Becoming a Person, pp. 
199-224. 
62. Ibid., pp. 218-223. 
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63. Rogers admits that he used to think of science 
as "something out there." That is no doubt a common 
view, though a naive one. The following quotation from 
Maurice Friedman's book on Buber can be taken as support 
for this early position of Rogers, but I think it can 
also be seen to undermine both it and Rogers' effort to 
cast the teacher in the role of reactor rather than 
interactor: "As Marjorie Reeves has shown in her 
application of Buber's !-Thou philosophy to education, 
the whole concept of the 'objectivity' of education is 
called in question by the fact that our knowledge of 
things is for the most part mediated through the minds 
of others and by the fact that real growth takes place 
'through the impact of person on person.'" Martin 
Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 178. 
Rogers quotes Buber, and refers to him in the essay 
"Persons or Science?" but, if Friedman's interpretation 
of Buber is correct, Rogers misunderstands or chooses to 
ignore some at least of Buber's position. "One of these 
(approaches to the problem of propagandizing and legit-
imately influencing) is the desire to safeguard the 
student by demanding of the teacher an illusory objec-
tivity, as if the teacher has no commitment to a certain 
field of knowledge, to a method of approaching this 
field, and to a set of attitudes and value assumptions 
which are embodied in the questions which he raises • 
• The true alternative to false objectivity and to 
standards set from the outside is not, of course, that 
subjectivity which imprisons the teacher within his own 
attachments or the absence of any value standards. It 
is the teacher's selection of the effective world and 
the act of inclusion or experiencing the other side, to 
which Buber has pointed." P. 181. 
64. Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, p. 106. 
65. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 290. 
66. Ibid., p. 291. 
67. Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of 
Dialogue, writes: "This means that no real learning 
takes place unless the pupil participates, but it also 
means that the pupil must encounter something really 
'other' than himself before he can learn." P. 177. And 
a few pages later: "The mark of our time, writes Buber, 
is the denial that values are anything other than the 
subjective needs of groups. This denial is not a 
product of reason but of the sickness of our age; hence 
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it is futile to meet it with arguments. All that the 
teacher can do is help keep awake in the pupil the pain 
which he suffers through his distorted relation to his 
own self and thus awaken his desire to become a real and 
whole person. The teacher can do this best of all when 
he recognizes that his real goal is the education of 
great character." Pp. 181-82. Friedman is concerned to 
point out the similarities between Rogers and Buber, but 
the differences, illustrated in the above quotations, 
are more striking to me. 
68. Richard W. Dettering, "Philosophic Idealism in 
Rogerian Psychology," p. 419. 
69. Dettering's critique of Rogers is in part an 
effort to show that contrary to what Rogers might think, 
the differences between himself and Dewey are great and 
outweigh the similarities. In summarizing, Dettering 
says that "one opposition which seems to run through all 
these differences we have discussed is between an 
intersubjective and an introspective concept of knowl-
edge. Here we must especially remember Dewey's criti-
cism of the 'introspectionist' view that 'conscious-
ness or experience is the organ of its own immediate 
disclosure of all its own secrets'--a view, he says, 
which arose with Descartes and Locke and was 'foisted on 
psychology from without.' On this issue above all, 
Rogers must part with Dewey. Whereas Dewey relied 
ultimately on the consensus of the scientific community, 
Rogers rests on the process of self- disclosure." P. 
420. The quotations from Dewey are taken from 
Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch and 
Co., 1931), p. 261. 
70. In referring so often to reasoning skills and 
methods of inquiry, I fear I will seem to have excluded 
the various arts as important ways of knowing. I do not 
intend to do so. This is not the place to discuss it, 
but I would not wish to be thought of as making vulgar 
distinctions between the arts as irrational and the 
sciences as rational. 
I wish to make a point here, not related to the one 
above, about the way honest questions might be used. 
Dorothy Heathcote is an English woman, well-known in 
educational circles for her method of using improvisa-
tional drama with students of all ages, and in a broad 
variety of subjects. Her efforts are explicitly 
directed to the end of significance, in both senses of 
the term. What is of especial interest to me is that 
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Ms. Heathcote uses what I call honest questions in her 
work. Betty Jane Wagner, in her book Drama as a 
Learning Medium, refers to them as real questions. 
(Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 
1976) Using real questions, Heathcote gets children to 
think very hard indeed about what they mean, and how 
they can show what they mean through actions. Her way 
is a dramatic one, if the pun may be forgiven, of doing 
concept analyses and thought experiments. 
71. Maurice Friedman: "in conversation the tension 
between the meaning which the word I use has for me and 
that which it has for my partner can prove itself 
fruitful and lead to a deeper personal understanding, 
• " Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 174. And 
from Richard W. Dettering, "Hegel's dialectical process 
mingled with the Darwinian struggle for survival to 
furnish the basis for Dewey's concern with conflict and 
challenge as a necessary factor in self-development." 
"Philosophical Idealism in Rogerian Psychology," pp. 
418-19. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
In this, the conclusion, I will present the 
briefest possible restatement of the argument for honest 
questioning, will note the limits of its usefulness, 
discuss the problems of evaluation of the technique, 
and, finally, will make a few observations about the 
practicality of the model, and about ideals. 
Honest questioning functions on several levels, in 
much the same way as good literature does. I chose to 
present it, initially, in its humblest function, as a 
way for the teacher to find out where the student is. 
It is surely credible that honest questioning is equal 
to that task. And it is no less credible that honest 
questioning is a fine tool for the teacher who wishes to 
use discussion in her classroom, since most people do 
like to talk about their beliefs. (1) Amongst the 
functions of honest questioning are these solutions to 
some immediate problems of the teacher. 
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They, however, 
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would not be enough to justify it as a teaching tech-
nique. If honest questioning is to be justified as a 
teaching technique, then it has to be shown to promote 
the end of the practice of teaching, which is bringing 
the student to know, and since teaching is a practice 
which deals directly with persons, it must also promote 
the rationality of persons, that is, of students. 
Honest questioning does both. The honest questioner 
brings the student to know how to justify by asking him 
to justify, and brings him to rationality by treating 
him as if rational. (2) Bringing the student to 
knowledge and to rationality are the ultimate ends of 
honest questioning. I make the assumption that 
knowledge is for the sake of rationality, and in the 
interest of simplicity of style, I shall, in what 
remains, omit reference to knowing and refer only to 
rationality as the end of honest questioning. 
Integrity of means and ends is characteristic of 
rational action. The technique of honest questioning 
fully exemplifies this characteristic. It is one with 
its end. It is rational behavior in its own right and 
its end is the rationality of the student. And it is as 
plausible to think that efforts to answer honest ques-
tions will lead to rationality as to think that trying 
to play a game will lead to one's being able to play the 
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game. (3) Having said this, it seems unnecessary to try 
to explain the effects of honest questioning, as if one 
were to try to explain how it is that trying to learn to 
ride a bicycle leads to learning how to ride a bicycle. 
But not everyone thinks such an explanation is unnec-
essary, perhaps because not everyone sees the identity 
of means and ends. This is why Piaget, as was noted, is 
criticized for not attending to the motivation for 
development. Why, the critics ask, does conflict lead 
to change? The question being asked, note, is not a 
question of why or how a person may be tempted to get on 
the bicycle in the first place, a question of no 
interest to the honest questioner, who does not attempt 
the often futile task of trying to arouse the students' 
interest in a subject in which they have none. Honest 
questions do provoke conflict. That they do, almost 
invariably, is simply a consequence of the fact that few 
persons are in possession of sets of beliefs which have 
been carefully formulated and examined for consistency. 
(4) The conflicts which result are moving, and that 
they do prompt change is explained as either a function 
of sheer cognitive conflict-- the recognition of 
inconsistency between two beliefs as Piaget might put 
it, or as a function of what might be called by Rogers 
affective conflict, that is a recognition of conflict 
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between my self-concept (that I am a reasonable person), 
and my perception that my beliefs are inconsistent so 
that, therefore, I cannot be so reasonable after all. 
If I want to ride a bicycle and I try to correct 
my mistakes, I will probably learn to ride a bicycle. 
If I wish to be rational and I recognize and try to 
correct my mistakes, then I will probably move in the 
direction of greater rationality. The wish to be 
rational is the motive for rationality, and, logically, 
there can be no other motive for it. The teacher's 
promise of gold stars will not produce greater 
rationality, and will completely subvert it. If 
integrity of means and ends is to be preserved, as it 
must be for the sake of rationality, then this is the 
only motive to which she can appeal. A further point to 
be noted is that the answer to the question ''why the 
student learns?" is also the answer to the question 
"what does the student learn?" that answer being, "to 
resolve conflict." 
Aristotle wrote that in dialectical reasoning one 
must begin with what was familiar, with what is prior in 
experience, but that the teacher should begin teaching 
from the first principles of the subject. Piaget, like 
many others who advocate a learning by doing, rejects 
the second half of the claim in favor of the first half. 
Do not, he says, axiomatize too quickly. Honest ques-
tioning observes this injunction, and it is, conse-
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quently, an informal way of teaching students. That is 
to say, the students are asked to think about what is 
familiar to them, and only gradually are they led to 
articulate principles implicit in their thinking. The 
students are learning skills, but always in context. 
This teaching in context approach was defended as 
sound pedagogy. But there is another reason why skills 
should not be taught in isolated fashion. The proper 
end of reasoning is rationality, but to teach reasoning 
skills in isolation is to teach them as means which can 
be put to any end, ·and is ~o encourage sophistry. (5) 
The skills of the surgeon are not taught outside of the 
context of their proper use, which is healing. The 
skills of the lawyer are not taught within the context 
of their proper use, which might conceivably be that of 
justice. To teach reasoning skills in isolation is to 
teach them as the skills of the lawyer are taught, 
rather than as the skills of the surgeon are taught. 
Although I claim much for honest questioning, I am 
not claiming that it is sufficient for either the 
acquisition of knowledge or the development of ration-
ality. There are limitations to what it can do, and 
these limitations come from several sources. There are, 
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first of all, those quite arbitrary learnings which are 
simply associative and to be remembered. 'The alphabet· 
and the digits are prime examples, and the category as a 
whole is the category of names. Whatever is the most 
efficient way to learn these conventions which make 
knowledge possible, honest questioning has little or no 
contribution to make. Nor can motor skills be learned 
in a dialectical way. If names are to be learned, if 
typing or throwing a ball are to be learned, then the 
learner must have a reason to learn them. And this 
cannot be given by the teacher. A teacher may state a 
reason why the student should learn, but unless the 
learner sees that reason as a reason, he doesn't have a 
reason. (Obviously, from what was said earlier, the 
best reason to learn is that he wants to.) 
Honest questioning is, furthermore, not the way to 
transmit quantities of information to the student. I do 
not deny that having information is one condition of 
effective rationality: the ignorant person cannot be 
rational. But, as stated in the introduction and in the 
chapter on Piaget, the teacher is not the most efficient 
transmitter of information, and other means, which are 
readily available, should be put to that end. (6) Nor 
is honest questioning to be considered in any way a 
substitute for experience, whatever one may mean by 
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that. It is not a substitute for experience in the 
sen~e of that which yields information. And it is not a 
substitute for experience which is productive. The 
point I wish to make is not that honest questioning is 
all there is to teaching. It is rather that whether the 
students are doing something else, and whether the 
teacher is working with the whole group or the 
individual, if language is being used, then more often 
than is now the cas~, and more often indeed than not, 
honest questioning is the form that language should 
take. 
Which brings me to the consideration of the ways 
the effects of honest questioning are limited by.the 
skills of the teacher. A teacher may wish to ask honest 
questions but be unable to do so, or be able to do so, 
but badly. A teacher cannot expect to get far if her 
only response to whatever the student says is, "can you 
tell me what you mean by that?" no matter how honestly 
she asks the question. Nor will it do to ask a student 
who has never heard of them if he thinks he has stated 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Within the 
category of questions that may be called honest, there 
will be good questions and bad ones. Good ones will be 
skillfully phrased in words students can comprehend, 
will reflect the structure of the subject matter, and 
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will not be all-purpose questions but will be 
specifically tailored to fit what the student has saiq. 
If the honest questioner is to be skillful, she be 
capable of treating others as ends in themselves. She 
will be open, honest, nondefensive, which is to say she 
will possess the characteristics of mental health and 
the skills of a good inquirer. She will also be 
knowledgeable about her field, having a feeling for its 
structure, and will be able to recognize coherence or 
the lack of it. Few teachers or teachers-to-be could 
satisfy these conditions. However, a teacher who is 
concerned enough about her students to make a serious 
effort to find out where they are, already satisfies at 
least some of the conditions in incipient form and will 
do her students some good. She will undoubtedly prompt 
them to do some thinking. Furthermore, if she has a 
good intelligence, her efforts will yield fruits in 
terms of her own understanding of her own discipline. 
(7) The claim so often made by teachers that they 
learned more from their students than their students 
learned from them sounds fatuous. Nonetheless it is 
true that honest questioning will yield benefits to the 
teacher as well as to the student. By inquiring, the 
teacher will learn how to be an inquirer, and she will 
learn something about reasoning by reflecting on the 
student's reasons. The only means to the end of 
learning to ask good honest questions is asking honest 
questions. The teacher as well as the student learns 
what she is doing by doing it. 
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Given the perfectly rational teacher, the student 
perfectly capable of achieving rationality, and endless 
time, honest questioning would produce rationality in 
the student. That is the ideal account, but not the 
account of honest questioning as it occurs. In prac-
tice, honest questioning is not sufficient to produce 
rationality. The capacity for rationality of both 
teachers and students, never perfect to begin with, has 
been affected by the circumstances of their lives, and 
their time together is short. The teacher will not be 
perfectly rational, and the student will not be 
perfectly capable of achieving rationality. 
The student may have emotional difficulties of one 
sort or another, of one degree or another, which the 
honest questioner in a classroom setting may or may not 
be equal to dealing with. There a~e the emotional 
difficulties experienced by students who are enrolled in 
classes against their will, and the honest questioner 
may not be able to make much headway with them, partic-
ularly when there may be no good reason why that student 
should take that course. Even if there is a reason for 
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the student to take the course, it may be too much to 
expect that he accept it as a reason, in which case, 
requiring him to take the course is requiring him to act 
without reason. (8) These sorts of problems are the 
result of the way schooling has been organized, and they 
are not problems the honest questioner can resolve. 
Other sources of emotional difficulties are mistrust, 
shallow or deep, which may or may not be quickly let go. 
Honest questioning, like a knife, can be perceived to 
have the characteristics of a tool and a weapon. It can 
be seen differently by different students. A student 
who has had much ~xperience being "put down," may see 
the honest questioner as an attacker. Sometimes honest 
questioning will be ineffective in the face of the 
anxiety or hostility of students who simply do not like 
a non-authoritarian teaching style. There are students 
who would rather the teacher lecture, but student 
preference does not itself justify lecturing. The 
student may dislike school and find it is a lot less 
trouble if the teacher just says what she wants. The 
student who prefers to be passive is a student only in 
name, and the passivity should be considered to be a 
symptom of a problem. (9) Emotional difficulties are 
present and make their presence felt in any classroom, 
whatever techniques the teacher employs. Honest 
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questioning bears more than an accidental resemblance to 
certain techniques of psychotherapy, and as is the case 
with psychotherapy, its success cannot be guaranteed. 
The effectiveness of honest questioning will also 
be limited by the innate capacity for rationality of the 
student. It is not clear to me what it means to speak 
of innate capacity for rationality, yet I believe there 
are differences in such capacities, differences which 
can be accounted for by genetic makeup or physiological 
accidents. What is clear to me, however, is that the 
presumption should always be on the side of potential 
rationality. All persons, no matter what their innate 
capacity, must be given a chance to speak for them-
selves. Regardless of what their innate capacity is, 
honest questioning is a way to develop that capacity. 
Although much of my argument for honest ques-
tionin is an argument based on the nature of 
rationality and on ethical principles, and does not, 
therefore, include claims which could be submitted to 
empirical test, other portions of the argument do 
include such claims. No claim is being made that 
students in courses in which the teacher uses honest 
questioning will acquire more information than students 
in more traditional settings, but the claim is made that 
as a result of honest questioning, students will learn 
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to reason better and will learn how to justify beliefs. 
How could this claim be evaluated? It would not be 
appropriate to compare the reasoning skills and the 
inquiry skills of students taught logic, for example, in 
traditional ways with the reasoning and inquiry skills 
of students taught using honest questioning. If such a 
comparison were to be made, critics could reasonably 
object that what was taught in the two courses was not 
the same. The student who learned in the traditional 
way would, presumably~ have been taught some of the 
formal principles of reasoning, while the student who 
has been exposed to honest questioning will probably not 
be explicitly familiar with these principles or with the 
vocabulary of logic, although explicit knowledge of this 
sort may be an eventual outcome of honest questioning. 
The student taught in the traditional way will not have 
had much chance to construct arguments to support his 
own beliefs, and if he has, then he has been exposed to 
something similar to honest questioning. If a test is 
valid, it has to test what has been taught. On the 
assumption that what is taught is in part a function of 
method, it follows that the test format has to resemble 
the teaching format, and it follows again that it is not 
possible to construct one test to evaluate different 
teaching techniques. Certainly an objective test would 
not be a suitable test of the effects of honest ques-
tioning. What one would want to know is the student's 
reasons for his answers and these could not, in 
principle, be anticipated as a series of choices, "a" 
through "e". One could ask students from a tradition-
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ally taught group to give reasons for their answers, but 
since they would not have had practice doing so, the 
test would be unfair to them. The problems of 
evaluating t~e effects of honest questioning are the 
same as the problems of evaluating what a person knows, 
in the strong sense of know. One cannot evaluate what a 
person knows unles"s one learns his reasons. As he 
provides these, his beliefs are likely to change. These 
problems provide a further illustration of a point made 
throughout this conclusion: that means and ends not only 
ought not be separated, but in some sense cannot be 
separated. (10) 
The same comments would have to be made of course, 
if the teacher wished to evaluate, not the program, but 
the student. Whether she wished to find out what he 
knew, or how well he could reason, she would have to 
evaluate by essay exams or oral exams. Since there are 
standards of reasoning, an examiner who was in pos-
session of these standards, could approach an objective 
judgment of the student's reasoning ability. I say 
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"approach" only, since it is well to bear in mind, as an 
honest questioner, that there will be times when it is 
not possible to say with certainty of a given answer 
that the student does or does not hold it for good 
reason. (11) But this lack of certainty does not mean 
we •cannot make good judgments, only that we must 
recognize that judgments are, at least sometimes, 
provisional. 
Clearly, if the effects of honest questioning on 
student learning can only be evaluated by honest 
questioning, honest questioning will be expensive to 
evaluate. That fact will likely cause people to wonder 
if it can be considered a practical technique. Other 
considerations will cause some to question the prac-
ticality of honest questioning. For example, there are 
those, teachers and parents alike, who will say they 
value discussion, but that, given all the information 
students have to acquire, there can be no time for it. 
Honest questioning, like all discussion, is time 
consuming. But I have already argued that the teacher 
is not efficient as a transmitter of information, so 
that it is not practical for her to lecture students. 
Furthermore, if one interprets "practical'' to mean 
practicable in the real world, then honest questioning 
seems to provide a kind of training far more practical 
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than that provided by lecturing and objective tests, for 
one rarely has to listen to lectures or take objectiv• 
tests in the real world. In many occupations, one does 
have to participate in discussions, and the more 
effectively one can make one's point and grasp another's 
the better. It is difficult to think what could be more 
practical than learning how to use the language 
skillfully. 
In another sense of practical, this proposal on 
behalf of honest questioning is not intended to be 
practical. It is not proposed in the expectation that 
it will change educational practice, but is offered, 
frankly, as an ideal. Honest questioning is an ideal, 
derived, as any ideal is, from a model. Up until now, 
the relationship of the authoritarian father to his 
child has served, more often than not, as the model for 
the teacher/student relationship. Ideally, the father 
or teacher has been able to exert extensive control over 
the compliant child or student. (12) The model is still 
acceptable to many, and the schoolroom is the scene of a 
daily struggle for control. Obviously, the model is not 
acceptable to me, for reasons implicit in what has been 
said. The model from which honest que~tion~ng is 
derived is the model of good conversation between 
equals. It is an adaptation of that model which takes 
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into account the ways the participants, teacher and 
student, are not equals. In the ideal conversation 
there is a turn-taking, and only to the degree that 
people share a background of training and information 
and have assured themselves that the other participants 
know what they are talking about, do they permit 
themselves to make extended statements. In an ideal 
conversation, participants are sensitive to the 
possibilities of misunderstanding. Ideally, the less 
well conversants know each other, the more careful they 
are to corroborate interpretations and the more their 
interaction approaches honest questioning. (13) 
To say that honest questioning is an ide~l towards 
which teaching might be directed, is to acknowledge 
again what has been already acknowledged, that it cannot 
be achieved. The schools will never be filled with 
ideal honest questioners, and in fact there will never 
be one ideal honest questioner. An ideal honest ques-
tioner would be perfectly rational. Honest questioning 
is an impractical ideal in the way any ideal is 
impractical. Just as it does not count against a 
religious ideal that it is unattainable, it does not 
count against this account of honest questioning that it 
describes an unattainable ideal. Nor does it count 
against honest questioning that it is not a foolproof 
method for bringing another person to knowledge or to 
rationality. 
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I have shown that honest questioning is not suf-
ficient to produce rationality or knowledge in another, 
and now admit that it is not absolutely necessary 
either. That honest questioning is not absolutely 
necessary if a person is to acquire knowledge or become 
rational is attested to by the fact that many human 
beings have acquired some knowledge and many have 
developed some of their capacity for rationality even 
though few have been exposed to honest questioning. 
However, few come to know as much as they could or 
develop their capacity for rationality to the fullest 
extent. It is reasonable to suppose that the amount of 
knowledge we acquire and the degree to which we become 
rational depend to a great extent on the kinds of 
encounters we have with other persons. More parti-
cularly, it is reasonable to suppose that, other things 
being equal, rationality is likely to develop better 
when one is exposed to models of rationality and when 
one is treated as if one possessed the capacity for 
rationality than when one is not so exposed or so 
treated. 
What has been said here about honest questioning 
and rationality may be summarized in an analogy. 
Becoming rational may be compared to learning to run 
well. One learns to run well, if at all, by running. 
One becomes rational, if at all, by trying to be 
rational. But the image of the person learning to run 
is not the one that best represents the idea of the 
person becoming more rational, for running is, essen-
tially, a solitary activity, while rationality is, 
essentially, the skill of a social being. Perhaps a 
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better image for the person in process of becoming more 
rational is the image of the person learning to dance 
with partners, an image which brings the function of the 
honest questioner into clearer focus. Conceivably, one 
could learn how-to-dance-with-partners, even if one had 
no partner, by following directions shouted at one by a 
teacher standing on the sidelines, but how much better 
one would learn from the teacher who joined one on the 
floor, who taught one to dance with a partner by being a 
dancing partner. 
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1. Quite naturally teachers assume a discussion 
will be about the reading students have been asked to 
do. But too often what students have read is or 
pretends to be nothing but a compilation of information 
(as in textbooks), and as such, it is not discussible. 
Or, if the students have read what is discussible, it is 
too remote from their experience for them to be able to 
discuss it: they don't really know what it is about yet 
and may be able to do little more than disagree or agree 
with isolated points. A teacher who insists on trying 
to get students to talk about the book is, in many 
cases, going to be disappointed at the results. Few 
people can discuss what is very unfamiliar to them. Few 
have much of a feeling for the purposes of a discussion. 
In particular, few think of a discussion as an occa-
sion to try out one's ideas so that their shortcomings 
might become visible, or as an occasion on which ideas 
new to all participants might be germinated. If one 
seriously wishes to engage in discussion, it is sensible 
to try to find out what participants are prepared to 
talk about, in both senses of prepared. If participants 
do not have a problem, there is little to talk about. 
2. It may be that integrity of means and ends 
exists even though the teacher might not wish it. That 
is to say, a teacher who assigns a workbook to her 
students might not think of herself as teaching students 
how to do a workbook: that is not the end she has in 
view, but it may be exactly the end she achieves. To 
put it a bit enigmatically, the teacher is teaching 
exactly what she is teaching. There is indeed transfer 
of learning, and part of what gets transfered is a way 
of looking at the subject that was embedded in the 
medium in which it was presented. If the teacher wants 
to teach students to reason as well as how to reason, it 
will not do to have them memorize principles of 
reasoning. 
3. Questions along the lines of "why do you think 
that is so?" are ambiguous as they stand. They can be 
interpreted to be questions about the world or questions 
about the thinking process. I would like to propose, as 
a hypothesis to be tested, that students exposed 
throughout schooling to honest questioning might move 
from understanding questions of this sort as questions 
about the world to understanding them as questions about 
the thinking process, and would be more likely to do so 
than students not exposed to honest questioning. The 
students exposed to honest questioning would have 
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learned to be more reflective and aware of their own 
mental processes. Cf. Piaget's idea that we project our 
mental constructs, as of causality, for example, onto 
the world and think they exist out there. 
4. An individual mind may be thought of as a more 
or less organized world view. As a result of cognitive 
conflict this mind is brought into greater congruence 
with the 'public mind', that is, with the bet~er 
organized world view which is what we call public 
knowledge. 
5. See John Wild's interesting paper, "Plato's 
Theory of Techne a Phenomenological Interpretation." 
"Rhetoric may use cultural knowledge and command of 
language not for its proper end, the instruction of an 
audience, but rather for mere pleasure. Finally soph-
istry may devote considerable logical skill and 
information to produce the pleasing appearance of 
knowledge, a mere byproduct rather than knowledge 
itself, the real product. Such distortions find an 
apology in the doctrine of 'the relativity of ends,'" 
which doctrine, says Wild, is false. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research I (March, 1949). Reprinted in 
Readings in the Philosophy of Education, ed. Malcolm 
Carron and Alfred D. Cavanaugh (Detroit: University of 
Detroit, 1963), p. 134. 
6. There is a further point to be made about 
information, one far too complex to be explored in 
detail here and that is the question of what counts 
as information to a given person. Is any proposition, 
the truth or falsity of which may be ascertained, to be 
considered information? In an objective sense that may 
be so. But one may also ask whether it makes more sense 
to think of information as a proposition which can be 
understood in the light of what a person already knows. 
Must a person be in a state of ignorance rather than a 
state of nescience with regard to a given proposition if 
it is to count as information for him? D. W. Hamlyn 
makes a related point about information, although with a 
different end in mind, when he asks: "how can what is 
'given' constitute information if it does not already 
presuppose concepts? "Epistemology and Cognitive 
Development," in Co nitive Develo ment and E istemolo 
ed. Theodore Mischel New York: Academic Press, 1971 
p. 14. 
7. Mary I. Yeazel! studied a group of teachers 
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who were trying to teach philosophy to grade school 
students. She wished to learn whether teachers improved 
their own critical thinking abilities while trying to 
foster them in students. She concluded that "the data 
indicate that no significant change occurred in critical 
thinking skills, " "What Happens to Teachers Who 
Teach Philosophy to Children?" Thinking, The Journal of 
Philosophy for Children 2 (1981):88. 
8. It is precisely because the young cannot always 
be expected to see the reason or to accept the reason as 
their reason that it is so important that the young 
learn that adults are trustworthy. The young person who 
has learned to trust adults can trust that it is in his 
best interest to take a course, that it will help him to 
achieve his goals. He will trust that the demand that 
he take a given course is not an arbitrary obstacle in 
his path even if he cannot see how it fits. 
9. "Not only is the dogmatic person unable to 
learn effectively in conditions of novelty, he is also 
swayed in his judgments by the contradictory judgments 
of high-status persons • • The implications of 
conformity on the part of dogmatic persons were 
authenticated by Zagona and Zurcher (1964) in 
observational evidence, gleaned over four months of 
contact, to the effect that in small groups, dogmatic 
persons are leader oriented, unspontaneous, and prefer 
lectures to class discussion." Salvatore Maddi, 
Personality Theories • . p. 475. 
10. For discussions of the literature on the 
effects of teaching methods on student achievement see 
David C. Berliner and N. L. Gage "The Psychology of 
"Teaching Methods," The Psychology of Teaching Methods. 
Seventy-fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the 
Study of Education, pt. 1, ed. N. L. Gage (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1976), pp. 1-20. 
11. Compare Martin Buber, who tells us "all 
objective knowledge about a human being is knowledge 
about his past, of what he has been rather than of what 
he is. • Genuine listening does not know ahead of 
time what it will hear; in the full uniqueness of the 
present it listens to the speech of the other without 
filtering what it hears through the screen of its own 
prejudgments." Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Martin 
Buber," by Michael Wyschogrod. 
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12. James McClellan writes that efforts to reform 
education have never had much effect and that this fact 
"validates the contention that in most times and places 
schools exist to perpetuate a given social order rather 
than to educate men and women to the status of 
rationality." "Dewey and the Concept of Method • 
p. 218. 
II 
13. Different writers come to mind, making points 
related to the one I make although in different ways. 
Brian Crittenden has this (and more) to say about the 
inequality of the teacher student relationship: "It is 
suggested by S. I. Benn that 'the distinctive feature of 
rational persuasion is that it invites and responds to 
criticism'; it is 'therefore essentially a dialogue 
between equals'. If this account is taken literally, we 
must rule out the practical possibility of rational 
persuasion in education (at least a considerable part of 
it). For students are usually not equal to teachers, 
assuming that the latter are competent in relation to 
the subject matter and methods of argument. However, I 
think that Benn's description of optimal conditions for 
rational persuasion can, and should, be applied with 
some modification to the role of teacher." Education 
and Social Ideals, p. 117. 
Michael Oakeshott refers to the "conversation of 
mankind," which takes place in various modes, i.e. the 
various disciplines. He speaks of education as initi-
ation into that conversation. What one is learning in 
school is a set of different languages so that one may 
join in that conversation. Honest questioning is a way 
of conversing and a way of initiating persons into the 
ways of conversation. 
See also "The Psychology of Social Consciousness," 
George Herbert Mead, originally published in Science 31 
(1910):688-693, and reprinted as "Language as Thinking" 
in Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children 1 
(May, 1979):23-26. "Education. .is conversation--
belongs to a universe of discourse," Mead claims, in 
arguing for disciplined dialogue in the classroom. 
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